I've moved the blog over to wordpress. If any of you who have linked to my blog on your sites could update the url it would be greatly appreciated.
This page should redirect to the new one at http://ipsumesse.wordpress.com in 5 seconds or so, if I haven't botched it.
Thanks
Monday, July 7, 2008
Moving to Wordpress
I've moved the blog over to wordpress. If any of you who have linked to my blog on your sites could update the url it would be greatly appreciated.
This page should redirect to the new one at http://ipsumesse.wordpress.com in 5 seconds or so, if I haven't botched it.
Thanks
This page should redirect to the new one at http://ipsumesse.wordpress.com in 5 seconds or so, if I haven't botched it.
Thanks
Monday, June 23, 2008
God Is Not A Story - Grammatical Thomists (Part 1)
By ‘Grammatical Thomists,’ Murphy means those Thomists who to some extent have adopted the ‘linguistic turn’ in modern philosophy, primarily through their engagement with Wittgenstein. Thus her primary interlocutors are Thomists such as Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner. What I find especially interesting about this work, is that one of Murphy’s main concerns is to re-present the ‘five ways’ of Thomas Aquinas as full-blooded proofs. Of course, nowadays, arguments for the existence of God are not particularly in vogue, mainly because of theology’s attempts to avoid any suspicion of ‘foundationalism’ and also because (post)modern theology has for the most part, bought into Heidegger’s narrative of Western philosophy as one giant exercise in onto-theology.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
God Is Not A Story
Scottish theologian Francesca Aran Murphy's new book, God is Not a Story continues the revival in interest in the work of Etienne Gilson that her biography of the great Thomist began. Her biography Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson is an excellent introduction to the life and work of the French scholar. In it she details the relationship between Gilson and his contemporaries such as Maritain and the indomitable Garrigou-Lagrange, providing insight into the debates that shaped French Catholic thought in the 20th Century and their philosophical, theological and political ramifications.
Her latest work is a critique of narrative theology. The book reads almost like an amplification of a section of the introduction to ‘Art and Intellect’ where she explains that “For those believers who have made a ghetto peace with nonbelief, revealed faith is without philosophical foundations. They give up the claim that revelation tells them what reality is like and say, ‘This is reality for me, a believer.’”
Murphy wants to get back to reality and in doing so she launches a critique of narrative theology, which she feels merely skims the surface and never really engages with the world of things as they are, favouring a coherence theory of truth and the claim that we all inhabit certain stories. Narrative theology is also characterized by an overemphasis on method in theology - what is deemed important is the ‘language game’ which the theological project represents and not whether reality and scripture correlate. In her book, Murphy focuses her critique on two principle targets: ‘story Barthians’ and ‘grammatical Thomists’. It is her second target that most interests me. I'll hopefully be blogging a bit about this in the coming weeks.
Her latest work is a critique of narrative theology. The book reads almost like an amplification of a section of the introduction to ‘Art and Intellect’ where she explains that “For those believers who have made a ghetto peace with nonbelief, revealed faith is without philosophical foundations. They give up the claim that revelation tells them what reality is like and say, ‘This is reality for me, a believer.’”
Murphy wants to get back to reality and in doing so she launches a critique of narrative theology, which she feels merely skims the surface and never really engages with the world of things as they are, favouring a coherence theory of truth and the claim that we all inhabit certain stories. Narrative theology is also characterized by an overemphasis on method in theology - what is deemed important is the ‘language game’ which the theological project represents and not whether reality and scripture correlate. In her book, Murphy focuses her critique on two principle targets: ‘story Barthians’ and ‘grammatical Thomists’. It is her second target that most interests me. I'll hopefully be blogging a bit about this in the coming weeks.
Friday, June 6, 2008
Say what you will about John Milbank...
...you can't say he's not interesting.
First of all there's this letter in response to this article.
It stirred up some discussion on the theological blog scene.
Personally, I'm of a somewhat 'Red Tory' persuasion myself, in that I'm not in favour of capitalism but I'm 'conservative' on most cultural and social issues. I found it a little odd that some people seemed to take his letter as a sort of lurch to the 'right' as if Milbank hadn't previously espoused views that were 'conservative'. The scare quotes around his use of 'the family' also struck me as rather strange: what exactly do people, including it seems some Christians, have against 'the family'? It is clear that Milbank is no leftist turning 'neo-conservative' as Hitchens did; if he's a Tory, then it's a Tory of the old school like Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and he makes it clear he still retains his (Christian) socialist allegiance.
It's also important to read the letter in the context of the article he's responding to. Thus his reference to "principled elites" is probably a reaction to the article's hysterical aversion to the Church having any influence in society whatsoever (we should all be guided by Science, you see).
Anyway, following on from this, there's a new interview with Milbank in The Other Journal (I was alerted to it on Inhabitatio Dei). The interview tackles the 'new atheism' (Dawkins, Hitchens and their ilk) and touches on other subjects such as sex and politics. He once again references 'Red Toryism' and argues that Christians need to start taking their Christianity into the political realm in a more self-conscious and explicit manner. I found this quote particularly amusing (no doubt it'll serve as further 'proof' that Milbank is a 'fascist' - a ridiculous claim):
We need now to celebrate instead the faithful legacy of peasants, learned, honourable and paternalist aristocrats, Christian warrior kings like Alfred the Great, yeomen farmers and scholars. Péguy is the man for the hour. William Cobbett also. Chesterton and Belloc likewise.
On a serious note, I would love for someone to present a practical blueprint for how this sort of political vision would work. It's all very well issuing these clarion calls, but what does it actually amount to in the context of British politics? Phillip Blond seems to think David Cameron is perhaps taking some steps towards this, but I don't think it goes anywhere near far enough (and I'm sure he'd agree). So how exactly is Red Toryism or Traditionalist Socialism meant to impact the political scene? And in what sort of changes would it manifest itself? Perhaps Blond's upcoming book on Red Toryism may go some way towards making this clearer.
First of all there's this letter in response to this article.
It stirred up some discussion on the theological blog scene.
Personally, I'm of a somewhat 'Red Tory' persuasion myself, in that I'm not in favour of capitalism but I'm 'conservative' on most cultural and social issues. I found it a little odd that some people seemed to take his letter as a sort of lurch to the 'right' as if Milbank hadn't previously espoused views that were 'conservative'. The scare quotes around his use of 'the family' also struck me as rather strange: what exactly do people, including it seems some Christians, have against 'the family'? It is clear that Milbank is no leftist turning 'neo-conservative' as Hitchens did; if he's a Tory, then it's a Tory of the old school like Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and he makes it clear he still retains his (Christian) socialist allegiance.
It's also important to read the letter in the context of the article he's responding to. Thus his reference to "principled elites" is probably a reaction to the article's hysterical aversion to the Church having any influence in society whatsoever (we should all be guided by Science, you see).
Anyway, following on from this, there's a new interview with Milbank in The Other Journal (I was alerted to it on Inhabitatio Dei). The interview tackles the 'new atheism' (Dawkins, Hitchens and their ilk) and touches on other subjects such as sex and politics. He once again references 'Red Toryism' and argues that Christians need to start taking their Christianity into the political realm in a more self-conscious and explicit manner. I found this quote particularly amusing (no doubt it'll serve as further 'proof' that Milbank is a 'fascist' - a ridiculous claim):
We need now to celebrate instead the faithful legacy of peasants, learned, honourable and paternalist aristocrats, Christian warrior kings like Alfred the Great, yeomen farmers and scholars. Péguy is the man for the hour. William Cobbett also. Chesterton and Belloc likewise.
On a serious note, I would love for someone to present a practical blueprint for how this sort of political vision would work. It's all very well issuing these clarion calls, but what does it actually amount to in the context of British politics? Phillip Blond seems to think David Cameron is perhaps taking some steps towards this, but I don't think it goes anywhere near far enough (and I'm sure he'd agree). So how exactly is Red Toryism or Traditionalist Socialism meant to impact the political scene? And in what sort of changes would it manifest itself? Perhaps Blond's upcoming book on Red Toryism may go some way towards making this clearer.
Tuesday, April 15, 2008
Some thoughts on the Grandeur of Reason conference
The announcement of the Centre for Theology and Philosophy's upcoming conference on the 'Grandeur of Reason' has occasioned a fair amount of debate on some theology blogs.
First of all, the conference itself looks set to be spectacular with a line up of theologians and philosophers including the likes of John Milbank, David B. Hart, Fergus Kerr and Slavoij Zizek. The précis of the conference is said to have been taken from Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg Address wherein he calls for a renewal of the relationship between faith and reason, which avoids the extremes of a fideism wherein God's decrees are completely divorced from humanity's reasoning and a reason which seeks to insulate itself from God altogether.
As a Catholic, I cannot say I share the same concerns that appear to trouble some of the contributors to the debate. The idea that Radical Orthodoxy's position sits too comfortably with that of the current Papacy is not really something that displeases me. The trajectory that RO also seems to be taking towards a more 'universalised' reason (as Jamie Smith contends) is, again, something I would welcome.
It does, however, strike a strange chord in me to hear RO speaking in the sort of way that they do in the conference précis: "From this standpoint we hope to begin thinking through an authentic understanding of tolerance and ecumenism. Our task is thus to establish a path of honest intercultural communication in pursuit of universal truth, guided by the "grandeur" of reason, and unashamedly grounded in the cultural and historical tradition of Christianity."
One of my principle problems with Milbank (and to that extent with various other RO 'adherents') has been the relativistic position he has adopted regarding the claims of reason. Whilst I had no problem with the dismantling of the 'Enlightenment' pretension of a neutral reason operating devoid of all particularities, the notion that the claims of the Christian 'meta-narrative' could only be articulated rhetorically and its truths only adhered to through literary reasons of 'good taste', is simply not compatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. As I argued in my posts on Milbank's essay 'The End of Dialogue', his position does not allow for any real engagement with other traditions.
Of course, Milbank has always insisted that his position is not a fideistic one and indeed he criticises the likes of Barth on that score. The exact envisaging of the relationship between faith and reason has remained somewhat opaque. However, as Smith has noted, the 'later' Milbank is moving towards a position seemingly less extreme than that offered in Theology and Social Theory. I don't think he'd yet embrace the idea of 'natural reason' as Smith suggests or of 'natural law' but his comments on the subject have changed rather dramatically. In an article responding to various readings of TST he rejected Aidan Nicholls' criticisms of his treatment of 'common wisdom', 'natural law' and the like by dismissingly calling them all "yogic delights".
However, Smith sees in Milbank a 'universalizing' tendency which is almost rehabilitating a 'natural theology' tradition in a different guise. He sees this change most markedly in Being Reconciled. (Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, p.165)
I think Smith's qualms about this are a consequence of his Reformed background and the emphasis he wishes to place on the fallen nature of human reason. As D.B. Hart responded to Smith, despite not having placed enough emphasis on a common rationality in The Beauty of the Infinite, his project does not involve the sort of incommensurability thesis that Smith wants to hold on to. Perhaps a similar sort of thing is happening with Milbank who wants to emphasise that the continued giving of grace after the fall in effect 'nullifies' to an extent the idea that reason has fallen to such an extent that it simply cannot function in any 'universal' manner whatsoever. (Introducing, p. 165)
It might not be going too far to say that this conception of universality Milbank seems to be promoting isn't THAT far from the Rahner's anonymous Christianity! So instead of a 'secular reason' acting in a universal fashion because divorced from all religious particularities, there is a universal drive of human reason towards the grace showered upon all. I think this is possible because the differences between de Lubac and Rahner aren't as pronounced as commentators (including Milbank) would have one believe.
Eric Lee, for example, makes a similar point when he argues that it is the Universality of the Logos that allows for a certain commonality and possibility of genuine debate and engagement (as opposed, perhaps, to simply 'out-narrating' one's opponent). This, however, still leaves the question of to what extent the Logos must be explicitly referred to when talking in the public sphere. Would we constantly need to articulate the entire Christian meta-narrative when proclaiming our views? With this in mind I found a comment made by Milbank especially interesting.
In the book God's Advocates, where he features in one of the interviews, he describes just this dilemma: "let's think of the situation of the Church, especially the Roman Catholic Church today, when it tries to speak in the public realm about moral and political issues. The dilemma is: do you speak on the basis of a natural law that should be available to everybody, whether or not they're recognising God, in which case it's very doubtful whether you're talking about any kind of natural law that the Middle Ages could have recognised; or do you, on the other hand, say that our positions are grounded in our entire Catholic vision, and here the obvious risk is that people will ask why the should listen. But you might also say that that's the only possible alternative course because, in fact, what we say only makes sense in terms of our entire vision."
What he then goes on to say is interesting, not least because it is far removed from what the general perception of Milbank would have you think he'd say. (Again, I think this is partly due to Milbank's own rhetorical ploys). Speaking of the trajectory of de Lubac's theology he goes on to say that "that kind of perspective would say that, speaking in the Christian realm, we should latch onto things that aren't completely unchristian, or that to some extent remain residually Christian. People still talk about forgiveness, reconciliation and mercy, and the idea that each person matters as much as everyone else, in a way that pagans, on a whole, didn't. And therefore we don't need to speak within a completely natural law-based kind of discourse: we can get people to try to see more deeply the implications of what they already think. This includes getting them to recognise that their vision isn't completely cut off from something that in the end resembles a religious vision; but it also doesn't mean that one has to start by overwhelming them with one's entire Christian meta-narrative and ontology." The part in bold is particularly interesting as it is just such a thing many would associate Milbank with advocating!
In this paper, he also calls for a renewed Christian humanism, emphasising that traces of the divine can be found in cultures and religions other than Christianity, and that the doctrine of the incarnation serves as a validation of the "human as such". Thus Milbank seems to be moving away from the incommensurability thesis that seemed more apparent in TST. It is just such a move that I think distresses someone like Smith but in the same way that Hart stated that his theological project wasn't intended to suggest that there was no such thing as a common reason, I think Milbank perhaps also overemphasised this point and is now seeking to redress the balance somewhat.
