Say what you will about John Milbank...

...you can't say he's not interesting.

First of all there's this letter in response to this article.

It stirred up some discussion on the theological blog scene.

Personally, I'm of a somewhat 'Red Tory' persuasion myself, in that I'm not in favour of capitalism but I'm 'conservative' on most cultural and social issues. I found it a little odd that some people seemed to take his letter as a sort of lurch to the 'right' as if Milbank hadn't previously espoused views that were 'conservative'. The scare quotes around his use of 'the family' also struck me as rather strange: what exactly do people, including it seems some Christians, have against 'the family'? It is clear that Milbank is no leftist turning 'neo-conservative' as Hitchens did; if he's a Tory, then it's a Tory of the old school like Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and he makes it clear he still retains his (Christian) socialist allegiance.

It's also important to read the letter in the context of the article he's responding to. Thus his reference to "principled elites" is probably a reaction to the article's hysterical aversion to the Church having any influence in society whatsoever (we should all be guided by Science, you see).

Anyway, following on from this, there's a new interview with Milbank in The Other Journal (I was alerted to it on Inhabitatio Dei). The interview tackles the 'new atheism' (Dawkins, Hitchens and their ilk) and touches on other subjects such as sex and politics. He once again references 'Red Toryism' and argues that Christians need to start taking their Christianity into the political realm in a more self-conscious and explicit manner. I found this quote particularly amusing (no doubt it'll serve as further 'proof' that Milbank is a 'fascist' - a ridiculous claim):

We need now to celebrate instead the faithful legacy of peasants, learned, honourable and paternalist aristocrats, Christian warrior kings like Alfred the Great, yeomen farmers and scholars. Péguy is the man for the hour. William Cobbett also. Chesterton and Belloc likewise.

On a serious note, I would love for someone to present a practical blueprint for how this sort of political vision would work. It's all very well issuing these clarion calls, but what does it actually amount to in the context of British politics? Phillip Blond seems to think David Cameron is perhaps taking some steps towards this, but I don't think it goes anywhere near far enough (and I'm sure he'd agree). So how exactly is Red Toryism or Traditionalist Socialism meant to impact the political scene? And in what sort of changes would it manifest itself? Perhaps Blond's upcoming book on Red Toryism may go some way towards making this clearer.

Some thoughts on the Grandeur of Reason conference

The announcement of the Centre for Theology and Philosophy's upcoming conference on the 'Grandeur of Reason' has occasioned a fair amount of debate on some theology blogs.

First of all, the conference itself looks set to be spectacular with a line up of theologians and philosophers including the likes of John Milbank, David B. Hart, Fergus Kerr and Slavoij Zizek. The précis of the conference is said to have been taken from Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg Address wherein he calls for a renewal of the relationship between faith and reason, which avoids the extremes of a fideism wherein God's decrees are completely divorced from humanity's reasoning and a reason which seeks to insulate itself from God altogether.

As a Catholic, I cannot say I share the same concerns that appear to trouble some of the contributors to the debate. The idea that Radical Orthodoxy's position sits too comfortably with that of the current Papacy is not really something that displeases me. The trajectory that RO also seems to be taking towards a more 'universalised' reason (as Jamie Smith contends) is, again, something I would welcome.

It does, however, strike a strange chord in me to hear RO speaking in the sort of way that they do in the conference précis: "From this standpoint we hope to begin thinking through an authentic understanding of tolerance and ecumenism. Our task is thus to establish a path of honest intercultural communication in pursuit of universal truth, guided by the "grandeur" of reason, and unashamedly grounded in the cultural and historical tradition of Christianity."

One of my principle problems with Milbank (and to that extent with various other RO 'adherents') has been the relativistic position he has adopted regarding the claims of reason. Whilst I had no problem with the dismantling of the 'Enlightenment' pretension of a neutral reason operating devoid of all particularities, the notion that the claims of the Christian 'meta-narrative' could only be articulated rhetorically and its truths only adhered to through literary reasons of 'good taste', is simply not compatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. As I argued in my posts on Milbank's essay 'The End of Dialogue', his position does not allow for any real engagement with other traditions.

