By ‘Grammatical Thomists,’ Murphy means those Thomists who to some extent have adopted the ‘linguistic turn’ in modern philosophy, primarily through their engagement with Wittgenstein. Thus her primary interlocutors are Thomists such as Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner. What I find especially interesting about this work, is that one of Murphy’s main concerns is to re-present the ‘five ways’ of Thomas Aquinas as full-blooded proofs. Of course, nowadays, arguments for the existence of God are not particularly in vogue, mainly because of theology’s attempts to avoid any suspicion of ‘foundationalism’ and also because (post)modern theology has for the most part, bought into Heidegger’s narrative of Western philosophy as one giant exercise in onto-theology.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
Monday, June 23, 2008
God Is Not A Story - Grammatical Thomists (Part 1)
By ‘Grammatical Thomists,’ Murphy means those Thomists who to some extent have adopted the ‘linguistic turn’ in modern philosophy, primarily through their engagement with Wittgenstein. Thus her primary interlocutors are Thomists such as Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner. What I find especially interesting about this work, is that one of Murphy’s main concerns is to re-present the ‘five ways’ of Thomas Aquinas as full-blooded proofs. Of course, nowadays, arguments for the existence of God are not particularly in vogue, mainly because of theology’s attempts to avoid any suspicion of ‘foundationalism’ and also because (post)modern theology has for the most part, bought into Heidegger’s narrative of Western philosophy as one giant exercise in onto-theology.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
God Is Not A Story
Scottish theologian Francesca Aran Murphy's new book, God is Not a Story continues the revival in interest in the work of Etienne Gilson that her biography of the great Thomist began. Her biography Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson is an excellent introduction to the life and work of the French scholar. In it she details the relationship between Gilson and his contemporaries such as Maritain and the indomitable Garrigou-Lagrange, providing insight into the debates that shaped French Catholic thought in the 20th Century and their philosophical, theological and political ramifications.
Her latest work is a critique of narrative theology. The book reads almost like an amplification of a section of the introduction to ‘Art and Intellect’ where she explains that “For those believers who have made a ghetto peace with nonbelief, revealed faith is without philosophical foundations. They give up the claim that revelation tells them what reality is like and say, ‘This is reality for me, a believer.’”
Murphy wants to get back to reality and in doing so she launches a critique of narrative theology, which she feels merely skims the surface and never really engages with the world of things as they are, favouring a coherence theory of truth and the claim that we all inhabit certain stories. Narrative theology is also characterized by an overemphasis on method in theology - what is deemed important is the ‘language game’ which the theological project represents and not whether reality and scripture correlate. In her book, Murphy focuses her critique on two principle targets: ‘story Barthians’ and ‘grammatical Thomists’. It is her second target that most interests me. I'll hopefully be blogging a bit about this in the coming weeks.
Her latest work is a critique of narrative theology. The book reads almost like an amplification of a section of the introduction to ‘Art and Intellect’ where she explains that “For those believers who have made a ghetto peace with nonbelief, revealed faith is without philosophical foundations. They give up the claim that revelation tells them what reality is like and say, ‘This is reality for me, a believer.’”
Murphy wants to get back to reality and in doing so she launches a critique of narrative theology, which she feels merely skims the surface and never really engages with the world of things as they are, favouring a coherence theory of truth and the claim that we all inhabit certain stories. Narrative theology is also characterized by an overemphasis on method in theology - what is deemed important is the ‘language game’ which the theological project represents and not whether reality and scripture correlate. In her book, Murphy focuses her critique on two principle targets: ‘story Barthians’ and ‘grammatical Thomists’. It is her second target that most interests me. I'll hopefully be blogging a bit about this in the coming weeks.
Friday, June 6, 2008
Say what you will about John Milbank...
...you can't say he's not interesting.
First of all there's this letter in response to this article.
It stirred up some discussion on the theological blog scene.
