Over at Life's Paradox, Eric Lee has written about the problem with "creationism". I wholly concur with him and the fundamentalist obsession with the literal interpretation of Genesis is both a modern phenomenon and completely lacking an awareness of what precisely is essential to Christianity. The frequent wrangling over this issue does not serve the best interests of the Christian faith and can only lead to further rancour and also ridiculing of Christianity, given that many (even intelligent) people's knowledge of the Christian faith consists almost exclusively in the "creationist creed", which Eric helpfully sums up in the following pithy manner:
Jesus Christ — the Word made flesh — came into this world, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, rose again after three days so that we could all know that the world was created in six ‘literal’ days.
That said, I believe there is a conflict between evolutionary theory and Christianity and I'm not really sure that this conflict ought only to be attributed to the ultra-darwinistic versions. Of course, the interpretation of Genesis in literal terms misses the point and one can refer to St. Augustine ad nauseum to show that such literal interpretations were not even the standard back in his day.
Nevertheless, Christian critics of evolution have had more concerns with it than simply the damage it does to the idea of "special creation". The principle problem it presents is the challenge to the Christian idea of a God who is Love. Whilst "the problem of evil" is typically dealt with through recourse to the "free will" defence, the 'evil' which evolution seems to entail cannot be dealt with in a similar fashion. In presenting man as the product of a long line of evolution from lower to higher Darwin's work undermines the entire Christian drama of Creation, Fall and the need for Redemption. How does the Pauline notion of the entry of death into the world through sin fit into all this?
Given the evil that appears inherent when one considers "nature red in tooth and claw", how are we to explain that the Triune God chose such a route to arrive at mankind? It is of course good theology to hold that God providentially causes good to arise from evil, but it is absolutely prohibited to say that God brings about good explicitly through evil. I suppose it may be answered that attributing 'evil' to a 'natural' process such as evolution is simply to anthropomorphise the issue but I cannot view such a world with equanimity and declare that it is "very good". David B. Hart also points out in The Doors of the Sea that the New Testament does not really make any fine distinctions between 'moral' evil and 'natural' evil. The Fall cannot, however, be brought in as a way to explain this evil if the scientific consensus regarding evolution is accepted. I am thus becoming less and less inclined to accept any glib reconciliations between science and faith regarding evolution. But where does one go from here? Is the only possible route to become a fundamentalist creationist? They make be wrong over the question of Genesis, but they are surely right regarding the question of the intrustion of death into creation, it cannot have been providentially assigned by God and if it was, what kind of God are we dealing with here?
Interestingly, John Milbank remarks in a interview that:
I think one thing that I don’t say in Theology and Social Theory very clearly is that I definitely line up with the die-hards who think that death comes into the world after the fall. And I agree with the nut cases who say, “If you abandon that, you abandon Christianity.” In fact, if you abandon that, then Christianity becomes really a rather nasty sort of doctrine in some ways that is going to get into all sorts of peculiar theodicies and so forth.
But just how do sophisticated theologians like Hart and Milbank reconcile the notion that death is inextricably linked to sin with the idea of evolution? I suppose one way would be to adopt Karl Rahner's position that 'death' as understood in the New Testament and 'natural death' should be differentiated. That is to say, whilst before the fall death would have existed in any case but presumably as a peaceful transition into eternity, what we know associate with death - fear, anxiety, despair, meaninglessness - are consequences of sin. In fact, Milbank intimates this in his forewood to James K. A. Smith's Introduction to Radical Orthodoxy. But that still leaves us with the problem of evolution as a whole before the advent of man. I read somewhere that Conor Cunningham was writing a book on Evolution but I've not seen any sign of it and I'm not sure it would address these issues in any case.
To sum up, I think all-to-easy concilations between evolution and Christianity need to be scrutinized. Is it possible to reconcile the idea of an originally good creation with the waste and downright cruelty that forms an intrinsic part of the evolutionary process?