Rhetorical posturing may have led to many thinking that RO almost advocated not listening to others (the 'twenty-four theses' are a prime example of this'). In practice this isn't really the case though. Take a look at Conor Cunningham's critique of evolution for example, barely any reference to theology at all – so clearly a constant harking back to theological positions is not necessary, and something like Neo-Darwinism can be critiqued on its own terms. With that in mind I wonder whether Milbank would modify his critique of Macintyre in TST? Interestingly, Smith also mentions in a footnote that the Milbank of Being Reconciled is far closer to the Macintyre he criticises in TST. (Introducing, p.181)
It was also especially intriguing to hear that Milbank had allegedly said that the problem with Islam is that it has no conception of the secular! Not sure if this could be verified but if so, then he's probably going a bit too far! That aspect of the conference (i.e. Islam) should also be fascinating although I wish I had more insight into what exactly the RO position regarding Islam (which again seems to be a bone of contention) is. The only clue I have is the articles by Adrian Pabst and Phillip Blond in the International Herald Tribune, but as regards Milbank his sparse comments on Islam have never struck me as overtly negative.
Hopefully, the conference will help elucidate these issues and provide greater insight into Milbank's views on the role of reason. I'm also particularly interested in what D.B. Hart might have to say and whether he'll build upon the reply he made to Smith's assessment of his work.
First of all, the conference itself looks set to be spectacular with a line up of theologians and philosophers including the likes of John Milbank, David B. Hart, Fergus Kerr and Slavoij Zizek. The précis of the conference is said to have been taken from Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg Address wherein he calls for a renewal of the relationship between faith and reason, which avoids the extremes of a fideism wherein God's decrees are completely divorced from humanity's reasoning and a reason which seeks to insulate itself from God altogether.
As a Catholic, I cannot say I share the same concerns that appear to trouble some of the contributors to the debate. The idea that Radical Orthodoxy's position sits too comfortably with that of the current Papacy is not really something that displeases me. The trajectory that RO also seems to be taking towards a more 'universalised' reason (as Jamie Smith contends) is, again, something I would welcome.
It does, however, strike a strange chord in me to hear RO speaking in the sort of way that they do in the conference précis: "From this standpoint we hope to begin thinking through an authentic understanding of tolerance and ecumenism. Our task is thus to establish a path of honest intercultural communication in pursuit of universal truth, guided by the "grandeur" of reason, and unashamedly grounded in the cultural and historical tradition of Christianity."
One of my principle problems with Milbank (and to that extent with various other RO 'adherents') has been the relativistic position he has adopted regarding the claims of reason. Whilst I had no problem with the dismantling of the 'Enlightenment' pretension of a neutral reason operating devoid of all particularities, the notion that the claims of the Christian 'meta-narrative' could only be articulated rhetorically and its truths only adhered to through literary reasons of 'good taste', is simply not compatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. As I argued in my posts on Milbank's essay 'The End of Dialogue', his position does not allow for any real engagement with other traditions.
Of course, Milbank has always insisted that his position is not a fideistic one and indeed he criticises the likes of Barth on that score. The exact envisaging of the relationship between faith and reason has remained somewhat opaque. However, as Smith has noted, the 'later' Milbank is moving towards a position seemingly less extreme than that offered in Theology and Social Theory. I don't think he'd yet embrace the idea of 'natural reason' as Smith suggests or of 'natural law' but his comments on the subject have changed rather dramatically. In an article responding to various readings of TST he rejected Aidan Nicholls' criticisms of his treatment of 'common wisdom', 'natural law' and the like by dismissingly calling them all "yogic delights".
However, Smith sees in Milbank a 'universalizing' tendency which is almost rehabilitating a 'natural theology' tradition in a different guise. He sees this change most markedly in Being Reconciled. (Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, p.165)
I think Smith's qualms about this are a consequence of his Reformed background and the emphasis he wishes to place on the fallen nature of human reason. As D.B. Hart responded to Smith, despite not having placed enough emphasis on a common rationality in The Beauty of the Infinite, his project does not involve the sort of incommensurability thesis that Smith wants to hold on to. Perhaps a similar sort of thing is happening with Milbank who wants to emphasise that the continued giving of grace after the fall in effect 'nullifies' to an extent the idea that reason has fallen to such an extent that it simply cannot function in any 'universal' manner whatsoever. (Introducing, p. 165)
It might not be going too far to say that this conception of universality Milbank seems to be promoting isn't THAT far from the Rahner's anonymous Christianity! So instead of a 'secular reason' acting in a universal fashion because divorced from all religious particularities, there is a universal drive of human reason towards the grace showered upon all. I think this is possible because the differences between de Lubac and Rahner aren't as pronounced as commentators (including Milbank) would have one believe.
Eric Lee, for example, makes a similar point when he argues that it is the Universality of the Logos that allows for a certain commonality and possibility of genuine debate and engagement (as opposed, perhaps, to simply 'out-narrating' one's opponent). This, however, still leaves the question of to what extent the Logos must be explicitly referred to when talking in the public sphere. Would we constantly need to articulate the entire Christian meta-narrative when proclaiming our views? With this in mind I found a comment made by Milbank especially interesting.
In the book God's Advocates, where he features in one of the interviews, he describes just this dilemma: "let's think of the situation of the Church, especially the Roman Catholic Church today, when it tries to speak in the public realm about moral and political issues. The dilemma is: do you speak on the basis of a natural law that should be available to everybody, whether or not they're recognising God, in which case it's very doubtful whether you're talking about any kind of natural law that the Middle Ages could have recognised; or do you, on the other hand, say that our positions are grounded in our entire Catholic vision, and here the obvious risk is that people will ask why the should listen. But you might also say that that's the only possible alternative course because, in fact, what we say only makes sense in terms of our entire vision."
What he then goes on to say is interesting, not least because it is far removed from what the general perception of Milbank would have you think he'd say. (Again, I think this is partly due to Milbank's own rhetorical ploys). Speaking of the trajectory of de Lubac's theology he goes on to say that "that kind of perspective would say that, speaking in the Christian realm, we should latch onto things that aren't completely unchristian, or that to some extent remain residually Christian. People still talk about forgiveness, reconciliation and mercy, and the idea that each person matters as much as everyone else, in a way that pagans, on a whole, didn't. And therefore we don't need to speak within a completely natural law-based kind of discourse: we can get people to try to see more deeply the implications of what they already think. This includes getting them to recognise that their vision isn't completely cut off from something that in the end resembles a religious vision; but it also doesn't mean that one has to start by overwhelming them with one's entire Christian meta-narrative and ontology." The part in bold is particularly interesting as it is just such a thing many would associate Milbank with advocating!
In this paper, he also calls for a renewed Christian humanism, emphasising that traces of the divine can be found in cultures and religions other than Christianity, and that the doctrine of the incarnation serves as a validation of the "human as such". Thus Milbank seems to be moving away from the incommensurability thesis that seemed more apparent in TST. It is just such a move that I think distresses someone like Smith but in the same way that Hart stated that his theological project wasn't intended to suggest that there was no such thing as a common reason, I think Milbank perhaps also overemphasised this point and is now seeking to redress the balance somewhat.
Rhetorical posturing may have led to many thinking that RO almost advocated not listening to others (the 'twenty-four theses' are a prime example of this'). In practice this isn't really the case though. Take a look at Conor Cunningham's critique of evolution for example, barely any reference to theology at all – so clearly a constant harking back to theological positions is not necessary, and something like Neo-Darwinism can be critiqued on its own terms. With that in mind I wonder whether Milbank would modify his critique of Macintyre in TST? Interestingly, Smith also mentions in a footnote that the Milbank of Being Reconciled is far closer to the Macintyre he criticises in TST. (Introducing, p.181)
It was also especially intriguing to hear that Milbank had allegedly said that the problem with Islam is that it has no conception of the secular! Not sure if this could be verified but if so, then he's probably going a bit too far! That aspect of the conference (i.e. Islam) should also be fascinating although I wish I had more insight into what exactly the RO position regarding Islam (which again seems to be a bone of contention) is. The only clue I have is the articles by Adrian Pabst and Phillip Blond in the International Herald Tribune, but as regards Milbank his sparse comments on Islam have never struck me as overtly negative.
Hopefully, the conference will help elucidate these issues and provide greater insight into Milbank's views on the role of reason. I'm also particularly interested in what D.B. Hart might have to say and whether he'll build upon the reply he made to Smith's assessment of his work.
Saturday, December 22, 2007
Dickens' "Carol Philosophy"
But I am sure I have always thought of Christmas
time, when it has come round -- apart from the
veneration due to its sacred name and origin, if anything
belonging to it can be apart from that -- as a
good time; a kind, forgiving, charitable, pleasant
time: the only time I know of, in the long calendar
of the year, when men and women seem by one consent
to open their shut-up hearts freely, and to think
of people below them as if they really were
fellow-passengers to the grave, and not another race
of creatures bound on other journeys. And therefore,
uncle, though it has never put a scrap of gold or
silver in my pocket, I believe that it has done me
good, and will do me good; and I say, God bless it!
This is what Dickens referred to as the "Carol Philosophy" and we would do well to adhere to it. Dickens was often written off as overly sentimental and A Christmas Carol may seem to some a perfect example of this. Even many Christians may be inclined to consider the 'Carol Philosophy' an overly 'bourgeois' conception, failing to address the deep horror of sin in the world and thus failing to recognise the immensity of its "sacred origin": a God descending into the midst of the world in order to be crucified for our sins. Perhaps Dickens' optimism clouds this from view, perhaps A Christmas Carol is simply a 'feel-good' story that warms our hearts without us having to stare too deeply into the misery of the world and realise the radical social changes necessary to bring about greater justice.
Yet such thoughts would be, in my view, mistaken. Of course, the vast scale of poverty on earth requires more than just almsgiving and charitable interventions at Christmas time. But if we focus only on grand-scale achievements it is all too easy to neglect the possibilities we have to exercise charity in the here and now, in our very own spheres of life.
A Christmas Carol is not a mere 'feel-good' narrative at all. It mirrors the Christian belief that for man to be redeemed, a supernatural intervention is necessary. No less than the visitation of the three spirits could redeem Scrooge. Without the spirits it would be inconceivable that Scrooge should undergo the massive change of heart which occurs at the end of the story. A man like Scrooge, who has cut himself off from fellowship with humankind and hardened his heart against joy needs a tremendous 'jolt'. And this is precisely what Christianity proclaims: metanoia, a complete turning of one's whole being, is possible only through grace.
To close oneself off from the source of all love and joy is to condemn oneself to the hellish misery of those spirits who find themselves condemned to walk abroad in death as they failed to do in life."It is required of every man," the ghost returned, "that the spirit within him should walk abroad among his fellow-men, and travel far and wide; and, if that spirit goes not forth in life, it is condemned to do so after death". The agony they endure as in the afterlife is a direct consequence of their failures to be charitable towards their fellow man in this life: "the misery with them all was, clearly, that they sought to interfere, for good, in human matters, and had lost the power for ever." This is a stark warning for us all not to waste our opportunities in the here and now to truly love our neighbour. This does not mean we need to embark on grandiose plans to 'save the world'. As Dickens puts it through the medium of Jacob Marley: "any Christian spirit working kindly in its little sphere, whatever it may be, will find its mortal life too short for its vast means of usefulness."
So we would all do well to heed the message that A Christmas Carol imparts. And, in whatever sphere of life we find ourselves in, to endeavour to be kind and charitable to our neighbours - our friends, family, workmates, all those we encounter in our daily lives - and know that even should we do this for the rest of our lives, it would still not exhaust our capacity for good. Let us then "honour Christmas in [our] hearts, and try to keep it all the year."
Merry Christmas.
time, when it has come round -- apart from the
veneration due to its sacred name and origin, if anything
belonging to it can be apart from that -- as a
good time; a kind, forgiving, charitable, pleasant
time: the only time I know of, in the long calendar
of the year, when men and women seem by one consent
to open their shut-up hearts freely, and to think
of people below them as if they really were
fellow-passengers to the grave, and not another race
of creatures bound on other journeys. And therefore,
uncle, though it has never put a scrap of gold or
silver in my pocket, I believe that it has done me
good, and will do me good; and I say, God bless it!
This is what Dickens referred to as the "Carol Philosophy" and we would do well to adhere to it. Dickens was often written off as overly sentimental and A Christmas Carol may seem to some a perfect example of this. Even many Christians may be inclined to consider the 'Carol Philosophy' an overly 'bourgeois' conception, failing to address the deep horror of sin in the world and thus failing to recognise the immensity of its "sacred origin": a God descending into the midst of the world in order to be crucified for our sins. Perhaps Dickens' optimism clouds this from view, perhaps A Christmas Carol is simply a 'feel-good' story that warms our hearts without us having to stare too deeply into the misery of the world and realise the radical social changes necessary to bring about greater justice.
Yet such thoughts would be, in my view, mistaken. Of course, the vast scale of poverty on earth requires more than just almsgiving and charitable interventions at Christmas time. But if we focus only on grand-scale achievements it is all too easy to neglect the possibilities we have to exercise charity in the here and now, in our very own spheres of life.
A Christmas Carol is not a mere 'feel-good' narrative at all. It mirrors the Christian belief that for man to be redeemed, a supernatural intervention is necessary. No less than the visitation of the three spirits could redeem Scrooge. Without the spirits it would be inconceivable that Scrooge should undergo the massive change of heart which occurs at the end of the story. A man like Scrooge, who has cut himself off from fellowship with humankind and hardened his heart against joy needs a tremendous 'jolt'. And this is precisely what Christianity proclaims: metanoia, a complete turning of one's whole being, is possible only through grace.
To close oneself off from the source of all love and joy is to condemn oneself to the hellish misery of those spirits who find themselves condemned to walk abroad in death as they failed to do in life."It is required of every man," the ghost returned, "that the spirit within him should walk abroad among his fellow-men, and travel far and wide; and, if that spirit goes not forth in life, it is condemned to do so after death". The agony they endure as in the afterlife is a direct consequence of their failures to be charitable towards their fellow man in this life: "the misery with them all was, clearly, that they sought to interfere, for good, in human matters, and had lost the power for ever." This is a stark warning for us all not to waste our opportunities in the here and now to truly love our neighbour. This does not mean we need to embark on grandiose plans to 'save the world'. As Dickens puts it through the medium of Jacob Marley: "any Christian spirit working kindly in its little sphere, whatever it may be, will find its mortal life too short for its vast means of usefulness."
So we would all do well to heed the message that A Christmas Carol imparts. And, in whatever sphere of life we find ourselves in, to endeavour to be kind and charitable to our neighbours - our friends, family, workmates, all those we encounter in our daily lives - and know that even should we do this for the rest of our lives, it would still not exhaust our capacity for good. Let us then "honour Christmas in [our] hearts, and try to keep it all the year."