Of course, Milbank has always insisted that his position is not a fideistic one and indeed he criticises the likes of Barth on that score. The exact envisaging of the relationship between faith and reason has remained somewhat opaque. However, as Smith has noted, the 'later' Milbank is moving towards a position seemingly less extreme than that offered in Theology and Social Theory. I don't think he'd yet embrace the idea of 'natural reason' as Smith suggests or of 'natural law' but his comments on the subject have changed rather dramatically. In an article responding to various readings of TST he rejected Aidan Nicholls' criticisms of his treatment of 'common wisdom', 'natural law' and the like by dismissingly calling them all "yogic delights".

However, Smith sees in Milbank a 'universalizing' tendency which is almost rehabilitating a 'natural theology' tradition in a different guise. He sees this change most markedly in Being Reconciled. (Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, p.165)

I think Smith's qualms about this are a consequence of his Reformed background and the emphasis he wishes to place on the fallen nature of human reason. As D.B. Hart responded to Smith, despite not having placed enough emphasis on a common rationality in The Beauty of the Infinite, his project does not involve the sort of incommensurability thesis that Smith wants to hold on to. Perhaps a similar sort of thing is happening with Milbank who wants to emphasise that the continued giving of grace after the fall in effect 'nullifies' to an extent the idea that reason has fallen to such an extent that it simply cannot function in any 'universal' manner whatsoever. (Introducing, p. 165)

It might not be going too far to say that this conception of universality Milbank seems to be promoting isn't THAT far from the Rahner's anonymous Christianity! So instead of a 'secular reason' acting in a universal fashion because divorced from all religious particularities, there is a universal drive of human reason towards the grace showered upon all. I think this is possible because the differences between de Lubac and Rahner aren't as pronounced as commentators (including Milbank) would have one believe.

Eric Lee, for example, makes a similar point when he argues that it is the Universality of the Logos that allows for a certain commonality and possibility of genuine debate and engagement (as opposed, perhaps, to simply 'out-narrating' one's opponent). This, however, still leaves the question of to what extent the Logos must be explicitly referred to when talking in the public sphere. Would we constantly need to articulate the entire Christian meta-narrative when proclaiming our views? With this in mind I found a comment made by Milbank especially interesting.

In the book God's Advocates, where he features in one of the interviews, he describes just this dilemma: "let's think of the situation of the Church, especially the Roman Catholic Church today, when it tries to speak in the public realm about moral and political issues. The dilemma is: do you speak on the basis of a natural law that should be available to everybody, whether or not they're recognising God, in which case it's very doubtful whether you're talking about any kind of natural law that the Middle Ages could have recognised; or do you, on the other hand, say that our positions are grounded in our entire Catholic vision, and here the obvious risk is that people will ask why the should listen. But you might also say that that's the only possible alternative course because, in fact, what we say only makes sense in terms of our entire vision."

What he then goes on to say is interesting, not least because it is far removed from what the general perception of Milbank would have you think he'd say. (Again, I think this is partly due to Milbank's own rhetorical ploys). Speaking of the trajectory of de Lubac's theology he goes on to say that "that kind of perspective would say that, speaking in the Christian realm, we should latch onto things that aren't completely unchristian, or that to some extent remain residually Christian. People still talk about forgiveness, reconciliation and mercy, and the idea that each person matters as much as everyone else, in a way that pagans, on a whole, didn't. And therefore we don't need to speak within a completely natural law-based kind of discourse: we can get people to try to see more deeply the implications of what they already think. This includes getting them to recognise that their vision isn't completely cut off from something that in the end resembles a religious vision; but it also doesn't mean that one has to start by overwhelming them with one's entire Christian meta-narrative and ontology." The part in bold is particularly interesting as it is just such a thing many would associate Milbank with advocating!


In this paper, he also calls for a renewed Christian humanism, emphasising that traces of the divine can be found in cultures and religions other than Christianity, and that the doctrine of the incarnation serves as a validation of the "human as such". Thus Milbank seems to be moving away from the incommensurability thesis that seemed more apparent in TST. It is just such a move that I think distresses someone like Smith but in the same way that Hart stated that his theological project wasn't intended to suggest that there was no such thing as a common reason, I think Milbank perhaps also overemphasised this point and is now seeking to redress the balance somewhat.