Showing posts with label David Bentley Hart. Show all posts
Showing posts with label David Bentley Hart. Show all posts
Sunday, September 2, 2007
The Problem with Evolution
Over at Life's Paradox, Eric Lee has written about the problem with "creationism". I wholly concur with him and the fundamentalist obsession with the literal interpretation of Genesis is both a modern phenomenon and completely lacking an awareness of what precisely is essential to Christianity. The frequent wrangling over this issue does not serve the best interests of the Christian faith and can only lead to further rancour and also ridiculing of Christianity, given that many (even intelligent) people's knowledge of the Christian faith consists almost exclusively in the "creationist creed", which Eric helpfully sums up in the following pithy manner:
Jesus Christ — the Word made flesh — came into this world, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, rose again after three days so that we could all know that the world was created in six ‘literal’ days.
That said, I believe there is a conflict between evolutionary theory and Christianity and I'm not really sure that this conflict ought only to be attributed to the ultra-darwinistic versions. Of course, the interpretation of Genesis in literal terms misses the point and one can refer to St. Augustine ad nauseum to show that such literal interpretations were not even the standard back in his day.
Nevertheless, Christian critics of evolution have had more concerns with it than simply the damage it does to the idea of "special creation". The principle problem it presents is the challenge to the Christian idea of a God who is Love. Whilst "the problem of evil" is typically dealt with through recourse to the "free will" defence, the 'evil' which evolution seems to entail cannot be dealt with in a similar fashion. In presenting man as the product of a long line of evolution from lower to higher Darwin's work undermines the entire Christian drama of Creation, Fall and the need for Redemption. How does the Pauline notion of the entry of death into the world through sin fit into all this?
Given the evil that appears inherent when one considers "nature red in tooth and claw", how are we to explain that the Triune God chose such a route to arrive at mankind? It is of course good theology to hold that God providentially causes good to arise from evil, but it is absolutely prohibited to say that God brings about good explicitly through evil. I suppose it may be answered that attributing 'evil' to a 'natural' process such as evolution is simply to anthropomorphise the issue but I cannot view such a world with equanimity and declare that it is "very good". David B. Hart also points out in The Doors of the Sea that the New Testament does not really make any fine distinctions between 'moral' evil and 'natural' evil. The Fall cannot, however, be brought in as a way to explain this evil if the scientific consensus regarding evolution is accepted. I am thus becoming less and less inclined to accept any glib reconciliations between science and faith regarding evolution. But where does one go from here? Is the only possible route to become a fundamentalist creationist? They make be wrong over the question of Genesis, but they are surely right regarding the question of the intrustion of death into creation, it cannot have been providentially assigned by God and if it was, what kind of God are we dealing with here?
Interestingly, John Milbank remarks in a interview that:
I think one thing that I don’t say in Theology and Social Theory very clearly is that I definitely line up with the die-hards who think that death comes into the world after the fall. And I agree with the nut cases who say, “If you abandon that, you abandon Christianity.” In fact, if you abandon that, then Christianity becomes really a rather nasty sort of doctrine in some ways that is going to get into all sorts of peculiar theodicies and so forth.
But just how do sophisticated theologians like Hart and Milbank reconcile the notion that death is inextricably linked to sin with the idea of evolution? I suppose one way would be to adopt Karl Rahner's position that 'death' as understood in the New Testament and 'natural death' should be differentiated. That is to say, whilst before the fall death would have existed in any case but presumably as a peaceful transition into eternity, what we know associate with death - fear, anxiety, despair, meaninglessness - are consequences of sin. In fact, Milbank intimates this in his forewood to James K. A. Smith's Introduction to Radical Orthodoxy. But that still leaves us with the problem of evolution as a whole before the advent of man. I read somewhere that Conor Cunningham was writing a book on Evolution but I've not seen any sign of it and I'm not sure it would address these issues in any case.
To sum up, I think all-to-easy concilations between evolution and Christianity need to be scrutinized. Is it possible to reconcile the idea of an originally good creation with the waste and downright cruelty that forms an intrinsic part of the evolutionary process?
Jesus Christ — the Word made flesh — came into this world, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, rose again after three days so that we could all know that the world was created in six ‘literal’ days.