Merry Christmas.
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Aquinas' Mariology (2)
From the earlier post looking at Aquinas’ and the popular view of Mary, significant differences will already have been noticed. Indeed one can sense Aquinas’ impatience with the popular views prevailing during his time in certain of his words. One such example can be found in Aquinas’ discussion of whether Mary was cleansed completely from the ‘inflammation of sin’ (she was not says Aquinas, though its effects were rendered harmless), when he remarks: “We can, then, ascribe to the blessed Virgin perfect virtue and grace’s full intensity without having to claim for her every occasion of perfect virtue.”(S.T. 3a, 27, q.3) Aquinas keeps the scriptural accounts of Mary always in view, and all the grace given to her is always given to her in such a way that its use is always “consonant with her way of life.” (S.T. 3a, 27, q.5) Thus Aquinas is clearly not representative of the popular view which would attribute to Mary every possible “occasion of perfect virtue” such as describing her as full of Biblical knowledge and so forth, in fact regarding this point, Aquinas expressly states that she did not have the use of wisdom as regards teaching for this did not befit her female sex (!). (S.T. 3a, 27, q. 5) Aquinas' 'sexism' (in scare quotes because it's a bit of an anachronism) notwithstanding, the principle feature of his Mariology is that he does not wish to attribute anything to Mary which would not accord with her own admission that she is but a “lowly handmaid” of the Lord.
A reply given to a certain Friar Gerard when asked whether it was true that the Blessed Virgin repeated the words “a sword will pierce my heart” is characteristic of Aquinas’ attitude to what he saw as the excessive Marian devotion of his time: “In my opinion such frivolities ought not to be preached, seeing there are so many subjects for preaching that are absolutely true.” (quoted in H. Graef, 'Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion') Aquinas follows his teacher St. Albert the Great whose Mariology represented the authentic tradition and who maintained the close link between Mariology and Christology: “the cause of her veneration, of her glorification, is not her own person, but Christ.” (quoted in Graef) In this Aquinas differs greatly from the popular view which increasingly developed an emphasis on Mary as an individual with no attention paid to either her union with Christ or with the Church. On the other hand, whilst Aquinas’ Mariology clearly differed significantly from the popular view there are certain points of contact between them. His Mariology may have been far more restrained but he certainly had a strong devotion to her. He had no problem placing her above the angels and would surely have been happy to call her the ‘Queen of Angels’ and ‘Mother of Mercy’. She was ‘in some way’ Mediatrix of all graces and one could profitably pray to her to intercede on one’s behalf.
Having surveyed both Aquinas’ Mariology and the popular view, typical in his time and perhaps paralleling the excesses of Marian devotion that Protestants so fear, it is clear that Aquinas cannot be said to be a representative of the latter. He did not share the popular enthusiasm for the various myths and legends associated with the person of Mary and he was theologically far more reticent about Mary’s role in salvation, always wishing to maintain the union with Christ that gave Mary her significance. The popular view on the other hand concentrated more and more on Mary as an individual in her own right, to the extent that she appeared at times to take on a role of equivalent value to that of Jesus Christ. It might not be going to far to say that had Aquinas’ more sober approach been able to better infiltrate the popular mindset, the Reformers’ backlash against what they saw as the excessive and unbiblical attention given to Mary may not have been so great, and may not have caused them to abandon Mariology altogether as they eventually occurred in the Protestant tradition (Luther at least, had quite a 'high' Mariology). Aquinas’ entire attitude towards Mariology is encapsulated perfectly in his closing sentence from his lecture in Naples: “So therefore is the Virgin blessed, but far more blessed is the fruit of her womb.” (Exposition of the Angelic Salutation)
A reply given to a certain Friar Gerard when asked whether it was true that the Blessed Virgin repeated the words “a sword will pierce my heart” is characteristic of Aquinas’ attitude to what he saw as the excessive Marian devotion of his time: “In my opinion such frivolities ought not to be preached, seeing there are so many subjects for preaching that are absolutely true.” (quoted in H. Graef, 'Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion') Aquinas follows his teacher St. Albert the Great whose Mariology represented the authentic tradition and who maintained the close link between Mariology and Christology: “the cause of her veneration, of her glorification, is not her own person, but Christ.” (quoted in Graef) In this Aquinas differs greatly from the popular view which increasingly developed an emphasis on Mary as an individual with no attention paid to either her union with Christ or with the Church. On the other hand, whilst Aquinas’ Mariology clearly differed significantly from the popular view there are certain points of contact between them. His Mariology may have been far more restrained but he certainly had a strong devotion to her. He had no problem placing her above the angels and would surely have been happy to call her the ‘Queen of Angels’ and ‘Mother of Mercy’. She was ‘in some way’ Mediatrix of all graces and one could profitably pray to her to intercede on one’s behalf.
Having surveyed both Aquinas’ Mariology and the popular view, typical in his time and perhaps paralleling the excesses of Marian devotion that Protestants so fear, it is clear that Aquinas cannot be said to be a representative of the latter. He did not share the popular enthusiasm for the various myths and legends associated with the person of Mary and he was theologically far more reticent about Mary’s role in salvation, always wishing to maintain the union with Christ that gave Mary her significance. The popular view on the other hand concentrated more and more on Mary as an individual in her own right, to the extent that she appeared at times to take on a role of equivalent value to that of Jesus Christ. It might not be going to far to say that had Aquinas’ more sober approach been able to better infiltrate the popular mindset, the Reformers’ backlash against what they saw as the excessive and unbiblical attention given to Mary may not have been so great, and may not have caused them to abandon Mariology altogether as they eventually occurred in the Protestant tradition (Luther at least, had quite a 'high' Mariology). Aquinas’ entire attitude towards Mariology is encapsulated perfectly in his closing sentence from his lecture in Naples: “So therefore is the Virgin blessed, but far more blessed is the fruit of her womb.” (Exposition of the Angelic Salutation)
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
A Sober Mariology: Thomas' view of Mary (1)
Medieval man’s attitude towards Mary was one of great devotion, she was seen as the ‘Mother of Mercy’ and mediator between them and Christ. It was felt that they could unreservedly commend themselves to her as their advocate. This view of Mary as the Mother of Mercy arose in part due to the emphasis on Jesus as judge, who was often portrayed as stern and unyielding in regard to sinners. This notion grew to such an extent that Mary was apparently seen as, having power over the bestowal of divine Mercy itself, as is shown in the 13th century Mappa Mundi in Hereford Cathedral. In fact, Mary was held in such high esteem that she was considered second in dignity only to God himself. With the growth of the Marian cult it is not surprising that various myths should have grown up around her. The rather scant account of her one can find in the canonical gospels was supplemented by various other stories which were taken from such works as the Book of James.
One can find far fuller accounts of her life in works such as The Golden Legend by Jacobus de Voragine. These accounts present Mary’s life in such a way as to parallel certain gospel narratives. This can be seen in the account given of Mary’s parents Anne and Joachim. Joachim receives an ‘annunciation’ of his own with an Angel telling him that his wife shall bear a child and that “she will be consecrated to the Lord from infancy and filled with the Holy Spirit from her mother’s womb.” Popular belief in Mary’s Immaculate Conception was unequivocal. Some theologians such as Aquinas rejected it, as had others including St. Anselm and even St. Bernard of Clairvaux who was otherwise renowned for his Marian devotion. Thus a popular legend arose sometime after the death of Bernard of Clairvaux that after his death there appeared upon him a black mark and it was widely believed that he was in Purgatory for having, in this case, spoken ill of the Virgin Mary. There are also tales of Mary’s childhood which of course does not feature at all in the New Testament: at the age of three she was presented at the temple and was able to mount “to the top without help from anyone, as if she were already fully grown up” and thereafter remained at the temple and had daily divine visions and visitations from angels. Mary had every possible perfection attributed her, despite there being no scriptural warrant for the myths that grew around her. During her life too, Mary excelled in every way and was even considered a great teacher of wisdom, proficient in knowledge of the Bible.
As well as the various stories about her life, there were also myriad stories about miracles that had been worked by the Blessed Virgin which fit in with the popular view of her as the ultimate intercessor. One such tale is that of a thief who had a deep devotion to the Blessed Mary and was miraculously kept from execution by the Virgin, after having being caught red-handed. Upon being released he is said to have entered a monastery and lived out his life in service to her. It is not surprising that such a tale would evoke a great sense of trust in Mary as Intercessor, seeing as she goes to the aid even of criminals who show devotion to her. In these folktales and miracle stories, however, it can be seen that Mary “undeniably usurps the unique privileges of Christ.” (Maria Warner, Alone of All Her Sex). These tales about Mary infiltrated the popular imagination, in particular through the medium of art, the visual image being readily accessible to all people regardless of education. The Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, Italy features various frescos by Giotto which detail the story of Mary and her infancy as elaborated in The Golden Legend.
This sort of hyper-mariology is of course one which many protestants tend to attribute to Catholics. Of course, nowadays, Marian devotion has decreased a great deal, but it isn't difficult to find protestant polemics which focus on such excesses and it must be said that it is probable that some Catholics do in fact tend towards superstition when it comes to Mary.
In this sense then, it is fruitful to look at Thomas' Mariology as a paradigm for Catholic views on the Mother of God: one which is always christocentric.
Aquinas’ Mariology is planted firmly within the context of his Christology - there is no separate section devoted exclusively to Mary – and is to be found in the Tertia Pars of the Summa. This in itself is a significant factor which points the way to an understanding of his entire Mariological outlook. Aquinas’ treatment of the theological importance of Mary cannot be divorced from his Christology – Mary is never spoken of other than in terms of what relation such and such a doctrine about her has to Christ. His Mariology is also based firmly on the accounts of Mary given by the Evangelists, and the opinion of Church Fathers, he does not look to apocryphal accounts of Mary in order to supplement his work.
Perhaps the best known aspect of Aquinas’ Mariology is his rejection of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. It was a much debated issue during the thirteenth century as it was not yet a dogmatically defined article of faith for Catholic believers. It was of course dogmatically defined in 1854 by Pope Pius IX. Aquinas rejects the doctrine that Mary was sanctified from the very moment of her conception and was instead sanctified whilst still in the womb (S.T. 3a, 27, 1) Now, at first sight it may seem that it matters little whether she was sanctified from the moment of conception or whether this took place a short time after, and indeed the controversy of the time was sometimes characterised as a 'controversy about a few moments' (Karl Rahner). The issue at stake, however, was indeed one of importance. Aquinas’ difficulty lay in his inability to see how if Mary was indeed sanctified from the moment of conception, she could still be said to have been redeemed by Christ. If she had never been subject to original sin, she could not be said to have been liberated from it. This, Aquinas felt, would “derogate from the dignity of Christ” who is the universal Saviour. (S.T. 3a, 27, 3) Likewise in his discussion over whether Mary was completely cleansed from the ‘inflammation of sin’ he objects on the grounds that whilst this assertion may seem to be part of the dignity of Mary it is somewhat demeaning to Christ, for only he can be declared to be completely free from sin. (He does state, however, that whilst it was not wholly removed, it was rendered harmless.)(S.T. 3a, 27, 3)
Whilst Aquinas was unable to see how Mary, despite being immaculately conceived, could still be said to have been redeemed (It was the Franciscan John Duns Scotus who championed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, arguing that the Blessed Virgin Mary was indeed redeemed by Christ and in fact could be said to have been the person most radically redeemed of all for to prevent someone from falling is better than to pick them up once they have fallen), he nevertheless asserted without hesitation that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin whether mortal or venial. Aquinas also states that she received a greater fullness of grace than all others and also argues that Mary was Mediatrix of all graces insofar as “by giving birth to him she brought, in a certain way, grace to all.” (S.T. 3a, 27, 5) In this minimal sense, I don't think many could have serious problems with the notion of Mary as mediatrix of grace.
Aquinas’ Exposition of the Angelic Salutation (Ave Maria), a Lenten Sermon probably dating from 1273, also helps illuminate our understanding of his Mariology. Aquinas states that the Angel’s salutation reveals her to exceed even the angels in fullness of grace, purity and familiarity with God. Mary is also said to be above all other saints for “she performed the works of all virtues whereas the saints exhibit particular ones.” Aquinas’ discussion of Mary’s virginity also reflects his Christological concerns and one of his principle arguments for Mary’s virginity is that it is fitting that Christ should be born of a virgin. He holds that Mary was a virgin when she conceived Christ and also in partu (during the actual birth of Christ) and this is because it was appropriate that it should be so when one considers whose birth is in question, and because to lose her virginity would lessen the honour due to the Mother of God. Mary is also held to have remained a virgin throughout the rest of her life.
The whole discussion concerning Mary’s virginity shows clearly Aquinas’ concern to place Mary within a Christological context, that she was a virgin throughout her life has more to do with her being the Mother of God than with any considerations about her own person and any ‘honour’ due to her, although this too is taken into account. Aquinas states that it was fitting that Mary should have been espoused and that she truly was married against those who would claim otherwise. His final section on Mariology concerns the Annunciation to the Blessed Virgin, wherein he tells us that the Annunciation was made to inform Mary so that her free consent “which was petitioned during the course of the announcement” should stand “for the consent of all men.” (S.T, 3a, 30, 1) Mary is seen here as acting on behalf of the whole of mankind, not acting in her own right, so to speak. Aquinas can be seen to hold a ‘high’ view of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but it remains strictly within Biblical bounds and he makes sure always to subject her to Christ, who is the Universal Redeemer.
One can find far fuller accounts of her life in works such as The Golden Legend by Jacobus de Voragine. These accounts present Mary’s life in such a way as to parallel certain gospel narratives. This can be seen in the account given of Mary’s parents Anne and Joachim. Joachim receives an ‘annunciation’ of his own with an Angel telling him that his wife shall bear a child and that “she will be consecrated to the Lord from infancy and filled with the Holy Spirit from her mother’s womb.” Popular belief in Mary’s Immaculate Conception was unequivocal. Some theologians such as Aquinas rejected it, as had others including St. Anselm and even St. Bernard of Clairvaux who was otherwise renowned for his Marian devotion. Thus a popular legend arose sometime after the death of Bernard of Clairvaux that after his death there appeared upon him a black mark and it was widely believed that he was in Purgatory for having, in this case, spoken ill of the Virgin Mary. There are also tales of Mary’s childhood which of course does not feature at all in the New Testament: at the age of three she was presented at the temple and was able to mount “to the top without help from anyone, as if she were already fully grown up” and thereafter remained at the temple and had daily divine visions and visitations from angels. Mary had every possible perfection attributed her, despite there being no scriptural warrant for the myths that grew around her. During her life too, Mary excelled in every way and was even considered a great teacher of wisdom, proficient in knowledge of the Bible.
