To conclude this mini-series I offer some thoughts and criticisms on Milbank's approach.
A major criticism of Milbank’s approach in general is that, despite his rhetoric about the possibility of harmonious difference, his assertion of theology (i.e. Christianity) as a master-discourse leaves little room for any other voices to co-exist. Milbank tells us that Christian theology has no need for any “external supplementation” to tell its story, but if this is the case, how can it be anything else than a totalizing discourse which obliterates all other narratives which ultimately have nothing to tell it?
Milbank, of course, firmly resists any notions that to regard Christianity as a master-discourse is to predispose one to act in a violent manner towards others. As we have seen he strongly emphasises the elements in Christianity which are completely opposed to such violence. However, it may well be questioned whether this is very convincing given the Church’s historical record.
His argument that the religions are absolutely incommensurable and that there exists no possibility of dialogue whatsoever can also be questioned. Is it really the case that the religions differ so vastly that no point of contact at all can be established from which some form of dialogue can ensue?
It is further claimed that Milbank’s construal of the other as the object of out-narration is unnecessary and that “the other may teach Christians to know and worship their own Trinitarian God more truthfully and richly.” (Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity)
A final criticism is that Milbank’s contention that the religions are incommensurable and that no dialogue can take places leads to a form of relativist fideism. Thus it can be seen that the principle objections to Milbank’s challenge are to do with the perceived ‘totalitarian’ character of his thesis which does not allow other narratives, including the religions, to adopt an even remotely positive position as regards the Christian meta-narrative.
Milbank’s challenge to theology of religions is clearly a provocative one. I believe, however, that he is right to assert the priority of mission and the task of conversion over any dialogical attempts to neuter the differences between the religions. In fact, I believe that here Milbank’s rhetoric can at times betray the possibility of conversation which Milbank himself acknowledges.
When Milbank proclaims the end of dialogue it is important that one realises that by this Milbank has in mind primarily the sort of ‘dialogue’ practiced by Pluralists that negates differences deemed to be merely external, in order to reach an underlying Truth shared by all the religions. Since this sort of dialogue is, ironically, profoundly disrespectful of the “otherness of the other” it is to be commended that Milbank denounces it so strongly. Nevertheless, Milbank’s blanket condemnation of ‘dialogue’ does not appear to me to be entirely necessary. Milbank himself states that each of the religions is a reading about Being or “what there is”. This in itself is a sort of ‘commonality’ which can open the way to ‘conversation’ (and Milbank states as much). Furthermore, Milbank does acknowledge the possibility of a joint stand on certain ethical issues (he cites usury) between the religions yet laments that this has not taken place. Milbank’s insistence that Christianity must simply “out-narrate” all other discourses does not mean that there can be nothing positive for the Christian to gain out of an encounter with other religions. In fact, he explicitly claims that in the process of encountering the other with the gospel, the Christian can expect to receive Christ time and again.
This, however, will take place in the context of the Christian’s explicit missionary mandate that must not be downplayed – the other can never simply be the object of dialogue for its own sake, the Christian must remember that the other too is called to enter the Church. It is precisely this sort of thinking that is often criticised by Pluralists, but it is hard to see how the Christian can theoretically adopt any other position without thereby ceasing to be a Christian. From a Christian perspective one also has to be prepared to accept that aspects of other religions may be detrimental to the human good. Thus Milbank’s argument that other religions do not contain the resources within themselves for concrete ethical action need not be all that alarming. If it is believed that Christianity is in fact the true story of God’s condescending love for humanity, and that the Church is the community in which this salvific love is actualised, it need not surprise one that from the perspective of the Church other traditions will be found wanting. As Milbank points out, the Church was firm in its insistence that extra ecclesiam nulla salus. (This need not be construed as meaning that the ultimate eschatological fate of non-Christians is perdition). G.K. Chesterton provides an example of this when he compares Christianity to Buddhism and argues that it is Christianity, not Buddhism, which offers an impetus towards moral action due to the utterly different ontological assumptions which characterise either religion. (G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy)
On the whole then, Milbank's position is a strong one and his critique of pluralist approaches to the theology of religions is to be commended. That said, I would argue that despite there being no 'neutral' vantage-point from which to survey the religions, a Macintyrean approach which fully acknowledges this yet still holds out the possibility of dialectically engaging other religious traditions is one which offers a more fruitful method with which to approach the issue.