Rhetorical posturing may have led to many thinking that RO almost advocated not listening to others (the 'twenty-four theses' are a prime example of this'). In practice this isn't really the case though. Take a look at Conor Cunningham's critique of evolution for example, barely any reference to theology at all – so clearly a constant harking back to theological positions is not necessary, and something like Neo-Darwinism can be critiqued on its own terms. With that in mind I wonder whether Milbank would modify his critique of Macintyre in TST? Interestingly, Smith also mentions in a footnote that the Milbank of Being Reconciled is far closer to the Macintyre he criticises in TST. (Introducing, p.181)

It was also especially intriguing to hear that Milbank had allegedly said that the problem with Islam is that it has no conception of the secular! Not sure if this could be verified but if so, then he's probably going a bit too far! That aspect of the conference (i.e. Islam) should also be fascinating although I wish I had more insight into what exactly the RO position regarding Islam (which again seems to be a bone of contention) is. The only clue I have is the articles by Adrian Pabst and Phillip Blond in the International Herald Tribune, but as regards Milbank his sparse comments on Islam have never struck me as overtly negative.

Hopefully, the conference will help elucidate these issues and provide greater insight into Milbank's views on the role of reason. I'm also particularly interested in what D.B. Hart might have to say and whether he'll build upon the reply he made to Smith's assessment of his work.

The Charge against Rahner (Part 1)

Rahner has been labelled a 'transcendental thomist'. His failed doctoral thesis on Thomas Aquinas (later published as Spirit in the World) read Thomas through the lens of the German idealist tradition. His account was inspired in part by earlier philosophers such as Maurice Blondel and Joseph Marechal. His basic philosophical presupposition is that all categorical knowledge is possible because of an openness to being itself as the horizon for this knowledge. Being here is taken to be God. For Rahner, humankind is ‘transcendental’ in that it searches for answers to the question of its own finitude – in the long run this answer can only be “the mystery of being” itself. This openness to being is prior to any categorical knowledge (since it is its presupposition). It can be described in a “nutshell” by saying that in recognising his finitude, man has an implicit knowledge of the infinite (God). It is on the basis of his early work in Spririt in the World that Rahner is seen to build the edifice of his theology. Rahner's position is held to be a form of the 'experiential-expressivist' approach to religion which George Lindbeck identifies. Thus he begins with the subject, conceived as existing within a noumenal realm divorced from the phenomenal world and thus ultimately transcending such factors as culture, language, and history (the Kantian inheritance). Indeed, Fergus Kerr, in his Theology after Wittgenstein, points to what he views as the basic Cartesian position that Rahner holds, presenting us with a self which has a "standpoint beyond his immersion in the bodily, the historical and the institutional."

John Milbank is another influential theologian who does not have much time for Rahner, believing that he was not as successful in overcoming the dichotomy between nature and grace that had developed in neo-scholasticism. In Theology and Social Theory, Milbank characterises Rahner's 'solution', in a self-confessed "crude" fashion as "naturalising the supernatural" whereas de Lubac "supernaturalised the natural". The distinction may seem slight to many, but according to Milbank it has disastrous consequences: no less than the relegation of religious faith to a private realm which allows the public and secular realm to continue its reign unabated. In fact it it this factor which undergirds Milbank's critique of Liberation Theology, which he sees as having followed Rahner's line. Rahner's solution to the nature/grace problematic retained the concept of a "pure nature" as a formal distinction in order to guarantee the gratuity of grace. For Milbank this entails an undermining of the rejection of extrinsicism despite Rahner's insistence that in concrete history this "pure nature" is nowhere to be found. The "Supernatural existential" which is a constitutive element in all human beings is already a gift of grace. The desire for the beatific vision is itself already grace, it is not a 'natural' aspect of human beings. But this "remainder concept" ensures the retention of a dual end for mankind, one supernatural, the other natural and the way towards secularisation remains open. Milbank acknowledges his debt to Balthasar's reading of Rahner: once again, it is Rahner's "transcendental" approach which is identified as the cause of the problems. The philosophical presuppositions Rahner is alleged to hold are responsible for the downplaying of the concrete in this theology, for "the encounter with grace is situated at the margins of every individual's knowing" and not in specific texts and images (as for de Lubac and Balthasar).J.B. Metz also shares these reservations about Rahner, arguing that his theology is too individualistic and too privatised to render a truly effective political theology possible.