As well as the various stories about her life, there were also myriad stories about miracles that had been worked by the Blessed Virgin which fit in with the popular view of her as the ultimate intercessor. One such tale is that of a thief who had a deep devotion to the Blessed Mary and was miraculously kept from execution by the Virgin, after having being caught red-handed. Upon being released he is said to have entered a monastery and lived out his life in service to her. It is not surprising that such a tale would evoke a great sense of trust in Mary as Intercessor, seeing as she goes to the aid even of criminals who show devotion to her. In these folktales and miracle stories, however, it can be seen that Mary “undeniably usurps the unique privileges of Christ.” (Maria Warner, Alone of All Her Sex). These tales about Mary infiltrated the popular imagination, in particular through the medium of art, the visual image being readily accessible to all people regardless of education. The Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, Italy features various frescos by Giotto which detail the story of Mary and her infancy as elaborated in The Golden Legend.
This sort of hyper-mariology is of course one which many protestants tend to attribute to Catholics. Of course, nowadays, Marian devotion has decreased a great deal, but it isn't difficult to find protestant polemics which focus on such excesses and it must be said that it is probable that some Catholics do in fact tend towards superstition when it comes to Mary.
In this sense then, it is fruitful to look at Thomas' Mariology as a paradigm for Catholic views on the Mother of God: one which is always christocentric.
Aquinas’ Mariology is planted firmly within the context of his Christology - there is no separate section devoted exclusively to Mary – and is to be found in the Tertia Pars of the Summa. This in itself is a significant factor which points the way to an understanding of his entire Mariological outlook. Aquinas’ treatment of the theological importance of Mary cannot be divorced from his Christology – Mary is never spoken of other than in terms of what relation such and such a doctrine about her has to Christ. His Mariology is also based firmly on the accounts of Mary given by the Evangelists, and the opinion of Church Fathers, he does not look to apocryphal accounts of Mary in order to supplement his work.
Perhaps the best known aspect of Aquinas’ Mariology is his rejection of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. It was a much debated issue during the thirteenth century as it was not yet a dogmatically defined article of faith for Catholic believers. It was of course dogmatically defined in 1854 by Pope Pius IX. Aquinas rejects the doctrine that Mary was sanctified from the very moment of her conception and was instead sanctified whilst still in the womb (S.T. 3a, 27, 1) Now, at first sight it may seem that it matters little whether she was sanctified from the moment of conception or whether this took place a short time after, and indeed the controversy of the time was sometimes characterised as a 'controversy about a few moments' (Karl Rahner). The issue at stake, however, was indeed one of importance. Aquinas’ difficulty lay in his inability to see how if Mary was indeed sanctified from the moment of conception, she could still be said to have been redeemed by Christ. If she had never been subject to original sin, she could not be said to have been liberated from it. This, Aquinas felt, would “derogate from the dignity of Christ” who is the universal Saviour. (S.T. 3a, 27, 3) Likewise in his discussion over whether Mary was completely cleansed from the ‘inflammation of sin’ he objects on the grounds that whilst this assertion may seem to be part of the dignity of Mary it is somewhat demeaning to Christ, for only he can be declared to be completely free from sin. (He does state, however, that whilst it was not wholly removed, it was rendered harmless.)(S.T. 3a, 27, 3)
Whilst Aquinas was unable to see how Mary, despite being immaculately conceived, could still be said to have been redeemed (It was the Franciscan John Duns Scotus who championed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, arguing that the Blessed Virgin Mary was indeed redeemed by Christ and in fact could be said to have been the person most radically redeemed of all for to prevent someone from falling is better than to pick them up once they have fallen), he nevertheless asserted without hesitation that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin whether mortal or venial. Aquinas also states that she received a greater fullness of grace than all others and also argues that Mary was Mediatrix of all graces insofar as “by giving birth to him she brought, in a certain way, grace to all.” (S.T. 3a, 27, 5) In this minimal sense, I don't think many could have serious problems with the notion of Mary as mediatrix of grace.
Aquinas’ Exposition of the Angelic Salutation (Ave Maria), a Lenten Sermon probably dating from 1273, also helps illuminate our understanding of his Mariology. Aquinas states that the Angel’s salutation reveals her to exceed even the angels in fullness of grace, purity and familiarity with God. Mary is also said to be above all other saints for “she performed the works of all virtues whereas the saints exhibit particular ones.” Aquinas’ discussion of Mary’s virginity also reflects his Christological concerns and one of his principle arguments for Mary’s virginity is that it is fitting that Christ should be born of a virgin. He holds that Mary was a virgin when she conceived Christ and also in partu (during the actual birth of Christ) and this is because it was appropriate that it should be so when one considers whose birth is in question, and because to lose her virginity would lessen the honour due to the Mother of God. Mary is also held to have remained a virgin throughout the rest of her life.
The whole discussion concerning Mary’s virginity shows clearly Aquinas’ concern to place Mary within a Christological context, that she was a virgin throughout her life has more to do with her being the Mother of God than with any considerations about her own person and any ‘honour’ due to her, although this too is taken into account. Aquinas states that it was fitting that Mary should have been espoused and that she truly was married against those who would claim otherwise. His final section on Mariology concerns the Annunciation to the Blessed Virgin, wherein he tells us that the Annunciation was made to inform Mary so that her free consent “which was petitioned during the course of the announcement” should stand “for the consent of all men.” (S.T, 3a, 30, 1) Mary is seen here as acting on behalf of the whole of mankind, not acting in her own right, so to speak. Aquinas can be seen to hold a ‘high’ view of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but it remains strictly within Biblical bounds and he makes sure always to subject her to Christ, who is the Universal Redeemer.
Friday, November 30, 2007
New Encyclical
Spe Salvi
Pope Benedict XVI's new Encyclical has been released. A quick skimming reveals references to Aquinas, de Lubac, Adorno and Horkheimer, Kant and Marx.
Pope Benedict XVI's new Encyclical has been released. A quick skimming reveals references to Aquinas, de Lubac, Adorno and Horkheimer, Kant and Marx.
Friday, November 23, 2007
Historical Jesus and Theology (3)
To finish up this series of posts on the quest for the Historical Jesus and its relation to theology I'd like to point to another argument in favour of the position which holds that the quest is essential is the danger of ideological appropriation of Jesus. If theology ignores the historical Jesus it leaves the path open to the ‘hijacking’ of the Jesus of history for propagandist reasons as occurred with the ‘German Christians’ in the Nazi era who denied that Jesus was a Jew and presented him as an Aryan. In the face of such a perverted ‘kerygma’ of a group’s own making is it not of the utmost irresponsibility of theology to ignore the vital question of the historical Jesus? From the perspective of Fundamental theology (apologetics) it therefore becomes of paramount necessity to demonstrate that the kerygmatic Christ is not divorced from the earthly Jesus but that there exists a fundamental thread linking the two. Further theological reasons for maintaining the essential nature of the quest for theology is the understanding of ‘faith’ itself. For faith is not merely an assent to various propositions but is first and foremost a question of trust and trust needs to be directed towards another person not a mere proclamation. The quest is therefore essential in order to enable theology to build up a picture of the Jesus in whom people believe, historical study can contribute to the “faith-image” believers have of Jesus, as Norman Perrin expresses it. It also allows for a constant critical self examination by the Christian churches to ensure that their comfortable Christian domestications of Jesus are challenged by disclosing the historical Jesus’ nonconformist aspects. (John Meier) Study of the historical Jesus can thus be seen as an essential corrective to a theology which might otherwise lose sight of the fact that Jesus was a particular human being in history. The argument that questing for the historical Jesus eliminates the risk of faith must also be seriously questioned, it is not the case that Jesus’ disciples were exempt from having to take a risk of faith: there was a decision to be made as regards Jesus even then and just as there were some who accepted him, there were others who rejected him. It is also to be pointed out that Bultmann’s position is to a large extent a result of his Lutheran perspective (i.e., an aversion to anything that might seem like “righteousness from works” rather than faith alone), and one filtered through existentialism at that. A final reason to regard the quest for the historical Jesus as essential to Christian theology is that provided by Joachim Jeremias, who is on the opposite end of the spectrum to Bultmann and who could be regarded as holding a somewhat ‘extreme’ position. Jeremias argues that Christian theology takes its impetus primarily from the words of the earthly Jesus himself, and that these words are the basis of the Kerygma. The quest is therefore seen as absolutely essential to Christian theology for it could not really exist without it.
The quest can thus be seen as an important and necessary to Christian theology. It is not however, the basis from which to build theology and faith cannot be made dependent on historical research as Jeremias’ position might seem to suggest. Neither could the theological enterprise truly flourish it were made constantly to refer back to what exegetes are now saying about Jesus of Nazareth. Theology is fides quaerens intellectum, ‘faith seeking understanding’, the quest is a ‘secondary’ consideration for the theologian for whom the faith of the church must remain the principle starting point, as it is found already in the New Testament and in the creeds of the church. I would suggest that the best way for theology to regard the quest is as an aspect of apologetics. A theologian cannot be expected to undertake a task as great as a reconstruction of the historical Jesus as a sort of prolegomena to his theology. It is enough that two aspects of Jesus are regarded as pertaining to the earthly Jesus himself: that he regarded himself not simply as one amongst a long line of prophets but as the eschatological prophet and that the resurrection of Jesus can be shown to be historically credible. Whilst this notion of carrying out research for the historical Jesus will obviously be regarded by some as simply an attempt to legitimize Christian faith and thus be compromised by being in a certain sense ‘predetermined’, one can answer that claims to complete objectivity in scholarship are somewhat spurious and unattainable, as Crossan himself remarks and that much of the work of those who ‘discover’ a Jesus not particularly amenable to Christian theology is often compromised by the adoption of a post-Enlightenment worldview. The complaints, for example, that the work of someone like N.T. Wright simply present a ‘biblical Christ’ reveal a great deal about those critics, for such a complaint could come about only from those who set out with the presupposition that the historical Jesus simply could not be the biblical Christ. This also really begs the question whether a Christian theology can from the outset even regard the separation between ‘Christ of faith’ and ‘Jesus of history’ as legitimate. Of course one must then consider the importance at the very least of engaging in an attempt to prove the historicity of the gospels. The issue cannot simply be dismissed and theology cannot insist on the historical validity of the gospel accounts of Jesus without answering those who claim to be discovering a historical Jesus quite different from that proclaimed by Christian faith. This bears certain parallels to the debate over the relationship between theology and philosophy. Whilst one can take a ‘Barthian’ approach and insist on the self-sufficiency of theology and present it in an almost positivist way, the Christian tradition has for the most part acknowledged the need to dialogue with the ‘secular’ world in a manner which allows for an intellectually respectable expression of the Christian message, and which is thus capable of engaging with those ‘outside’. The fact that groups such as the Jesus Seminar have their findings entering the mainstream through the media requires that theology undertake historical research of its own, lest it leave the field entirely open to those who are finding a Jesus who has little affinity which that preached by faith.
In conclusion the Quest can be said to be essential to Christian theology but primarily as a minimalist task. It is enough for Christian theology to demonstrate that between the historical Jesus and later Christology there is a fundamental link which ensures that one does not think of theology as having simply invented a ‘Christ-myth’. A wholesale reconstruction of the historical Jesus by biblical scholars is perfectly legitimate and may prove an aid to theology but is not in and of itself an essential aspect of theology for which the gospel portraits of Jesus must serve as the norm. For it is these portraits which give us Jesus as he was seen through the eyes of faith and which present to theology the Jesus who is the object of Christian faith.
Part 1 of this series
Part 2 of this series
The quest can thus be seen as an important and necessary to Christian theology. It is not however, the basis from which to build theology and faith cannot be made dependent on historical research as Jeremias’ position might seem to suggest. Neither could the theological enterprise truly flourish it were made constantly to refer back to what exegetes are now saying about Jesus of Nazareth. Theology is fides quaerens intellectum, ‘faith seeking understanding’, the quest is a ‘secondary’ consideration for the theologian for whom the faith of the church must remain the principle starting point, as it is found already in the New Testament and in the creeds of the church. I would suggest that the best way for theology to regard the quest is as an aspect of apologetics. A theologian cannot be expected to undertake a task as great as a reconstruction of the historical Jesus as a sort of prolegomena to his theology. It is enough that two aspects of Jesus are regarded as pertaining to the earthly Jesus himself: that he regarded himself not simply as one amongst a long line of prophets but as the eschatological prophet and that the resurrection of Jesus can be shown to be historically credible. Whilst this notion of carrying out research for the historical Jesus will obviously be regarded by some as simply an attempt to legitimize Christian faith and thus be compromised by being in a certain sense ‘predetermined’, one can answer that claims to complete objectivity in scholarship are somewhat spurious and unattainable, as Crossan himself remarks and that much of the work of those who ‘discover’ a Jesus not particularly amenable to Christian theology is often compromised by the adoption of a post-Enlightenment worldview. The complaints, for example, that the work of someone like N.T. Wright simply present a ‘biblical Christ’ reveal a great deal about those critics, for such a complaint could come about only from those who set out with the presupposition that the historical Jesus simply could not be the biblical Christ. This also really begs the question whether a Christian theology can from the outset even regard the separation between ‘Christ of faith’ and ‘Jesus of history’ as legitimate. Of course one must then consider the importance at the very least of engaging in an attempt to prove the historicity of the gospels. The issue cannot simply be dismissed and theology cannot insist on the historical validity of the gospel accounts of Jesus without answering those who claim to be discovering a historical Jesus quite different from that proclaimed by Christian faith. This bears certain parallels to the debate over the relationship between theology and philosophy. Whilst one can take a ‘Barthian’ approach and insist on the self-sufficiency of theology and present it in an almost positivist way, the Christian tradition has for the most part acknowledged the need to dialogue with the ‘secular’ world in a manner which allows for an intellectually respectable expression of the Christian message, and which is thus capable of engaging with those ‘outside’. The fact that groups such as the Jesus Seminar have their findings entering the mainstream through the media requires that theology undertake historical research of its own, lest it leave the field entirely open to those who are finding a Jesus who has little affinity which that preached by faith.
