Showing posts with label Theology of religions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Theology of religions. Show all posts

Thursday, August 9, 2007

John Milbank and the Theology of Religions (3)

To conclude this mini-series I offer some thoughts and criticisms on Milbank's approach.


A major criticism of Milbank’s approach in general is that, despite his rhetoric about the possibility of harmonious difference, his assertion of theology (i.e. Christianity) as a master-discourse leaves little room for any other voices to co-exist. Milbank tells us that Christian theology has no need for any “external supplementation” to tell its story, but if this is the case, how can it be anything else than a totalizing discourse which obliterates all other narratives which ultimately have nothing to tell it?

Milbank, of course, firmly resists any notions that to regard Christianity as a master-discourse is to predispose one to act in a violent manner towards others. As we have seen he strongly emphasises the elements in Christianity which are completely opposed to such violence. However, it may well be questioned whether this is very convincing given the Church’s historical record.
His argument that the religions are absolutely incommensurable and that there exists no possibility of dialogue whatsoever can also be questioned. Is it really the case that the religions differ so vastly that no point of contact at all can be established from which some form of dialogue can ensue?
It is further claimed that Milbank’s construal of the other as the object of out-narration is unnecessary and that “the other may teach Christians to know and worship their own Trinitarian God more truthfully and richly.” (Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity)
A final criticism is that Milbank’s contention that the religions are incommensurable and that no dialogue can take places leads to a form of relativist fideism. Thus it can be seen that the principle objections to Milbank’s challenge are to do with the perceived ‘totalitarian’ character of his thesis which does not allow other narratives, including the religions, to adopt an even remotely positive position as regards the Christian meta-narrative.

Milbank’s challenge to theology of religions is clearly a provocative one. I believe, however, that he is right to assert the priority of mission and the task of conversion over any dialogical attempts to neuter the differences between the religions. In fact, I believe that here Milbank’s rhetoric can at times betray the possibility of conversation which Milbank himself acknowledges.

When Milbank proclaims the end of dialogue it is important that one realises that by this Milbank has in mind primarily the sort of ‘dialogue’ practiced by Pluralists that negates differences deemed to be merely external, in order to reach an underlying Truth shared by all the religions. Since this sort of dialogue is, ironically, profoundly disrespectful of the “otherness of the other” it is to be commended that Milbank denounces it so strongly. Nevertheless, Milbank’s blanket condemnation of ‘dialogue’ does not appear to me to be entirely necessary. Milbank himself states that each of the religions is a reading about Being or “what there is”. This in itself is a sort of ‘commonality’ which can open the way to ‘conversation’ (and Milbank states as much). Furthermore, Milbank does acknowledge the possibility of a joint stand on certain ethical issues (he cites usury) between the religions yet laments that this has not taken place. Milbank’s insistence that Christianity must simply “out-narrate” all other discourses does not mean that there can be nothing positive for the Christian to gain out of an encounter with other religions. In fact, he explicitly claims that in the process of encountering the other with the gospel, the Christian can expect to receive Christ time and again.

This, however, will take place in the context of the Christian’s explicit missionary mandate that must not be downplayed – the other can never simply be the object of dialogue for its own sake, the Christian must remember that the other too is called to enter the Church. It is precisely this sort of thinking that is often criticised by Pluralists, but it is hard to see how the Christian can theoretically adopt any other position without thereby ceasing to be a Christian. From a Christian perspective one also has to be prepared to accept that aspects of other religions may be detrimental to the human good. Thus Milbank’s argument that other religions do not contain the resources within themselves for concrete ethical action need not be all that alarming. If it is believed that Christianity is in fact the true story of God’s condescending love for humanity, and that the Church is the community in which this salvific love is actualised, it need not surprise one that from the perspective of the Church other traditions will be found wanting. As Milbank points out, the Church was firm in its insistence that extra ecclesiam nulla salus. (This need not be construed as meaning that the ultimate eschatological fate of non-Christians is perdition). G.K. Chesterton provides an example of this when he compares Christianity to Buddhism and argues that it is Christianity, not Buddhism, which offers an impetus towards moral action due to the utterly different ontological assumptions which characterise either religion. (G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy)

On the whole then, Milbank's position is a strong one and his critique of pluralist approaches to the theology of religions is to be commended. That said, I would argue that despite there being no 'neutral' vantage-point from which to survey the religions, a Macintyrean approach which fully acknowledges this yet still holds out the possibility of dialectically engaging other religious traditions is one which offers a more fruitful method with which to approach the issue.