The transcendental approach adopted by Rahner, therefore, trades on a Cartesio-Kantian understanding on the self, it fails to locate the site of God's revelation in concrete beings within history and is therefore prone to a relativisation of the specific revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the importance of the Church and so forth. It is also too individualistic, failing to truly ground humanity's inter-subjective nature, in a way that Balthasar's theology of the person does (e.g. his emphasis on the mother's smile as the awakening of the experience of love in the child etc).

As regards the question of other religions; the self is seen to share a common religious experience with the rest of humanity and the religions are seen to be expressions of this prior experience. Although Rahner would never have gone as far as someone such as John Hick in this direction, it may be asked whether Rahner's theory of the "anonymous Christian" does not already tend in that direction. It is the notion of the "anonymous Christian" which drew the most ire from Balthasar. I will explore the problems with the notion of "anonymous Christians" in my next post.

The Problem with Evolution

Over at Life's Paradox, Eric Lee has written about the problem with "creationism". I wholly concur with him and the fundamentalist obsession with the literal interpretation of Genesis is both a modern phenomenon and completely lacking an awareness of what precisely is essential to Christianity. The frequent wrangling over this issue does not serve the best interests of the Christian faith and can only lead to further rancour and also ridiculing of Christianity, given that many (even intelligent) people's knowledge of the Christian faith consists almost exclusively in the "creationist creed", which Eric helpfully sums up in the following pithy manner:

Jesus Christ — the Word made flesh — came into this world, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, rose again after three days so that we could all know that the world was created in six ‘literal’ days.

That said, I believe there is a conflict between evolutionary theory and Christianity and I'm not really sure that this conflict ought only to be attributed to the ultra-darwinistic versions. Of course, the interpretation of Genesis in literal terms misses the point and one can refer to St. Augustine ad nauseum to show that such literal interpretations were not even the standard back in his day.

Nevertheless, Christian critics of evolution have had more concerns with it than simply the damage it does to the idea of "special creation". The principle problem it presents is the challenge to the Christian idea of a God who is Love. Whilst "the problem of evil" is typically dealt with through recourse to the "free will" defence, the 'evil' which evolution seems to entail cannot be dealt with in a similar fashion. In presenting man as the product of a long line of evolution from lower to higher Darwin's work undermines the entire Christian drama of Creation, Fall and the need for Redemption. How does the Pauline notion of the entry of death into the world through sin fit into all this?

Given the evil that appears inherent when one considers "nature red in tooth and claw", how are we to explain that the Triune God chose such a route to arrive at mankind? It is of course good theology to hold that God providentially causes good to arise from evil, but it is absolutely prohibited to say that God brings about good explicitly through evil. I suppose it may be answered that attributing 'evil' to a 'natural' process such as evolution is simply to anthropomorphise the issue but I cannot view such a world with equanimity and declare that it is "very good". David B. Hart also points out in The Doors of the Sea that the New Testament does not really make any fine distinctions between 'moral' evil and 'natural' evil. The Fall cannot, however, be brought in as a way to explain this evil if the scientific consensus regarding evolution is accepted. I am thus becoming less and less inclined to accept any glib reconciliations between science and faith regarding evolution. But where does one go from here? Is the only possible route to become a fundamentalist creationist? They make be wrong over the question of Genesis, but they are surely right regarding the question of the intrustion of death into creation, it cannot have been providentially assigned by God and if it was, what kind of God are we dealing with here?

Interestingly, John Milbank remarks in a interview that:

I think one thing that I don’t say in Theology and Social Theory very clearly is that I definitely line up with the die-hards who think that death comes into the world after the fall. And I agree with the nut cases who say, “If you abandon that, you abandon Christianity.” In fact, if you abandon that, then Christianity becomes really a rather nasty sort of doctrine in some ways that is going to get into all sorts of peculiar theodicies and so forth.