In conclusion the Quest can be said to be essential to Christian theology but primarily as a minimalist task. It is enough for Christian theology to demonstrate that between the historical Jesus and later Christology there is a fundamental link which ensures that one does not think of theology as having simply invented a ‘Christ-myth’. A wholesale reconstruction of the historical Jesus by biblical scholars is perfectly legitimate and may prove an aid to theology but is not in and of itself an essential aspect of theology for which the gospel portraits of Jesus must serve as the norm. For it is these portraits which give us Jesus as he was seen through the eyes of faith and which present to theology the Jesus who is the object of Christian faith.
Part 1 of this series
Part 2 of this series
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Free Journal Access
Just a heads up for those who may be interested in reading scholarly theological articles but aren't at University and have no access to online databases, or maybe even those at University who don't have access to Sage Publications: if you sign up now you will have free access to all their journals until the 30th November and can download articles and so forth.
There are some theology journals there such as Studies in Christian Ethics, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Ecclesiology etc.
Might be of interest to some.
http://online.sagepub.com/
There are some theology journals there such as Studies in Christian Ethics, Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, Ecclesiology etc.
Might be of interest to some.
http://online.sagepub.com/
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
The Historical Jesus and Theology (2)
The 'idealist' position denying the quest for the Historical Jesus any theological relevance was adopted by the dialectical theologians of the 20th century such as Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann for whom any attempt to ground faith in historical certainty was theologically impermissible on the basis of the Sola Fides of the reformers. There is also the influence of Soren Kierkegaard, the ‘father’ of modern existentialism who stressed the either/or aspect of Christian faith, with the Christian message presenting itself as a challenge demanding existential commitment or rejection, not as an assertion to be historically verified before one made a decision. Bultmann expresses it thus: “The word of preaching confronts us as the word of God. It is not for us to question its credentials [by historical research]. It is we who are questioned.”
From this perspective then, it is theologically unnecessary to inquire into the details of Jesus’ life; moreover it may also be theologically impermissible as doing so would be an attempt to remove the risk of faith in response to the ‘preached Christ’. There is no possibility of absolute certainty, the only historical assertion necessary is that Jesus lived and died on a cross. This position frees theology from the contingent nature of historical research, and allows it to reflect on the Christian proclamation without fearing that its death knell might be pronounced at any moment by historical research: such a faith. as Karl Adam remarks, would be “useless”. A contemporary exponent of this view is Luke T. Johnson who argues in a similar manner to Kahler that the Gospel narratives are written with a focus primarily on Jesus’ death and resurrection. Whilst they are evidently concerned with Jesus’ humanity and aspects of his life and teaching, the emphasis does not lie there. Thus the proper object of theology is the Resurrected Christ as portrayed in the Gospels; for Johnson the quest for the historical Jesus cannot therefore be undertaken with primarily theological motives. The testimony of the Gospels themselves is that the death and Resurrection of Jesus are the normative basis for Christian theology.
This position, however, is one that is open to serious criticism. There are strong reasons to suppose that research into the life of Jesus is not only relevant but essential to Christian theology. One of the principle dangers inherent in denying the historical Jesus any relevance for theology is that theological affirmations become mere mythical assertions. Although one can affirm with Bultmann the independence of theology from historical research, one cannot go to the extreme that Bultmann went to, for if there was no objective historical event which correlates to theology’s assertions there would exist only a mythological idea. Thus even Karl Barth. who shared to a large extent similar convictions to Bultmann, became increasingly concerned at his existential approach to the Resurrection which appeared to suggest that it had no historical foundations and came to emphasise the empty tomb narratives (Barth however, maintained despite this that the resurrection remained closed to historical investigation). It is this apparent collapse into myth if one rejects the role of history in theology which justifies the Quest for theology.
The centrality of the notion of the incarnation to Christian theology is another reason why the Quest must be given attention. Christian faith is “an act of faith in the historical Jesus as the manifestation of God” (Crossan) and thus the words and deeds of the historical cannot be of no interest to theology which believes that the ‘Word was made flesh’ and entered history. This is pointed out by Ernst Kasemann, a student of Bultmann who inaugurated the ‘new quest’ in his 1953 lecture at Marburg. He remarks that even the Gospel of John, which is the most theological of the four and has developed its Christology further than the synoptics in the light of the resurrection faith, is nevertheless concerned with Jesus’ earthly history as the sphere wherein revelation takes place. The Easter experience did not render the experience of the earthly history of Jesus superfluous; it confirmed it. If this were not the case the Christian faith could be charged with creating “the Christ of salvation ‘on the occasion of’ Jesus of Nazareth”. If theology does not wish to become mythological but remain firmly grounded in history as the sphere of God’s revelation it must take account of the historical Jesus: “This inescapable Jesus-centeredness [for theology] is the result of the incarnation: it not only permits but demands historical study.” This concern with the implications of the doctrine of the incarnation for theology’s relationship with history is exemplified in the work of Pannenberg and his insistence on the resurrection of Jesus as an historical fact open to investigation. It is the contention of those theologians who stress the importance of the historical Jesus for theology that any dismissal of the earthly life of Jesus is a lapse into the heresy of docetism, where the Logos only has the appearance of being a human being.
Part 1 of this series
Part 3 of this series
From this perspective then, it is theologically unnecessary to inquire into the details of Jesus’ life; moreover it may also be theologically impermissible as doing so would be an attempt to remove the risk of faith in response to the ‘preached Christ’. There is no possibility of absolute certainty, the only historical assertion necessary is that Jesus lived and died on a cross. This position frees theology from the contingent nature of historical research, and allows it to reflect on the Christian proclamation without fearing that its death knell might be pronounced at any moment by historical research: such a faith. as Karl Adam remarks, would be “useless”. A contemporary exponent of this view is Luke T. Johnson who argues in a similar manner to Kahler that the Gospel narratives are written with a focus primarily on Jesus’ death and resurrection. Whilst they are evidently concerned with Jesus’ humanity and aspects of his life and teaching, the emphasis does not lie there. Thus the proper object of theology is the Resurrected Christ as portrayed in the Gospels; for Johnson the quest for the historical Jesus cannot therefore be undertaken with primarily theological motives. The testimony of the Gospels themselves is that the death and Resurrection of Jesus are the normative basis for Christian theology.
This position, however, is one that is open to serious criticism. There are strong reasons to suppose that research into the life of Jesus is not only relevant but essential to Christian theology. One of the principle dangers inherent in denying the historical Jesus any relevance for theology is that theological affirmations become mere mythical assertions. Although one can affirm with Bultmann the independence of theology from historical research, one cannot go to the extreme that Bultmann went to, for if there was no objective historical event which correlates to theology’s assertions there would exist only a mythological idea. Thus even Karl Barth. who shared to a large extent similar convictions to Bultmann, became increasingly concerned at his existential approach to the Resurrection which appeared to suggest that it had no historical foundations and came to emphasise the empty tomb narratives (Barth however, maintained despite this that the resurrection remained closed to historical investigation). It is this apparent collapse into myth if one rejects the role of history in theology which justifies the Quest for theology.
The centrality of the notion of the incarnation to Christian theology is another reason why the Quest must be given attention. Christian faith is “an act of faith in the historical Jesus as the manifestation of God” (Crossan) and thus the words and deeds of the historical cannot be of no interest to theology which believes that the ‘Word was made flesh’ and entered history. This is pointed out by Ernst Kasemann, a student of Bultmann who inaugurated the ‘new quest’ in his 1953 lecture at Marburg. He remarks that even the Gospel of John, which is the most theological of the four and has developed its Christology further than the synoptics in the light of the resurrection faith, is nevertheless concerned with Jesus’ earthly history as the sphere wherein revelation takes place. The Easter experience did not render the experience of the earthly history of Jesus superfluous; it confirmed it. If this were not the case the Christian faith could be charged with creating “the Christ of salvation ‘on the occasion of’ Jesus of Nazareth”. If theology does not wish to become mythological but remain firmly grounded in history as the sphere of God’s revelation it must take account of the historical Jesus: “This inescapable Jesus-centeredness [for theology] is the result of the incarnation: it not only permits but demands historical study.” This concern with the implications of the doctrine of the incarnation for theology’s relationship with history is exemplified in the work of Pannenberg and his insistence on the resurrection of Jesus as an historical fact open to investigation. It is the contention of those theologians who stress the importance of the historical Jesus for theology that any dismissal of the earthly life of Jesus is a lapse into the heresy of docetism, where the Logos only has the appearance of being a human being.
Part 1 of this series
Part 3 of this series
Thursday, November 8, 2007
History and Theology: Is the Historical Jesus essential to Christian Theology?
Historical-critical research on the Gospels has, in the eyes of many, rendered an uncritical acceptance of the Gospel texts as completely historical accounts documenting the words and deeds of Jesus of Nazareth, impossible. It has long been acknowledged that the Gospels (our principle source for information on the historical Jesus) are not objectively neutral accounts of the life of Jesus in the manner one might expect of a modern biography but confessional documents written in the light of the faith of a community which believed Jesus to have risen from the dead after his crucifixion therefore being vindicated and exalted by God. This recognition lead to the distinction being made between the ‘historical Jesus’ and the ‘Christ of faith’. The question Christian faith and theology must face is whether the search for the historical Jesus is in fact of importance, perhaps even essential to theology or whether theology need only be concerned with the Christ of faith. The theological issue lies in the ambiguous nature of historical research which does not produce definitive results; the question is therefore naturally raised about whether these results can serve as the base for theological assertions, or whether theology is essentially independent of historical investigation.
One approach to this problem is to deny the quest for the historical Jesus any theological relevance. This position can take a basically ‘idealist’ form in which the question of the historical Jesus is regarded as irrelevant due to the fact that it is the symbol of Christ as a source of religious and ethical guidance and challenge which is considered of utmost importance. This position is not one which can be adopted by theologians who would wish to classify themselves as essentially Christian. The most common approach which pays little heed to the historical Jesus as a source for theological affirmations is that which affirms the historical Jesus as a presupposition for the kerygma of the Christian community but is not concerned about learning the details of Jesus’ life. This position can be seen as having originated with Martin Kahler, the first great critic of the ‘life of Jesus’ research, in his lecture ‘The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ’. It was Kahler’s contention that “the historical Jesus of modern authors conceals from us the living Christ”. For Christian faith which believed Jesus to be the “unique sinless person” there could be no use of historical analysis which uses analogy to determine its results. Whilst Kahler’s argument was directed against the original ‘liberal’ quest for the historical Jesus and thus may not actually apply to the newer quests which can be viewed as possible and legitimate, he makes extremely pertinent points which must be answered by Christian theology. His concern about how one can come to know Jesus Christ is of great importance: would humanity need recourse to historical-critical methods in order to believe? The point being made is that historical research cannot be normative for faith, or as Kahler expresses it: “I cannot find sure footing in probabilities or in a shifting mass of details the reliability of which is constantly changing”.
Part 2 of this topic
Part 3 of this topic
One approach to this problem is to deny the quest for the historical Jesus any theological relevance. This position can take a basically ‘idealist’ form in which the question of the historical Jesus is regarded as irrelevant due to the fact that it is the symbol of Christ as a source of religious and ethical guidance and challenge which is considered of utmost importance. This position is not one which can be adopted by theologians who would wish to classify themselves as essentially Christian. The most common approach which pays little heed to the historical Jesus as a source for theological affirmations is that which affirms the historical Jesus as a presupposition for the kerygma of the Christian community but is not concerned about learning the details of Jesus’ life. This position can be seen as having originated with Martin Kahler, the first great critic of the ‘life of Jesus’ research, in his lecture ‘The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ’. It was Kahler’s contention that “the historical Jesus of modern authors conceals from us the living Christ”. For Christian faith which believed Jesus to be the “unique sinless person” there could be no use of historical analysis which uses analogy to determine its results. Whilst Kahler’s argument was directed against the original ‘liberal’ quest for the historical Jesus and thus may not actually apply to the newer quests which can be viewed as possible and legitimate, he makes extremely pertinent points which must be answered by Christian theology. His concern about how one can come to know Jesus Christ is of great importance: would humanity need recourse to historical-critical methods in order to believe? The point being made is that historical research cannot be normative for faith, or as Kahler expresses it: “I cannot find sure footing in probabilities or in a shifting mass of details the reliability of which is constantly changing”.
Part 2 of this topic
Part 3 of this topic
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Some More Reflections on Rahner
Recent expositions of his work have called into question the idea that the transcendental philosophy which Rahner adopts is crucial to his theology. The rather ad hoc approach of Rahner to theology has been pointed out; he preferred essays rather than systematic treatises. Even Fergus Kerr, who in an earlier post was referred to as pointed out a basically Cartesian starting point for Rahner has come to Rahner's defence. He does this in the final chapter of his Immortal Longings where he discusses Balthasar's critique of Rahner. According to Kerr, Balthasar is striking out at phantoms so to speak, when he charges Rahner's theology with reducing the particularity of the Christian faith to the mere expression of the human subject's self transcendence. I'm afraid I can't elaborate further on Kerr's analysis as I read the chapter some years ago and no longer have access to the book. I would definitely recommend that anyone interested in a defence of Rahner read this chapter.
Now, it need not be denied that the language in which Rahner expressed his conviction that the human person reaches beyond himself to an answer to which he is the question is not particularly felicitous and there is always the danger that such a theology will be all too anthropocentric. However, is it really all that different to the Augustinian emphasis on man's desire for God? "Thou hast made us unto thyself [ad te], and our heart is restless, until it find rest in thee."
Rahner's own evaluations of his work should also be taken into account. His disavowals of being a 'systematic' theologian and of actually being something of a dilettante should be taken as more than just false humility on his part. In later interviews he also distanced himself from certain aspects of his work and did not like being pigeon-holed into the philosopher-theologian niche based on readings of his early work and called Spirit and Hearers "lopsided works of my youth" (Faith in a Wintry Season). Rahner also became increasingly aware of the plurality of philosophies, the impossibility of one, single unifying philosophy - what he called "gnoseological concupiscence". These evaluations by Rahner of his own work militate against 'foundationalist' readings of Rahner.