Personally, I'm of a somewhat 'Red Tory' persuasion myself, in that I'm not in favour of capitalism but I'm 'conservative' on most cultural and social issues. I found it a little odd that some people seemed to take his letter as a sort of lurch to the 'right' as if Milbank hadn't previously espoused views that were 'conservative'. The scare quotes around his use of 'the family' also struck me as rather strange: what exactly do people, including it seems some Christians, have against 'the family'? It is clear that Milbank is no leftist turning 'neo-conservative' as Hitchens did; if he's a Tory, then it's a Tory of the old school like Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and he makes it clear he still retains his (Christian) socialist allegiance.
It's also important to read the letter in the context of the article he's responding to. Thus his reference to "principled elites" is probably a reaction to the article's hysterical aversion to the Church having any influence in society whatsoever (we should all be guided by Science, you see).
Anyway, following on from this, there's a new interview with Milbank in The Other Journal (I was alerted to it on Inhabitatio Dei). The interview tackles the 'new atheism' (Dawkins, Hitchens and their ilk) and touches on other subjects such as sex and politics. He once again references 'Red Toryism' and argues that Christians need to start taking their Christianity into the political realm in a more self-conscious and explicit manner. I found this quote particularly amusing (no doubt it'll serve as further 'proof' that Milbank is a 'fascist' - a ridiculous claim):
We need now to celebrate instead the faithful legacy of peasants, learned, honourable and paternalist aristocrats, Christian warrior kings like Alfred the Great, yeomen farmers and scholars. Péguy is the man for the hour. William Cobbett also. Chesterton and Belloc likewise.
On a serious note, I would love for someone to present a practical blueprint for how this sort of political vision would work. It's all very well issuing these clarion calls, but what does it actually amount to in the context of British politics? Phillip Blond seems to think David Cameron is perhaps taking some steps towards this, but I don't think it goes anywhere near far enough (and I'm sure he'd agree). So how exactly is Red Toryism or Traditionalist Socialism meant to impact the political scene? And in what sort of changes would it manifest itself? Perhaps Blond's upcoming book on Red Toryism may go some way towards making this clearer.
First of all there's this letter in response to this article.
It stirred up some discussion on the theological blog scene.
Personally, I'm of a somewhat 'Red Tory' persuasion myself, in that I'm not in favour of capitalism but I'm 'conservative' on most cultural and social issues. I found it a little odd that some people seemed to take his letter as a sort of lurch to the 'right' as if Milbank hadn't previously espoused views that were 'conservative'. The scare quotes around his use of 'the family' also struck me as rather strange: what exactly do people, including it seems some Christians, have against 'the family'? It is clear that Milbank is no leftist turning 'neo-conservative' as Hitchens did; if he's a Tory, then it's a Tory of the old school like Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and he makes it clear he still retains his (Christian) socialist allegiance.
It's also important to read the letter in the context of the article he's responding to. Thus his reference to "principled elites" is probably a reaction to the article's hysterical aversion to the Church having any influence in society whatsoever (we should all be guided by Science, you see).
Anyway, following on from this, there's a new interview with Milbank in The Other Journal (I was alerted to it on Inhabitatio Dei). The interview tackles the 'new atheism' (Dawkins, Hitchens and their ilk) and touches on other subjects such as sex and politics. He once again references 'Red Toryism' and argues that Christians need to start taking their Christianity into the political realm in a more self-conscious and explicit manner. I found this quote particularly amusing (no doubt it'll serve as further 'proof' that Milbank is a 'fascist' - a ridiculous claim):
We need now to celebrate instead the faithful legacy of peasants, learned, honourable and paternalist aristocrats, Christian warrior kings like Alfred the Great, yeomen farmers and scholars. Péguy is the man for the hour. William Cobbett also. Chesterton and Belloc likewise.
On a serious note, I would love for someone to present a practical blueprint for how this sort of political vision would work. It's all very well issuing these clarion calls, but what does it actually amount to in the context of British politics? Phillip Blond seems to think David Cameron is perhaps taking some steps towards this, but I don't think it goes anywhere near far enough (and I'm sure he'd agree). So how exactly is Red Toryism or Traditionalist Socialism meant to impact the political scene? And in what sort of changes would it manifest itself? Perhaps Blond's upcoming book on Red Toryism may go some way towards making this clearer.
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