But just how do sophisticated theologians like Hart and Milbank reconcile the notion that death is inextricably linked to sin with the idea of evolution? I suppose one way would be to adopt Karl Rahner's position that 'death' as understood in the New Testament and 'natural death' should be differentiated. That is to say, whilst before the fall death would have existed in any case but presumably as a peaceful transition into eternity, what we know associate with death - fear, anxiety, despair, meaninglessness - are consequences of sin. In fact, Milbank intimates this in his forewood to James K. A. Smith's Introduction to Radical Orthodoxy. But that still leaves us with the problem of evolution as a whole before the advent of man. I read somewhere that Conor Cunningham was writing a book on Evolution but I've not seen any sign of it and I'm not sure it would address these issues in any case.

To sum up, I think all-to-easy concilations between evolution and Christianity need to be scrutinized. Is it possible to reconcile the idea of an originally good creation with the waste and downright cruelty that forms an intrinsic part of the evolutionary process?

John Milbank and the Theology of Religions (3)

To conclude this mini-series I offer some thoughts and criticisms on Milbank's approach.

A major criticism of Milbank’s approach in general is that, despite his rhetoric about the possibility of harmonious difference, his assertion of theology (i.e. Christianity) as a master-discourse leaves little room for any other voices to co-exist. Milbank tells us that Christian theology has no need for any “external supplementation” to tell its story, but if this is the case, how can it be anything else than a totalizing discourse which obliterates all other narratives which ultimately have nothing to tell it?

Milbank, of course, firmly resists any notions that to regard Christianity as a master-discourse is to predispose one to act in a violent manner towards others. As we have seen he strongly emphasises the elements in Christianity which are completely opposed to such violence. However, it may well be questioned whether this is very convincing given the Church’s historical record.
His argument that the religions are absolutely incommensurable and that there exists no possibility of dialogue whatsoever can also be questioned. Is it really the case that the religions differ so vastly that no point of contact at all can be established from which some form of dialogue can ensue?
It is further claimed that Milbank’s construal of the other as the object of out-narration is unnecessary and that “the other may teach Christians to know and worship their own Trinitarian God more truthfully and richly.” (Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity)
A final criticism is that Milbank’s contention that the religions are incommensurable and that no dialogue can take places leads to a form of relativist fideism. Thus it can be seen that the principle objections to Milbank’s challenge are to do with the perceived ‘totalitarian’ character of his thesis which does not allow other narratives, including the religions, to adopt an even remotely positive position as regards the Christian meta-narrative.

Milbank’s challenge to theology of religions is clearly a provocative one. I believe, however, that he is right to assert the priority of mission and the task of conversion over any dialogical attempts to neuter the differences between the religions. In fact, I believe that here Milbank’s rhetoric can at times betray the possibility of conversation which Milbank himself acknowledges.

When Milbank proclaims the end of dialogue it is important that one realises that by this Milbank has in mind primarily the sort of ‘dialogue’ practiced by Pluralists that negates differences deemed to be merely external, in order to reach an underlying Truth shared by all the religions. Since this sort of dialogue is, ironically, profoundly disrespectful of the “otherness of the other” it is to be commended that Milbank denounces it so strongly. Nevertheless, Milbank’s blanket condemnation of ‘dialogue’ does not appear to me to be entirely necessary. Milbank himself states that each of the religions is a reading about Being or “what there is”. This in itself is a sort of ‘commonality’ which can open the way to ‘conversation’ (and Milbank states as much). Furthermore, Milbank does acknowledge the possibility of a joint stand on certain ethical issues (he cites usury) between the religions yet laments that this has not taken place. Milbank’s insistence that Christianity must simply “out-narrate” all other discourses does not mean that there can be nothing positive for the Christian to gain out of an encounter with other religions. In fact, he explicitly claims that in the process of encountering the other with the gospel, the Christian can expect to receive Christ time and again.

This, however, will take place in the context of the Christian’s explicit missionary mandate that must not be downplayed – the other can never simply be the object of dialogue for its own sake, the Christian must remember that the other too is called to enter the Church. It is precisely this sort of thinking that is often criticised by Pluralists, but it is hard to see how the Christian can theoretically adopt any other position without thereby ceasing to be a Christian. From a Christian perspective one also has to be prepared to accept that aspects of other religions may be detrimental to the human good. Thus Milbank’s argument that other religions do not contain the resources within themselves for concrete ethical action need not be all that alarming. If it is believed that Christianity is in fact the true story of God’s condescending love for humanity, and that the Church is the community in which this salvific love is actualised, it need not surprise one that from the perspective of the Church other traditions will be found wanting. As Milbank points out, the Church was firm in its insistence that extra ecclesiam nulla salus. (This need not be construed as meaning that the ultimate eschatological fate of non-Christians is perdition). G.K. Chesterton provides an example of this when he compares Christianity to Buddhism and argues that it is Christianity, not Buddhism, which offers an impetus towards moral action due to the utterly different ontological assumptions which characterise either religion. (G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy)