That said, I believe there is a conflict between evolutionary theory and Christianity and I'm not really sure that this conflict ought only to be attributed to the ultra-darwinistic versions. Of course, the interpretation of Genesis in literal terms misses the point and one can refer to St. Augustine ad nauseum to show that such literal interpretations were not even the standard back in his day.
Nevertheless, Christian critics of evolution have had more concerns with it than simply the damage it does to the idea of "special creation". The principle problem it presents is the challenge to the Christian idea of a God who is Love. Whilst "the problem of evil" is typically dealt with through recourse to the "free will" defence, the 'evil' which evolution seems to entail cannot be dealt with in a similar fashion. In presenting man as the product of a long line of evolution from lower to higher Darwin's work undermines the entire Christian drama of Creation, Fall and the need for Redemption. How does the Pauline notion of the entry of death into the world through sin fit into all this?
Given the evil that appears inherent when one considers "nature red in tooth and claw", how are we to explain that the Triune God chose such a route to arrive at mankind? It is of course good theology to hold that God providentially causes good to arise from evil, but it is absolutely prohibited to say that God brings about good explicitly through evil. I suppose it may be answered that attributing 'evil' to a 'natural' process such as evolution is simply to anthropomorphise the issue but I cannot view such a world with equanimity and declare that it is "very good". David B. Hart also points out in The Doors of the Sea that the New Testament does not really make any fine distinctions between 'moral' evil and 'natural' evil. The Fall cannot, however, be brought in as a way to explain this evil if the scientific consensus regarding evolution is accepted. I am thus becoming less and less inclined to accept any glib reconciliations between science and faith regarding evolution. But where does one go from here? Is the only possible route to become a fundamentalist creationist? They make be wrong over the question of Genesis, but they are surely right regarding the question of the intrustion of death into creation, it cannot have been providentially assigned by God and if it was, what kind of God are we dealing with here?
Interestingly, John Milbank remarks in a interview that:
I think one thing that I don’t say in Theology and Social Theory very clearly is that I definitely line up with the die-hards who think that death comes into the world after the fall. And I agree with the nut cases who say, “If you abandon that, you abandon Christianity.” In fact, if you abandon that, then Christianity becomes really a rather nasty sort of doctrine in some ways that is going to get into all sorts of peculiar theodicies and so forth.
But just how do sophisticated theologians like Hart and Milbank reconcile the notion that death is inextricably linked to sin with the idea of evolution? I suppose one way would be to adopt Karl Rahner's position that 'death' as understood in the New Testament and 'natural death' should be differentiated. That is to say, whilst before the fall death would have existed in any case but presumably as a peaceful transition into eternity, what we know associate with death - fear, anxiety, despair, meaninglessness - are consequences of sin. In fact, Milbank intimates this in his forewood to James K. A. Smith's Introduction to Radical Orthodoxy. But that still leaves us with the problem of evolution as a whole before the advent of man. I read somewhere that Conor Cunningham was writing a book on Evolution but I've not seen any sign of it and I'm not sure it would address these issues in any case.
To sum up, I think all-to-easy concilations between evolution and Christianity need to be scrutinized. Is it possible to reconcile the idea of an originally good creation with the waste and downright cruelty that forms an intrinsic part of the evolutionary process?
Thursday, August 30, 2007
D.B. Hart on Reason
I have not yet read David Bentley Hart’s The Beauty of the Infinite, though I have read his small book on theodicy and various articles of his, many of which can be accessed for free on www.firstthings.com. I find him to be an exhilarating writer and am often carried away by the beauty of his prose. Until now, however, I had the same concerns over his theological orientation as I have over Milbanks’. I was therefore extremely pleased to see him address these outright in the latest issue of New Blackfriars.
He responds to three evaluations of his work and it is his response to James K. A. Smith that I was most interested in. He contends that Smith has misread his intentions in The Beauty of the Infinite, and aligned him far too much with ‘Yale School’ tendencies which he had expressed dissatisfaction with but had perhaps not sufficiently distinguished his position from. Thus he flat out asserts that:
In my haste to dismiss the Enlightenment myth of a "pure reason," neutrally available to every reflective mind, undetermined by the particularities of language or culture, I seem not to have made it sufficiently clear that I was by no means calling into question the power of natural reason to discern many truths, to clarify its understanding of those truths, and to inform and receive nourishment from reasoned debate and reflection.