I think no clearer statement can be found on the centrality of Jesus Christ for theology than this one by Rahner:
"Christianity's concretissimum for which alone it stands, is Jesus Christ, who in accepting death and suffering for us (and in no other way) has created our relationship of immediacy before God, and the Church, which looks for the Kingdom which is yet to be fulfilled and which is not identical with the humanism we ourselves have produced or shall produce in the near future."
Rahner thus emphatically affirms the capacity for the Christian faith to disrupt and transform as much as he affirms its power to complete and intensify our deepest spiritual longings.
But although grace may disrupt nature but whilst it overturns the creature's expectations it also fulfils their deepest desires. Grace is first and foremost God's self-communication, the gift of himself. This is not something 'alien' to human nature, but humanity's self-fulfilment, the bringing to completion of the human being's desire for God. To reject this is to reject an entire strand of Christian tradition.
For those who feel that Rahner's theology is too 'universal' it is perhaps worth bearing in mind what Rahner says here: "Just because grace is free and unmerited this does not mean that it is rare (theology has been led astray for too long already by the tacit assumption that grace would no longer be grace if God became too free with it)." (Nature and Grace, Dilemmas in the Modern Church)
As for Rahner's much contested Vorgriff auf Esse - the pre-apprehension of being: does not Balthasar require this too? He admits it himself, otherwise the human being would not be able to recognise the coming of beauty. To an extent then, the differences between Rahner and Balthasar are a difference in emphasis.
Given Rahner's views on God's offer of himself as a constitutive element of humanity, it becomes clear that reflection on human experience is not going to provide merely the structures of a 'purely' human nature, but of a human nature already historically engraced and existing in the presence of the divine.
Rahner also introduces the notion of "negative philosophy" by which he meant that all philosophical reflections on human experience are inadequate to the task. This along with his emphasis on the pluralism of philosophies once again undermines the idea that Rahner adopted one particular philosophy to serve as the foundation of his theology. He explicitly rejected this possibility.
Other writers have highlighted the principle source for Rahner's theology: his spirituality. Rahner's work is ultimately rooted in his Ignatian spirituality, with its emphasis on "finding God in all things." I think this emphasis on Rahner's sprituality is salutary. One book on Rahner aptly describes him as a "mystic of everyday life" and this is one of the principle reasons I am drawn to Rahner. He speaks to the situation ordinary men and women find themselves in during the daily struggles and also joys of life. One can read many a brilliant theologian and wonder how on earth all they say relates to their own life. Not so with Rahner. He writes on sleep, on work, on eating. Anyone new to Rahner could do no better than start with his writings on prayer and the spiritual life, for these are the wellspring of his theology, not his early philosophical works.
It is also important to bear in mind the context in which Rahner formulated his ideas about "anonymous Christians". First of all, he was not the first, Barth and de Lubac had already begun considering this. Barth in his assertion that in our dealings with those to whom we are directed to preach the gospel we are not encountering an 'actual' Christian but "certainly a virtual or potential Christian" (!) Balthasar too, would not wish to deny it. The notion of an implicit "baptism of desire" could also be seen as belonging to this tradition. One of the occasions when the idea of an "anonymous Christian" comes up is in an essay entitled "The Christian and Unbelieving Relations" - as one can see just from the title, there is a very practical starting point here; it arises from a specific, concrete situation that many Christians find themselves in and the purpose of the essay is to develop the idea that a Christian need not remain in agonising anxiety as regards the eschatological fate of relations who do not believe. The starting point for all these reflections was, again, NOT his transcendental philosophy, but the Christian doctrine of God's universal salvific will. Rahner recognises this hope for all when he says that all people “including the good Christians, enter silently into the darkness of God, and no mortal eye follows them there on their way, no earthly ear listens to the judgment of their eternity. But this uncertainty can be contained within the hope for all.” (The Christian among Unbelieving Relations, TI 3)
Could this not have come from the pen of Balthasar himself? Consider for example Balthasar's impassioned defence of the possibility of the salvation of all men in Dare we hope? This issue was one of supreme concern for Balthasar. Could the difference between the two lie in the fact that Balthasar sees no need for the development of a formal scheme for how the salvation of non-Christians can take place? Or rather, that he sees the inherent dangers in doing so? (i.e. the possible relativisation of Christianity). But is it not the task for Christian theology to work out these issues in its reflection on the faith? Nostra Aetate perhaps is a pointer: it remained silent on the issue - but is this just a matter of leaving it open to theologians to work it out? Rahner thought so.
Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday provides powerful hope for the salvation of all men, but I'm worried it remains somewhat 'gnostic' and fails to account for how grace is encountered in this life. Human beings are socio-historical beings, how is grace encountered if not through concrete practices? Thus Rahner's assertion that grace can be encountered in lawful religions and that the religions themselves are the means by which grace becomes available seems necessary. Of course, Rahner never said that all religions were necessarily lawful or that they were not in a gravely deficient situation as opposed to Christianity. He explicitly does argue this and never goes as far as one of his followers such as Jacques Dupuis who calls the religions "paths of salvation" and refuses to accept that they are merely "transitory" as Rahner insisted.
Rahner also addressed the issue of whether his speculations rendered Christianity a mere superfluous and explicit manifestation of what is already there implicity: "Anonymous Christianity does not render explicit Christianity superfluous, but rather itself demands it, and that there would no longer be any anonymous Christianity . . . if he upon whom it is bestowed as offering were radically to close himself to any explicit Christianity" - (Anonymous Christianity and the Missionary Task of the Church, TI 12)
As Rahner put it: a seed has no right to refuse to grow into a plant. One could not choose to remain in the implicit depths of faith once encountered with the explicit offer of Christianity existentially efficacious - to do so would be to reject grace.
Rahner was adamant that Christianity was the one, true valid religion and that "wherever in practice Christianity reaches man in the real urgency and rigour of his actual existence, Christianity - once understood - presents itself as the only still valid religion for this man, a necessary means for salvation." (Christianity and Non-Christian Religions, TI 5)
As regards the charge that the theory of "anonymous Christians" does away with the Church's missionary imperative I'd be inclined to suggest that the theory behind the terminology is in fact helpful in explaining how mission may even be possible! Look, in contrast, at post-liberal theories of "incommensurability": if it is really true that different religions are wholly incommensurable then the missionary has a serious problem in addressing what is going to be a completely alien language to those he wishes to 'win over'. If it is really the case that non-Christians have no experience of the grace which flows from Christ, then any preaching of the Christian message will be falling on deaf ears. They will not be able to understand and they will see no reason why this message relates to them at all.
The terminology is perhaps unfortunate and Rahner did not pretend otherwise. It was never meant to signify that Christianity could ever forego its character of proclamation and witness. Likewise from the perspective that it is a somewhat 'arrogant' or 'imperialistic' appelation: he did not intend it to be used in inter-religious dialogue. That said, I find the criticism that the term is problematic because it is in some way offensive an odd one. It is the consequence of a resolute adherence to the truth that Jesus Christ is the absolute, universal saviour, that all grace flows from him. One cannot really take issue with the principle of the matter without also taking issue with a central truth of the Christian faith.
It is not the case that 'special revelation' is merely one instance of general revelation as has been claimed. For Rahner, 'general revelation' (or transcendental revelation as he puts it) flows from the special revelation in Jesus Christ. This is obviously not a chronological dependence.
There is obviously a tension between the two different visions represented by two theologians such as Rahner and von Balthasar, but I do neet feel that they are wholly incommensurable, and what is needed is not the opting for one over the other, but a means by which to hold the two in balance as two different 'poles' of the same Christian faith. We must definitely not"genuflect before the world" as Jacques Maritain had it. But neither should the relationship between Christianity and 'the world' be construed in too dialectical a fashion. In uniting the two poles, we ought to aim at a Christian humanism, that whilst giving due emphasis to the transformative power of the Christian message, does not thereby cut off all ties with the religious element of humanity as such. The religious strivings of humanity are not simply a "fabrica idolorum" (as Balthasar affirmed).
Considering there are 23 volumes of Rahner's Theological Investigations available in English, which cover countless different topics related to doctrine, ecclesiology, spirituality and various other questions that address themselves to Christians today, the idea that Rahner is somehow 'overrated' and not really worth reading any longer needs to justify itself more fully. Rahner is not best read as the author of a 'system' which must either be accepted or rejected wholesale. Dip into his essays, focus on matters that interest you at any given moment, you are sure to find incisive creative wisdom from the man whom von Balthasar himself considered "to be, on the whole, the strongest theological power of our time."
Now, it need not be denied that the language in which Rahner expressed his conviction that the human person reaches beyond himself to an answer to which he is the question is not particularly felicitous and there is always the danger that such a theology will be all too anthropocentric. However, is it really all that different to the Augustinian emphasis on man's desire for God? "Thou hast made us unto thyself [ad te], and our heart is restless, until it find rest in thee."
Rahner's own evaluations of his work should also be taken into account. His disavowals of being a 'systematic' theologian and of actually being something of a dilettante should be taken as more than just false humility on his part. In later interviews he also distanced himself from certain aspects of his work and did not like being pigeon-holed into the philosopher-theologian niche based on readings of his early work and called Spirit and Hearers "lopsided works of my youth" (Faith in a Wintry Season). Rahner also became increasingly aware of the plurality of philosophies, the impossibility of one, single unifying philosophy - what he called "gnoseological concupiscence". These evaluations by Rahner of his own work militate against 'foundationalist' readings of Rahner.
I think no clearer statement can be found on the centrality of Jesus Christ for theology than this one by Rahner:
"Christianity's concretissimum for which alone it stands, is Jesus Christ, who in accepting death and suffering for us (and in no other way) has created our relationship of immediacy before God, and the Church, which looks for the Kingdom which is yet to be fulfilled and which is not identical with the humanism we ourselves have produced or shall produce in the near future."
Rahner thus emphatically affirms the capacity for the Christian faith to disrupt and transform as much as he affirms its power to complete and intensify our deepest spiritual longings.
But although grace may disrupt nature but whilst it overturns the creature's expectations it also fulfils their deepest desires. Grace is first and foremost God's self-communication, the gift of himself. This is not something 'alien' to human nature, but humanity's self-fulfilment, the bringing to completion of the human being's desire for God. To reject this is to reject an entire strand of Christian tradition.
For those who feel that Rahner's theology is too 'universal' it is perhaps worth bearing in mind what Rahner says here: "Just because grace is free and unmerited this does not mean that it is rare (theology has been led astray for too long already by the tacit assumption that grace would no longer be grace if God became too free with it)." (Nature and Grace, Dilemmas in the Modern Church)
As for Rahner's much contested Vorgriff auf Esse - the pre-apprehension of being: does not Balthasar require this too? He admits it himself, otherwise the human being would not be able to recognise the coming of beauty. To an extent then, the differences between Rahner and Balthasar are a difference in emphasis.
Given Rahner's views on God's offer of himself as a constitutive element of humanity, it becomes clear that reflection on human experience is not going to provide merely the structures of a 'purely' human nature, but of a human nature already historically engraced and existing in the presence of the divine.
Rahner also introduces the notion of "negative philosophy" by which he meant that all philosophical reflections on human experience are inadequate to the task. This along with his emphasis on the pluralism of philosophies once again undermines the idea that Rahner adopted one particular philosophy to serve as the foundation of his theology. He explicitly rejected this possibility.
Other writers have highlighted the principle source for Rahner's theology: his spirituality. Rahner's work is ultimately rooted in his Ignatian spirituality, with its emphasis on "finding God in all things." I think this emphasis on Rahner's sprituality is salutary. One book on Rahner aptly describes him as a "mystic of everyday life" and this is one of the principle reasons I am drawn to Rahner. He speaks to the situation ordinary men and women find themselves in during the daily struggles and also joys of life. One can read many a brilliant theologian and wonder how on earth all they say relates to their own life. Not so with Rahner. He writes on sleep, on work, on eating. Anyone new to Rahner could do no better than start with his writings on prayer and the spiritual life, for these are the wellspring of his theology, not his early philosophical works.
It is also important to bear in mind the context in which Rahner formulated his ideas about "anonymous Christians". First of all, he was not the first, Barth and de Lubac had already begun considering this. Barth in his assertion that in our dealings with those to whom we are directed to preach the gospel we are not encountering an 'actual' Christian but "certainly a virtual or potential Christian" (!) Balthasar too, would not wish to deny it. The notion of an implicit "baptism of desire" could also be seen as belonging to this tradition. One of the occasions when the idea of an "anonymous Christian" comes up is in an essay entitled "The Christian and Unbelieving Relations" - as one can see just from the title, there is a very practical starting point here; it arises from a specific, concrete situation that many Christians find themselves in and the purpose of the essay is to develop the idea that a Christian need not remain in agonising anxiety as regards the eschatological fate of relations who do not believe. The starting point for all these reflections was, again, NOT his transcendental philosophy, but the Christian doctrine of God's universal salvific will. Rahner recognises this hope for all when he says that all people “including the good Christians, enter silently into the darkness of God, and no mortal eye follows them there on their way, no earthly ear listens to the judgment of their eternity. But this uncertainty can be contained within the hope for all.” (The Christian among Unbelieving Relations, TI 3)
Could this not have come from the pen of Balthasar himself? Consider for example Balthasar's impassioned defence of the possibility of the salvation of all men in Dare we hope? This issue was one of supreme concern for Balthasar. Could the difference between the two lie in the fact that Balthasar sees no need for the development of a formal scheme for how the salvation of non-Christians can take place? Or rather, that he sees the inherent dangers in doing so? (i.e. the possible relativisation of Christianity). But is it not the task for Christian theology to work out these issues in its reflection on the faith? Nostra Aetate perhaps is a pointer: it remained silent on the issue - but is this just a matter of leaving it open to theologians to work it out? Rahner thought so.
Balthasar's theology of Holy Saturday provides powerful hope for the salvation of all men, but I'm worried it remains somewhat 'gnostic' and fails to account for how grace is encountered in this life. Human beings are socio-historical beings, how is grace encountered if not through concrete practices? Thus Rahner's assertion that grace can be encountered in lawful religions and that the religions themselves are the means by which grace becomes available seems necessary. Of course, Rahner never said that all religions were necessarily lawful or that they were not in a gravely deficient situation as opposed to Christianity. He explicitly does argue this and never goes as far as one of his followers such as Jacques Dupuis who calls the religions "paths of salvation" and refuses to accept that they are merely "transitory" as Rahner insisted.