Wednesday, August 8, 2007

John Milbank and the Theology of Religions (2)

Here is the continuation of the post from yesterday:

Milbank is again demonstrating his conviction that it is Christianity alone which can ultimately serve the cause of justice which pluralism conspicuously fails to do. His view of Christianity as the 'master discourse' is never more apparent. In answer to the criticisms of Western imperialism, Milbank answers that the notions of justice and the Good are themselves inextricably tied up with the West and that the East has no such concept of the Good available to it and so the Eastern religions cannot in fact provide the grounds for concrete ethical action. On the other hand, what Milbank calls the “Platonic-Jewish-Christian mode of social-intellectual imperialism” contains within itself directives to respect the “otherness of the other".

Again, Milbank’s thesis that Christian theology alone can allow for harmony between other discourses in a fundamental ontology of peace comes through here. This respect of the Other, however, has nothing to do with the liberal mode of dialogue which essentially respects the Other only as a mirror of oneself, instead of respecting precisely the otherness of the Other.

Finally Milbank tackles the theory of Raimundo Panikkar who attempts to posit an identity between the Trinitarian difference and neo-Vedantic difference. Milbank claims that, once again, such a project will only lead to the reinforcement of the ideology of liberal society’s pluralism. Milbank ends his essay with the claim that Christianity must continue the work of conversion and only in this context engage in conversation (not ‘dialogue’) between other religions which each represent readings of the nature of Being itself. This will not attempt to play down differences between religions but will respect the ‘otherness of the Other’ whilst at the same time continuing the work of conversion.

Tuesday, August 7, 2007

John Milbank and the Theology of Religions

As is probably to be expected given Milbank's views on Christianity as a 'master discourse' placing all other narratives, he does not have a very positive view on the so called 'theology of religions'. This can be seen through an analysis of his essay entitled 'The End of Dialogue'.

Milbank’s essay ‘The End of Dialogue’ appears in the collection Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered which was designed as a response to the volume The Myth of Christian Uniqueness. In this essay, Milbank takes issue with several of the contributors to Myth and their attempts to render possible a dialogue between different religions. Milbank is critical of the notion that ‘religion’ is a genus which all the different traditions belong to. This (Western) assumption assumes that all the different traditions share similar characteristics and so there can be dialogue between them. On the contrary, argues Milbank, different traditions have construed the world in radically different ways which are ultimately incommensurable.

He acknowledges that various of the contributors have abandoned any attempts to ground dialogue in foundational theoretical reason (which as we have seen Milbank considers an impossibility) and have instead looked to practical reason as a means out of the impasse. Milbank, however, rejects this grounding in praxis as equally mistaken. Praxis does not offer an objective starting point for dialogue but in fact is as inseparable as theoretical reason is, from the tradition in which it originates.

The religions themselves embody certain social projects (i.e. they are ‘political’) in a manner which does not allow for the neat separation of a political realm from an individual sphere of religious experience. Furthermore, even if the pluralists were right, and these two realms could be separated and a common action agreed upon this would do nothing to help mediate the differences between the religions themselves.

Thus with the rejection of theoretical reason as a supposed objective meeting place for the religions, Milbank is able to dismiss such pluralist theologians as John Hick who posits a noumenal realm of pure ‘religious experience’ which bypasses all the supposedly external trappings of religion. With his rejection of the praxis solution it is theologians such as Paul Knitter and Rosemary Radford Reuther who fall under the axe.

Milbank further criticises the pluralists because he believes that their position is in fact detrimental to the social justice agenda they are keen to push. This is a rather damning indictment. Milbank charges that the pluralists are doomed to failure for their notions of justice remain tied to a Western Liberal-capitalist framework. Hence, ‘dialogue’ is not really of any relevance to the poor for whom it is necessary to create the conditions where they can enter conversations no longer as the poor.

Milbank charges that Rosemary Radford Reuther’s use of liberal discourse in speaking of justice for the Third World questions whether she (and others like her) truly desire a post-liberal outcome. Furthermore, if it were accepted that all cultures (the term by which Milbank designates the religions) had equal access to the truth then there would be no place for any criticisms of certain practices which these religions embody. Once again Milbank’s claim that the Church must of necessity provide criticism of other readings of Being is apparent here. He does not, however, deny that this criticism is coming from a non-neutral and inherently ‘biased’ position.

I'll post some more on this topic tomorrow, hopefully.