On the whole then, Milbank's position is a strong one and his critique of pluralist approaches to the theology of religions is to be commended. That said, I would argue that despite there being no 'neutral' vantage-point from which to survey the religions, a Macintyrean approach which fully acknowledges this yet still holds out the possibility of dialectically engaging other religious traditions is one which offers a more fruitful method with which to approach the issue.

John Milbank and the Theology of Religions (2)

Here is the continuation of the post from yesterday:

Milbank is again demonstrating his conviction that it is Christianity alone which can ultimately serve the cause of justice which pluralism conspicuously fails to do. His view of Christianity as the 'master discourse' is never more apparent. In answer to the criticisms of Western imperialism, Milbank answers that the notions of justice and the Good are themselves inextricably tied up with the West and that the East has no such concept of the Good available to it and so the Eastern religions cannot in fact provide the grounds for concrete ethical action. On the other hand, what Milbank calls the “Platonic-Jewish-Christian mode of social-intellectual imperialism” contains within itself directives to respect the “otherness of the other".

Again, Milbank’s thesis that Christian theology alone can allow for harmony between other discourses in a fundamental ontology of peace comes through here. This respect of the Other, however, has nothing to do with the liberal mode of dialogue which essentially respects the Other only as a mirror of oneself, instead of respecting precisely the otherness of the Other.

Finally Milbank tackles the theory of Raimundo Panikkar who attempts to posit an identity between the Trinitarian difference and neo-Vedantic difference. Milbank claims that, once again, such a project will only lead to the reinforcement of the ideology of liberal society’s pluralism. Milbank ends his essay with the claim that Christianity must continue the work of conversion and only in this context engage in conversation (not ‘dialogue’) between other religions which each represent readings of the nature of Being itself. This will not attempt to play down differences between religions but will respect the ‘otherness of the Other’ whilst at the same time continuing the work of conversion.

John Milbank and the Theology of Religions

As is probably to be expected given Milbank's views on Christianity as a 'master discourse' placing all other narratives, he does not have a very positive view on the so called 'theology of religions'. This can be seen through an analysis of his essay entitled 'The End of Dialogue'.

Milbank’s essay ‘The End of Dialogue’ appears in the collection Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered which was designed as a response to the volume The Myth of Christian Uniqueness. In this essay, Milbank takes issue with several of the contributors to Myth and their attempts to render possible a dialogue between different religions. Milbank is critical of the notion that ‘religion’ is a genus which all the different traditions belong to. This (Western) assumption assumes that all the different traditions share similar characteristics and so there can be dialogue between them. On the contrary, argues Milbank, different traditions have construed the world in radically different ways which are ultimately incommensurable.

He acknowledges that various of the contributors have abandoned any attempts to ground dialogue in foundational theoretical reason (which as we have seen Milbank considers an impossibility) and have instead looked to practical reason as a means out of the impasse. Milbank, however, rejects this grounding in praxis as equally mistaken. Praxis does not offer an objective starting point for dialogue but in fact is as inseparable as theoretical reason is, from the tradition in which it originates.

The religions themselves embody certain social projects (i.e. they are ‘political’) in a manner which does not allow for the neat separation of a political realm from an individual sphere of religious experience. Furthermore, even if the pluralists were right, and these two realms could be separated and a common action agreed upon this would do nothing to help mediate the differences between the religions themselves.

Thus with the rejection of theoretical reason as a supposed objective meeting place for the religions, Milbank is able to dismiss such pluralist theologians as John Hick who posits a noumenal realm of pure ‘religious experience’ which bypasses all the supposedly external trappings of religion. With his rejection of the praxis solution it is theologians such as Paul Knitter and Rosemary Radford Reuther who fall under the axe.