Rahner also addressed the issue of whether his speculations rendered Christianity a mere superfluous and explicit manifestation of what is already there implicity: "Anonymous Christianity does not render explicit Christianity superfluous, but rather itself demands it, and that there would no longer be any anonymous Christianity . . . if he upon whom it is bestowed as offering were radically to close himself to any explicit Christianity" - (Anonymous Christianity and the Missionary Task of the Church, TI 12)
As Rahner put it: a seed has no right to refuse to grow into a plant. One could not choose to remain in the implicit depths of faith once encountered with the explicit offer of Christianity existentially efficacious - to do so would be to reject grace.
Rahner was adamant that Christianity was the one, true valid religion and that "wherever in practice Christianity reaches man in the real urgency and rigour of his actual existence, Christianity - once understood - presents itself as the only still valid religion for this man, a necessary means for salvation." (Christianity and Non-Christian Religions, TI 5)
As regards the charge that the theory of "anonymous Christians" does away with the Church's missionary imperative I'd be inclined to suggest that the theory behind the terminology is in fact helpful in explaining how mission may even be possible! Look, in contrast, at post-liberal theories of "incommensurability": if it is really true that different religions are wholly incommensurable then the missionary has a serious problem in addressing what is going to be a completely alien language to those he wishes to 'win over'. If it is really the case that non-Christians have no experience of the grace which flows from Christ, then any preaching of the Christian message will be falling on deaf ears. They will not be able to understand and they will see no reason why this message relates to them at all.
The terminology is perhaps unfortunate and Rahner did not pretend otherwise. It was never meant to signify that Christianity could ever forego its character of proclamation and witness. Likewise from the perspective that it is a somewhat 'arrogant' or 'imperialistic' appelation: he did not intend it to be used in inter-religious dialogue. That said, I find the criticism that the term is problematic because it is in some way offensive an odd one. It is the consequence of a resolute adherence to the truth that Jesus Christ is the absolute, universal saviour, that all grace flows from him. One cannot really take issue with the principle of the matter without also taking issue with a central truth of the Christian faith.
It is not the case that 'special revelation' is merely one instance of general revelation as has been claimed. For Rahner, 'general revelation' (or transcendental revelation as he puts it) flows from the special revelation in Jesus Christ. This is obviously not a chronological dependence.
There is obviously a tension between the two different visions represented by two theologians such as Rahner and von Balthasar, but I do neet feel that they are wholly incommensurable, and what is needed is not the opting for one over the other, but a means by which to hold the two in balance as two different 'poles' of the same Christian faith. We must definitely not"genuflect before the world" as Jacques Maritain had it. But neither should the relationship between Christianity and 'the world' be construed in too dialectical a fashion. In uniting the two poles, we ought to aim at a Christian humanism, that whilst giving due emphasis to the transformative power of the Christian message, does not thereby cut off all ties with the religious element of humanity as such. The religious strivings of humanity are not simply a "fabrica idolorum" (as Balthasar affirmed).
Considering there are 23 volumes of Rahner's Theological Investigations available in English, which cover countless different topics related to doctrine, ecclesiology, spirituality and various other questions that address themselves to Christians today, the idea that Rahner is somehow 'overrated' and not really worth reading any longer needs to justify itself more fully. Rahner is not best read as the author of a 'system' which must either be accepted or rejected wholesale. Dip into his essays, focus on matters that interest you at any given moment, you are sure to find incisive creative wisdom from the man whom von Balthasar himself considered "to be, on the whole, the strongest theological power of our time."
Sunday, October 21, 2007
Charles de Foucauld Quote
"To love anyone is to hope in him for always. From the moment at which we begin to judge anyone, to limit our confidence in him, from the moment at which we identify him with what we know of him and so reduce him to that, we cease to love him and he ceases to be able to be better."
- Charles de Foucauld
- Charles de Foucauld
Monday, October 15, 2007
The Charge Against Rahner (Part 2): Anonymous Christians?
Man’s implicit knowledge of God is a ‘transcendental revelation’ which remains somewhat shadowy and moves towards an explicit, categorical revelation. This revelation is Jesus Christ. Other religions, however, can be seen as legitimate means of salvation insofar as they have not yet encountered the truth of Christianity in an existentially meaningful way. He states that his view of other religions is analogous to the religion of Israel which was a lawful religion which enabled its faithful adherents to attain salvation. If non-Christians are to be saved then they must be able to receive grace through their religious traditions (for man is a socio-historical being). All this does not relativise Christianity which remains the absolute religion and Jesus Christ the final mediator of grace. For Rahner then, adherents of other religions can be viewed as “anonymous Christians” because they receive grace which ultimately derives from Christ himself even though they remain ignorant of this fact. Rahner is opposed to the approach of “dialectical theology” to the theology of religions which posits a sharp distinction between the revelation of Christianity and the unbelief and humanly constructed character which permeates the other religions. This is so because of his transcendental anthropology wherein all humanity is implicitly seeking God.
One of the major criticisms of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” is that it seems to do away with the salvific efficacy of Christ’s death on the cross. Karl Rahner asks the question of how Jesus Christ can be said to be present in the lives of non-Christians. He affirms that Christ is present in the lives of these individuals through the presence of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is present through the “merits of Christ.” Here Rahner, however, encounters a problem. He does not wish to assert that Christ’s death in anyway ‘changes the mind of God’ – he appears to have a somewhat crude atonement theory in mind wherein the mind of a capricious God is appeased through the sacrifice of his Son. He wants to steer clear of any such notions and also maintain the basic continuity of the revelation of Christ with general, transcendental revelation – it is simply a fuller revelation of what was already implicit – the historical and dramatic aspect of the Christ-event is downplayed. Thus Rahner posits that rather than being an ‘efficient cause’ of God’s grace (i.e. it actually brings it about), the Cross is to be seen as the ‘final’ cause of God’s grace – the sign of his irrevocable and tangible gift of the Spirit for our salvation. It seems clear that Rahner has abandoned the traditional Christian emphasis on the salvific efficacy of the Cross of Christ of which the New Testament is replete. In so doing he also seems to minimise the tragic aspects of life and the brokenness and sinfulness of our human condition. In a sense his theory can appear overly optimistic – he downplays the extent to which human beings reject God’s offer of Himself for a far more optimistic notion that in confronting adherents of other religions one should approach them as if they were already living a life of grace and so are “anonymous Christians”.
This leads on to a second major criticism of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” and that is that it appears to render mission somewhat superfluous. If God’s universal salvific will (and this cannot be denied regardless of what position one takes regarding Rahner) means that humanity is already ‘enveloped’ in grace and on the path to salvation – the necessity of preaching the gospel “to the ends of the earth” appears to lose its urgency. As the then Cardinal Ratizinger points out, all individuals now seem to be able to be saved simply by virtue of fully accepting their humanity and the Christian “plus” is merely that he realises he is grasped by God’s love. This seems apparent in the following passage by Rahner: “anyone who courageously accepts life…has really already accepted God.” The particularity of Christianity, the necessity of the Church, the sacramental system and so forth no longer appear absolutely necessary. The explicit proclamation of having heard Jesus’ call and responded to it are of the essence of Christianity and the formation of disciples and preaching the word is absolutely necessary for this to take place. If others are “anonymous Christians”, however, this urgency is lost, for by becoming Christian, people would merely be moving into the realm of the explicit and visible sign of God’s self-communication. The notion of conversion seems to disappear. Rahner is sensitive to these criticisms and argues that implicit faith is always striving to be made explicit and so all people are still called to become members of the Church. He also adds that Christians have a greater chance of salvation than those who remain outside. Despite these attempted assurances (and Rahner’s basically orthodox intentions cannot be doubted) it is difficult to dismiss the charge that the notion of the “anonymous Christian” does certainly make mission seem far less of an important issue than the major task of the Church which it has long been held to be. Rahner does state, however, that anyone who closed himself off to ‘explicit faith’ could not be justified by implicit faith and so the basic problem may lie to an extent in Rahner’s use of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ which certainly tends towards a misunderstanding of Rahner’s position as making the ‘explicit’ superfluous. Von Balthasar charged Rahner with basically positing an Enlightenment version of religion, a general theory of religion – universally applicable to all men and doing away with particularity.
Or so the story goes. But is it a fair account of Rahner's position? Does his theology ultimately end up with Christians annihilating themselves, as Balthasar has it in his dialogue between the commissar and the Christian (a Rahnerian) in The Moment of Christian Witness? "You've liquidated yourselves and spared us the trouble"...
Another criticism of Rahner has been directed at him from both so-called ‘pluralists’ and ‘exclusivists’. This is that the term “anonymous Christian” is in fact ‘imperialistic’ and an impediment to dialogue. John Hick is one who has thus accused Rahner – stating that if one regards the adherents of non-Christian religions as basically ‘crypto-Christians’ then one is simply imposing a Christian identity on them whether they like it or not. Rahner, however, never meant for the term to be used in the confrontation with other religions, rather it was an intra-Christian term. The force of the argument is somewhat nullified when one considers that Hick basically tells adherents of all religions (including Christianity) that their beliefs and practices are simply expressions of a common religious experience of man and that he knows better than all of them what their fundamental beliefs really are. Rahner is working within a Christian dogmatic framework and any charges of ‘arrogance’ are simply misplaced – they are essentially arguments against the claims of Christianity to be the absolute religion – one can argue against this if one wishes but in doing so one ceases to be a Christian. Similarly Lindbeck argues that any notions of “implicit faith” such as the “anonymous Christian” are a hindrance to dialogue. It is better, says Lindbeck to dispense with any such designations and treat the other religions as they would like to be treated – as distinct readings of being. “The otherness of the other” (Milbank) is thereby respected and an authentic dialogue can commence. There is certainly some force to this argument and it certainly appears more honest than when Hick levels it at Rahner.
One of the major criticisms of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” is that it seems to do away with the salvific efficacy of Christ’s death on the cross. Karl Rahner asks the question of how Jesus Christ can be said to be present in the lives of non-Christians. He affirms that Christ is present in the lives of these individuals through the presence of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is present through the “merits of Christ.” Here Rahner, however, encounters a problem. He does not wish to assert that Christ’s death in anyway ‘changes the mind of God’ – he appears to have a somewhat crude atonement theory in mind wherein the mind of a capricious God is appeased through the sacrifice of his Son. He wants to steer clear of any such notions and also maintain the basic continuity of the revelation of Christ with general, transcendental revelation – it is simply a fuller revelation of what was already implicit – the historical and dramatic aspect of the Christ-event is downplayed. Thus Rahner posits that rather than being an ‘efficient cause’ of God’s grace (i.e. it actually brings it about), the Cross is to be seen as the ‘final’ cause of God’s grace – the sign of his irrevocable and tangible gift of the Spirit for our salvation. It seems clear that Rahner has abandoned the traditional Christian emphasis on the salvific efficacy of the Cross of Christ of which the New Testament is replete. In so doing he also seems to minimise the tragic aspects of life and the brokenness and sinfulness of our human condition. In a sense his theory can appear overly optimistic – he downplays the extent to which human beings reject God’s offer of Himself for a far more optimistic notion that in confronting adherents of other religions one should approach them as if they were already living a life of grace and so are “anonymous Christians”.
This leads on to a second major criticism of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” and that is that it appears to render mission somewhat superfluous. If God’s universal salvific will (and this cannot be denied regardless of what position one takes regarding Rahner) means that humanity is already ‘enveloped’ in grace and on the path to salvation – the necessity of preaching the gospel “to the ends of the earth” appears to lose its urgency. As the then Cardinal Ratizinger points out, all individuals now seem to be able to be saved simply by virtue of fully accepting their humanity and the Christian “plus” is merely that he realises he is grasped by God’s love. This seems apparent in the following passage by Rahner: “anyone who courageously accepts life…has really already accepted God.” The particularity of Christianity, the necessity of the Church, the sacramental system and so forth no longer appear absolutely necessary. The explicit proclamation of having heard Jesus’ call and responded to it are of the essence of Christianity and the formation of disciples and preaching the word is absolutely necessary for this to take place. If others are “anonymous Christians”, however, this urgency is lost, for by becoming Christian, people would merely be moving into the realm of the explicit and visible sign of God’s self-communication. The notion of conversion seems to disappear. Rahner is sensitive to these criticisms and argues that implicit faith is always striving to be made explicit and so all people are still called to become members of the Church. He also adds that Christians have a greater chance of salvation than those who remain outside. Despite these attempted assurances (and Rahner’s basically orthodox intentions cannot be doubted) it is difficult to dismiss the charge that the notion of the “anonymous Christian” does certainly make mission seem far less of an important issue than the major task of the Church which it has long been held to be. Rahner does state, however, that anyone who closed himself off to ‘explicit faith’ could not be justified by implicit faith and so the basic problem may lie to an extent in Rahner’s use of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ which certainly tends towards a misunderstanding of Rahner’s position as making the ‘explicit’ superfluous. Von Balthasar charged Rahner with basically positing an Enlightenment version of religion, a general theory of religion – universally applicable to all men and doing away with particularity.
Or so the story goes. But is it a fair account of Rahner's position? Does his theology ultimately end up with Christians annihilating themselves, as Balthasar has it in his dialogue between the commissar and the Christian (a Rahnerian) in The Moment of Christian Witness? "You've liquidated yourselves and spared us the trouble"...
Another criticism of Rahner has been directed at him from both so-called ‘pluralists’ and ‘exclusivists’. This is that the term “anonymous Christian” is in fact ‘imperialistic’ and an impediment to dialogue. John Hick is one who has thus accused Rahner – stating that if one regards the adherents of non-Christian religions as basically ‘crypto-Christians’ then one is simply imposing a Christian identity on them whether they like it or not. Rahner, however, never meant for the term to be used in the confrontation with other religions, rather it was an intra-Christian term. The force of the argument is somewhat nullified when one considers that Hick basically tells adherents of all religions (including Christianity) that their beliefs and practices are simply expressions of a common religious experience of man and that he knows better than all of them what their fundamental beliefs really are. Rahner is working within a Christian dogmatic framework and any charges of ‘arrogance’ are simply misplaced – they are essentially arguments against the claims of Christianity to be the absolute religion – one can argue against this if one wishes but in doing so one ceases to be a Christian. Similarly Lindbeck argues that any notions of “implicit faith” such as the “anonymous Christian” are a hindrance to dialogue. It is better, says Lindbeck to dispense with any such designations and treat the other religions as they would like to be treated – as distinct readings of being. “The otherness of the other” (Milbank) is thereby respected and an authentic dialogue can commence. There is certainly some force to this argument and it certainly appears more honest than when Hick levels it at Rahner.