I have to say that this was music to my ears, coming as I do from a Roman Catholic perspective. I fully agree that there is no such thing as a “pure reason” but it seems to me that the rejection of this should not entail a rejection of the possibility of the human mind ‘naturally’ attaining truth. I think it’s all the more important for Catholics to remember that this is not a negotiable aspect of their faith.
Hart continues in the same vein when speaking of God‘s revelation:
He reveals himself in nature, in human reason, in human culture, in human religions: always now through a veil of sin and death, perhaps, but never unavailingly.
Hart, however, does not overstate the role of reason and his view of the analogia entis remains firmly within that established in 1215 by the Fourth Lateran Council wherein it was stated that:
For between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them.
This was the view followed by Przywara and, following him, Balthasar.
Thus Hart remarks (perhaps rhetorically overstating the case in my view) that:
Still, all that said, I grant that we are talking about a very great difference of degree indeed—as great, perhaps, as the difference between the self-love of the suicide and the self-love of the saint (who loves himself wholly and only in God).
On a separate note, I must say that I was also very pleased when Hart, in the best tradition of 1 Cor 15:14, called himself an “unregenerate primitive” regarding the resurrection, unequivocally asserting that the resurrection only makes sense if it is understood as a literally historical event occurring after the crucifixion. I am of the same opinion and must confess myself completely befuddled as to what some theologians are really saying when it comes to the resurrection (Rahner in The Foundations of Christian Faith springs to mind). I often find myself exasperated at such equivocations and just want them to say outright whether they believe the resurrection really occurred in history.
He responds to three evaluations of his work and it is his response to James K. A. Smith that I was most interested in. He contends that Smith has misread his intentions in The Beauty of the Infinite, and aligned him far too much with ‘Yale School’ tendencies which he had expressed dissatisfaction with but had perhaps not sufficiently distinguished his position from. Thus he flat out asserts that:
In my haste to dismiss the Enlightenment myth of a "pure reason," neutrally available to every reflective mind, undetermined by the particularities of language or culture, I seem not to have made it sufficiently clear that I was by no means calling into question the power of natural reason to discern many truths, to clarify its understanding of those truths, and to inform and receive nourishment from reasoned debate and reflection.
I have to say that this was music to my ears, coming as I do from a Roman Catholic perspective. I fully agree that there is no such thing as a “pure reason” but it seems to me that the rejection of this should not entail a rejection of the possibility of the human mind ‘naturally’ attaining truth. I think it’s all the more important for Catholics to remember that this is not a negotiable aspect of their faith.
Hart continues in the same vein when speaking of God‘s revelation:
He reveals himself in nature, in human reason, in human culture, in human religions: always now through a veil of sin and death, perhaps, but never unavailingly.
Hart, however, does not overstate the role of reason and his view of the analogia entis remains firmly within that established in 1215 by the Fourth Lateran Council wherein it was stated that:
For between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them.
This was the view followed by Przywara and, following him, Balthasar.
Thus Hart remarks (perhaps rhetorically overstating the case in my view) that:
Still, all that said, I grant that we are talking about a very great difference of degree indeed—as great, perhaps, as the difference between the self-love of the suicide and the self-love of the saint (who loves himself wholly and only in God).
On a separate note, I must say that I was also very pleased when Hart, in the best tradition of 1 Cor 15:14, called himself an “unregenerate primitive” regarding the resurrection, unequivocally asserting that the resurrection only makes sense if it is understood as a literally historical event occurring after the crucifixion. I am of the same opinion and must confess myself completely befuddled as to what some theologians are really saying when it comes to the resurrection (Rahner in The Foundations of Christian Faith springs to mind). I often find myself exasperated at such equivocations and just want them to say outright whether they believe the resurrection really occurred in history.
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