Milbank further criticises the pluralists because he believes that their position is in fact detrimental to the social justice agenda they are keen to push. This is a rather damning indictment. Milbank charges that the pluralists are doomed to failure for their notions of justice remain tied to a Western Liberal-capitalist framework. Hence, ‘dialogue’ is not really of any relevance to the poor for whom it is necessary to create the conditions where they can enter conversations no longer as the poor.

Milbank charges that Rosemary Radford Reuther’s use of liberal discourse in speaking of justice for the Third World questions whether she (and others like her) truly desire a post-liberal outcome. Furthermore, if it were accepted that all cultures (the term by which Milbank designates the religions) had equal access to the truth then there would be no place for any criticisms of certain practices which these religions embody. Once again Milbank’s claim that the Church must of necessity provide criticism of other readings of Being is apparent here. He does not, however, deny that this criticism is coming from a non-neutral and inherently ‘biased’ position.

I'll post some more on this topic tomorrow, hopefully.

Simplicity Itself: John Milbank's thesis in Theology and Social Theory

Fergus Kerr once remarked that John Milbank's argument in his magisterial Theology and Social Theory could be described as 'simplicity itself' (New Blackfriars 73 (1992)). This will be seen as an extremely odd claim for anyone who's attempted to slog through the 400 plus pages of a book densely packed with references to just about every important and even somewhat marginal figures in the history of Western thought. The general contours of his argument are not, however, difficult to grasp and I offer a brief summary of his thesis below which, if anyone ever comes across it, may be of some use as a very short introduction to John Milbank's theology.

Milbank’s aim in Theology and Social Theory is nothing less than to show how all social theory is in fact ‘heresy’, for it is parasitic upon theology. There is no such thing as an autonomous realm of the secular; as Milbank has it: “once there was no secular”. Milbank decries the “false modesty” of theology which has abandoned its position as the “queen of the sciences” and entered an unholy alliance with social theory. He calls for a complete overturn of this situation: theology must no longer allow itself to be positioned by other discourses.

If secular reason is itself a contingent narrative competing amongst others and not the unfolding of a universal and foundational reason there is no need for theology to prove itself before the tribunal of secular reason. There is no such fundamental account of society and history available and so theology itself must provide its own account. The ‘post-modern condition’ creates the space for Christian theology to reassert itself as a master-discourse. Milbank explains that if Christianity is persuasive then this because of the intrinsic persuasive power of the Christian Logos itself “not the apologetic mediation of a universal human reason.” The virtue of Christianity is that, in contrast to the narratives of modernity and post-modernity, it alone affirms an ontological priority of peace as opposed to an ‘original violence’: “theology, alone remains the discourse of non-mastery”.

Modernity and post-modernity ultimately end up in nihilism. Modernity’s pretensions are exposed as a genealogy of violence by Nietzsche and post-modernity abandons any attempts to ground the human telos in any notion of the good, leaving only an anarchic reality which can only be controlled by subjecting it to the will-to-power. Milbank tells us that the any attempts at a separation of the term ‘good’ from the term ‘God’ invariably lead to the positing of the priority of ‘right’ over the ‘good’ and the abandonment of any objective telos for human beings at all.

I was initially extremely attracted to Milbank's robust assertion of the claims of Christianity as master-discourse and in many ways I still feel he is right about a lot of things. However, it is clear that from a Roman Catholic perspective, Milbank's position cannot be adopted in its totality. He allows no room for any natural law or 'natural' knowledge of God - a position which is simply untenable in Roman Catholic theology. Of course it is tempting to jettison such concepts, especially in today's theological climate, but doing so would go against the grain of the entire Catholic tradition including Vatican I. Milbank (and Pickstock's) attempts to gain Thomas Aquinas for their project are thus rather strange in this context. The fact is Thomas did allow for a 'natural' knowledge of God (i.e. one which has no recourse to revelation) and despite Milbank and Pickstock's tendentious exegesis in Truth in Aquinas, I do not believe it is possible to claim Aquinas for their position.

Denys Turner's book Faith, Reason and the Existence of God is a strong defence of Aquinas' (and Vatican I's) claim that the existence of God can be known through the light of natural reason and he also offers a strong critique of Milbank's claims that Aquinas never meant for his "5 ways" to be taken as demonstrative proofs of God's existence. I hope to write something about this in the future.