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Balthasar Blog Conference
I'm not sure if this is the first theology 'blog conference' but it's certainly an interesting idea. It's being hosted at the Fire and the Rose blog.
The topic is “Von Balthasar’s Theological Interpretation of Scripture.” Not something I'm terribly familiar with so it should prove to be enlightening.
A NT scholar whilst I was in University did however, in the course of lamenting the divorce between theology and biblical studies, point to Balthasar as an example of a theologian who proof-texts scripture without due regard to historical criticism and so forth.
Hopefully the conference papers will provide a more nuanced view of von Balthasar's approach to Scripture. Though the issue of Biblical studies' relation to theology is obviously one that needs to be worked out more completely. The same lecturer also complained about Karl Rahner, in an essay in a rare compilation that he owned, telling off Biblical scholars and letting them know that their findings had to conform to the ideas that dogmatic theologians were discussing! I read the essay and found myself agreeing with Rahner for the most part!
The topic is “Von Balthasar’s Theological Interpretation of Scripture.” Not something I'm terribly familiar with so it should prove to be enlightening.
A NT scholar whilst I was in University did however, in the course of lamenting the divorce between theology and biblical studies, point to Balthasar as an example of a theologian who proof-texts scripture without due regard to historical criticism and so forth.
Hopefully the conference papers will provide a more nuanced view of von Balthasar's approach to Scripture. Though the issue of Biblical studies' relation to theology is obviously one that needs to be worked out more completely. The same lecturer also complained about Karl Rahner, in an essay in a rare compilation that he owned, telling off Biblical scholars and letting them know that their findings had to conform to the ideas that dogmatic theologians were discussing! I read the essay and found myself agreeing with Rahner for the most part!
The Charge against Rahner (Part 1)
Rahner has been labelled a 'transcendental thomist'. His failed doctoral thesis on Thomas Aquinas (later published as Spirit in the World) read Thomas through the lens of the German idealist tradition. His account was inspired in part by earlier philosophers such as Maurice Blondel and Joseph Marechal. His basic philosophical presupposition is that all categorical knowledge is possible because of an openness to being itself as the horizon for this knowledge. Being here is taken to be God. For Rahner, humankind is ‘transcendental’ in that it searches for answers to the question of its own finitude – in the long run this answer can only be “the mystery of being” itself. This openness to being is prior to any categorical knowledge (since it is its presupposition). It can be described in a “nutshell” by saying that in recognising his finitude, man has an implicit knowledge of the infinite (God). It is on the basis of his early work in Spririt in the World that Rahner is seen to build the edifice of his theology. Rahner's position is held to be a form of the 'experiential-expressivist' approach to religion which George Lindbeck identifies. Thus he begins with the subject, conceived as existing within a noumenal realm divorced from the phenomenal world and thus ultimately transcending such factors as culture, language, and history (the Kantian inheritance). Indeed, Fergus Kerr, in his Theology after Wittgenstein, points to what he views as the basic Cartesian position that Rahner holds, presenting us with a self which has a "standpoint beyond his immersion in the bodily, the historical and the institutional."
John Milbank is another influential theologian who does not have much time for Rahner, believing that he was not as successful in overcoming the dichotomy between nature and grace that had developed in neo-scholasticism. In Theology and Social Theory, Milbank characterises Rahner's 'solution', in a self-confessed "crude" fashion as "naturalising the supernatural" whereas de Lubac "supernaturalised the natural". The distinction may seem slight to many, but according to Milbank it has disastrous consequences: no less than the relegation of religious faith to a private realm which allows the public and secular realm to continue its reign unabated. In fact it it this factor which undergirds Milbank's critique of Liberation Theology, which he sees as having followed Rahner's line. Rahner's solution to the nature/grace problematic retained the concept of a "pure nature" as a formal distinction in order to guarantee the gratuity of grace. For Milbank this entails an undermining of the rejection of extrinsicism despite Rahner's insistence that in concrete history this "pure nature" is nowhere to be found. The "Supernatural existential" which is a constitutive element in all human beings is already a gift of grace. The desire for the beatific vision is itself already grace, it is not a 'natural' aspect of human beings. But this "remainder concept" ensures the retention of a dual end for mankind, one supernatural, the other natural and the way towards secularisation remains open. Milbank acknowledges his debt to Balthasar's reading of Rahner: once again, it is Rahner's "transcendental" approach which is identified as the cause of the problems. The philosophical presuppositions Rahner is alleged to hold are responsible for the downplaying of the concrete in this theology, for "the encounter with grace is situated at the margins of every individual's knowing" and not in specific texts and images (as for de Lubac and Balthasar).J.B. Metz also shares these reservations about Rahner, arguing that his theology is too individualistic and too privatised to render a truly effective political theology possible.
The transcendental approach adopted by Rahner, therefore, trades on a Cartesio-Kantian understanding on the self, it fails to locate the site of God's revelation in concrete beings within history and is therefore prone to a relativisation of the specific revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the importance of the Church and so forth. It is also too individualistic, failing to truly ground humanity's inter-subjective nature, in a way that Balthasar's theology of the person does (e.g. his emphasis on the mother's smile as the awakening of the experience of love in the child etc).
As regards the question of other religions; the self is seen to share a common religious experience with the rest of humanity and the religions are seen to be expressions of this prior experience. Although Rahner would never have gone as far as someone such as John Hick in this direction, it may be asked whether Rahner's theory of the "anonymous Christian" does not already tend in that direction. It is the notion of the "anonymous Christian" which drew the most ire from Balthasar. I will explore the problems with the notion of "anonymous Christians" in my next post.
John Milbank is another influential theologian who does not have much time for Rahner, believing that he was not as successful in overcoming the dichotomy between nature and grace that had developed in neo-scholasticism. In Theology and Social Theory, Milbank characterises Rahner's 'solution', in a self-confessed "crude" fashion as "naturalising the supernatural" whereas de Lubac "supernaturalised the natural". The distinction may seem slight to many, but according to Milbank it has disastrous consequences: no less than the relegation of religious faith to a private realm which allows the public and secular realm to continue its reign unabated. In fact it it this factor which undergirds Milbank's critique of Liberation Theology, which he sees as having followed Rahner's line. Rahner's solution to the nature/grace problematic retained the concept of a "pure nature" as a formal distinction in order to guarantee the gratuity of grace. For Milbank this entails an undermining of the rejection of extrinsicism despite Rahner's insistence that in concrete history this "pure nature" is nowhere to be found. The "Supernatural existential" which is a constitutive element in all human beings is already a gift of grace. The desire for the beatific vision is itself already grace, it is not a 'natural' aspect of human beings. But this "remainder concept" ensures the retention of a dual end for mankind, one supernatural, the other natural and the way towards secularisation remains open. Milbank acknowledges his debt to Balthasar's reading of Rahner: once again, it is Rahner's "transcendental" approach which is identified as the cause of the problems. The philosophical presuppositions Rahner is alleged to hold are responsible for the downplaying of the concrete in this theology, for "the encounter with grace is situated at the margins of every individual's knowing" and not in specific texts and images (as for de Lubac and Balthasar).J.B. Metz also shares these reservations about Rahner, arguing that his theology is too individualistic and too privatised to render a truly effective political theology possible.
The transcendental approach adopted by Rahner, therefore, trades on a Cartesio-Kantian understanding on the self, it fails to locate the site of God's revelation in concrete beings within history and is therefore prone to a relativisation of the specific revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the importance of the Church and so forth. It is also too individualistic, failing to truly ground humanity's inter-subjective nature, in a way that Balthasar's theology of the person does (e.g. his emphasis on the mother's smile as the awakening of the experience of love in the child etc).
As regards the question of other religions; the self is seen to share a common religious experience with the rest of humanity and the religions are seen to be expressions of this prior experience. Although Rahner would never have gone as far as someone such as John Hick in this direction, it may be asked whether Rahner's theory of the "anonymous Christian" does not already tend in that direction. It is the notion of the "anonymous Christian" which drew the most ire from Balthasar. I will explore the problems with the notion of "anonymous Christians" in my next post.
Friday, October 5, 2007
The Continuing Relevance of Karl Rahner
It is a common to encounter the opinion that Karl Rahner, once the most influential theologian in the Catholic Church, is now somewhat passé. While Rahner's influence was great during the debates leading up to and after Vatican II, his theology is now often looked upon as overly dependent on his transcendental anthropology. A major reason for this reversal in opinions has been the asendency in influence of Hans urs Von Balthasar. He was one of Rahner's most vocal critics, his objection to Rahner's project being most forcefully expressed in his short book Cordula oder der Ernstfall, translated in english as The Moment of Christian Witness. I am a great fan of Balthasar and feel that he levelled some extremely telling criticisms at Rahner's theology and in so doing all theologies which take as their point of departure 'the turn to the subject' characteristic of modern philosophy. This attitude is clearly expressed in an interview with theologian Werner Loser (which doesn't seem to be available online any longer). In it he states that "One morning while reading one of his books, it suddenly struck me that Rahner's theology was limited by his philosophy." This is a common criticism. In theological discourse Rahner is often presented as a sort of 'Catholic Schleiermacher' (with Balthasar the Catholic Barth).
I do, however, retain a soft spot for Rahner, his 'Foundations of Christian Faith' was the first 'heavy' book of theology I read, and it seems unfair that a theologian of his stature, one whom Balthasar himself acknowledged to surpass him in speculative capacity, should be quite so easily written off. Yet this is unfortunately the sort of view prevalent amongst many orthodox Catholics. Indeed, it was on my first forays into the world of the theology on the internet that I first became aware of the attitudes of many 'conservative' Catholics to Rahner: he is habitually written off as a "modernist" and a "heretic". There still are, however, some excellent expositors of Rahner, who while not trying to pretend that his theology is in some ways problematic, attempt to secure Rahner's legacy by demonstrating his continuing relevance.
Such readings of Rahner by Karen Kilby and Richard Lennan reveal a different Rahner from the 'transcendental' theologian so harshly criticised by Balthasar, one who, it could be argued, is actually non-foundationalist (i.e. he doesn't build him entire system on a questionable transcendental anthropology) and of whom the defining characteristic should rather be said to be his ecclesiological emphasis. His writing on the Church far outweighs any other theological theme. These are important developments for they do not allow an easy dismissal of Rahner on the grounds that his entire theology is built on shaky foundations, that these foundations have been destroyed and thus Rahner's theology too, is merely a matter of historical interest. I will offer a series of posts in the coming weeks examining the critiques of Rahner and arguing that his theology does have a future although many criticisms against him are valid.
I do, however, retain a soft spot for Rahner, his 'Foundations of Christian Faith' was the first 'heavy' book of theology I read, and it seems unfair that a theologian of his stature, one whom Balthasar himself acknowledged to surpass him in speculative capacity, should be quite so easily written off. Yet this is unfortunately the sort of view prevalent amongst many orthodox Catholics. Indeed, it was on my first forays into the world of the theology on the internet that I first became aware of the attitudes of many 'conservative' Catholics to Rahner: he is habitually written off as a "modernist" and a "heretic". There still are, however, some excellent expositors of Rahner, who while not trying to pretend that his theology is in some ways problematic, attempt to secure Rahner's legacy by demonstrating his continuing relevance.
Such readings of Rahner by Karen Kilby and Richard Lennan reveal a different Rahner from the 'transcendental' theologian so harshly criticised by Balthasar, one who, it could be argued, is actually non-foundationalist (i.e. he doesn't build him entire system on a questionable transcendental anthropology) and of whom the defining characteristic should rather be said to be his ecclesiological emphasis. His writing on the Church far outweighs any other theological theme. These are important developments for they do not allow an easy dismissal of Rahner on the grounds that his entire theology is built on shaky foundations, that these foundations have been destroyed and thus Rahner's theology too, is merely a matter of historical interest. I will offer a series of posts in the coming weeks examining the critiques of Rahner and arguing that his theology does have a future although many criticisms against him are valid.
Monday, October 1, 2007
A Nutty Take on La Nouvelle Théologie
This series of articles hosted on a SSPX website (Society of Saint Pius X - 'traditionalist' schismatics) are illuminating in the perspective they offer on 'la nouvelle théologie' of the last century. It's the story of the battles which raged between the proponents of the 'new theology' and the members of the old guard written from the point of view of those who would now be viewed as 'the losers'. Of course, the term 'new theology' was originally one of opprobrium and thus 'réssourcement' is to be preferred. As de Lubac and company argued, the theology was not 'new': it was there in the Fathers and Thomas Aquinas.
For those who know French, the article by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange which originally coined the term 'nouvelle théologie' can be accessed here.
The article by Aidan Nichols on 'Thomism and La Nouvelle Théologie' is a useful historical look at the issues at stake in the debates.
Although it is hysterically negative (and wrong) (the SSPX series. not Aidan Nichols' article!) it is interesting in that it really demonstrates just how radical such theologians as Henri de Lubac and von Balthasar were. The series 'investigates' major theologians and philosophers from Maurice Blondel to Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI and if one is sick of the portrayal of the latter two as unyielding conservatives one is treated here to a diametrically opposed view of them as fiery radicals! In the chapter on Balthasar he is portrayed as having some crazed obsession with ecumenism. Aside from the novelty interest in the articles they do include quite a number of direct quotes from the theologians and passages from correspondence between them which are of interest.
For those who know French, the article by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange which originally coined the term 'nouvelle théologie' can be accessed here.
The article by Aidan Nichols on 'Thomism and La Nouvelle Théologie' is a useful historical look at the issues at stake in the debates.
Although it is hysterically negative (and wrong) (the SSPX series. not Aidan Nichols' article!) it is interesting in that it really demonstrates just how radical such theologians as Henri de Lubac and von Balthasar were. The series 'investigates' major theologians and philosophers from Maurice Blondel to Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI and if one is sick of the portrayal of the latter two as unyielding conservatives one is treated here to a diametrically opposed view of them as fiery radicals! In the chapter on Balthasar he is portrayed as having some crazed obsession with ecumenism. Aside from the novelty interest in the articles they do include quite a number of direct quotes from the theologians and passages from correspondence between them which are of interest.
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