Man’s implicit knowledge of God is a ‘transcendental revelation’ which remains somewhat shadowy and moves towards an explicit, categorical revelation. This revelation is Jesus Christ. Other religions, however, can be seen as legitimate means of salvation insofar as they have not yet encountered the truth of Christianity in an existentially meaningful way. He states that his view of other religions is analogous to the religion of Israel which was a lawful religion which enabled its faithful adherents to attain salvation. If non-Christians are to be saved then they must be able to receive grace through their religious traditions (for man is a socio-historical being). All this does not relativise Christianity which remains the absolute religion and Jesus Christ the final mediator of grace. For Rahner then, adherents of other religions can be viewed as “anonymous Christians” because they receive grace which ultimately derives from Christ himself even though they remain ignorant of this fact. Rahner is opposed to the approach of “dialectical theology” to the theology of religions which posits a sharp distinction between the revelation of Christianity and the unbelief and humanly constructed character which permeates the other religions. This is so because of his transcendental anthropology wherein all humanity is implicitly seeking God.
One of the major criticisms of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” is that it seems to do away with the salvific efficacy of Christ’s death on the cross. Karl Rahner asks the question of how Jesus Christ can be said to be present in the lives of non-Christians. He affirms that Christ is present in the lives of these individuals through the presence of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is present through the “merits of Christ.” Here Rahner, however, encounters a problem. He does not wish to assert that Christ’s death in anyway ‘changes the mind of God’ – he appears to have a somewhat crude atonement theory in mind wherein the mind of a capricious God is appeased through the sacrifice of his Son. He wants to steer clear of any such notions and also maintain the basic continuity of the revelation of Christ with general, transcendental revelation – it is simply a fuller revelation of what was already implicit – the historical and dramatic aspect of the Christ-event is downplayed. Thus Rahner posits that rather than being an ‘efficient cause’ of God’s grace (i.e. it actually brings it about), the Cross is to be seen as the ‘final’ cause of God’s grace – the sign of his irrevocable and tangible gift of the Spirit for our salvation. It seems clear that Rahner has abandoned the traditional Christian emphasis on the salvific efficacy of the Cross of Christ of which the New Testament is replete. In so doing he also seems to minimise the tragic aspects of life and the brokenness and sinfulness of our human condition. In a sense his theory can appear overly optimistic – he downplays the extent to which human beings reject God’s offer of Himself for a far more optimistic notion that in confronting adherents of other religions one should approach them as if they were already living a life of grace and so are “anonymous Christians”.
This leads on to a second major criticism of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” and that is that it appears to render mission somewhat superfluous. If God’s universal salvific will (and this cannot be denied regardless of what position one takes regarding Rahner) means that humanity is already ‘enveloped’ in grace and on the path to salvation – the necessity of preaching the gospel “to the ends of the earth” appears to lose its urgency. As the then Cardinal Ratizinger points out, all individuals now seem to be able to be saved simply by virtue of fully accepting their humanity and the Christian “plus” is merely that he realises he is grasped by God’s love. This seems apparent in the following passage by Rahner: “anyone who courageously accepts life…has really already accepted God.” The particularity of Christianity, the necessity of the Church, the sacramental system and so forth no longer appear absolutely necessary. The explicit proclamation of having heard Jesus’ call and responded to it are of the essence of Christianity and the formation of disciples and preaching the word is absolutely necessary for this to take place. If others are “anonymous Christians”, however, this urgency is lost, for by becoming Christian, people would merely be moving into the realm of the explicit and visible sign of God’s self-communication. The notion of conversion seems to disappear. Rahner is sensitive to these criticisms and argues that implicit faith is always striving to be made explicit and so all people are still called to become members of the Church. He also adds that Christians have a greater chance of salvation than those who remain outside. Despite these attempted assurances (and Rahner’s basically orthodox intentions cannot be doubted) it is difficult to dismiss the charge that the notion of the “anonymous Christian” does certainly make mission seem far less of an important issue than the major task of the Church which it has long been held to be. Rahner does state, however, that anyone who closed himself off to ‘explicit faith’ could not be justified by implicit faith and so the basic problem may lie to an extent in Rahner’s use of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ which certainly tends towards a misunderstanding of Rahner’s position as making the ‘explicit’ superfluous. Von Balthasar charged Rahner with basically positing an Enlightenment version of religion, a general theory of religion – universally applicable to all men and doing away with particularity.
Or so the story goes. But is it a fair account of Rahner's position? Does his theology ultimately end up with Christians annihilating themselves, as Balthasar has it in his dialogue between the commissar and the Christian (a Rahnerian) in The Moment of Christian Witness? "You've liquidated yourselves and spared us the trouble"...
Another criticism of Rahner has been directed at him from both so-called ‘pluralists’ and ‘exclusivists’. This is that the term “anonymous Christian” is in fact ‘imperialistic’ and an impediment to dialogue. John Hick is one who has thus accused Rahner – stating that if one regards the adherents of non-Christian religions as basically ‘crypto-Christians’ then one is simply imposing a Christian identity on them whether they like it or not. Rahner, however, never meant for the term to be used in the confrontation with other religions, rather it was an intra-Christian term. The force of the argument is somewhat nullified when one considers that Hick basically tells adherents of all religions (including Christianity) that their beliefs and practices are simply expressions of a common religious experience of man and that he knows better than all of them what their fundamental beliefs really are. Rahner is working within a Christian dogmatic framework and any charges of ‘arrogance’ are simply misplaced – they are essentially arguments against the claims of Christianity to be the absolute religion – one can argue against this if one wishes but in doing so one ceases to be a Christian. Similarly Lindbeck argues that any notions of “implicit faith” such as the “anonymous Christian” are a hindrance to dialogue. It is better, says Lindbeck to dispense with any such designations and treat the other religions as they would like to be treated – as distinct readings of being. “The otherness of the other” (Milbank) is thereby respected and an authentic dialogue can commence. There is certainly some force to this argument and it certainly appears more honest than when Hick levels it at Rahner.
Monday, October 15, 2007
The Charge Against Rahner (Part 2): Anonymous Christians?
Man’s implicit knowledge of God is a ‘transcendental revelation’ which remains somewhat shadowy and moves towards an explicit, categorical revelation. This revelation is Jesus Christ. Other religions, however, can be seen as legitimate means of salvation insofar as they have not yet encountered the truth of Christianity in an existentially meaningful way. He states that his view of other religions is analogous to the religion of Israel which was a lawful religion which enabled its faithful adherents to attain salvation. If non-Christians are to be saved then they must be able to receive grace through their religious traditions (for man is a socio-historical being). All this does not relativise Christianity which remains the absolute religion and Jesus Christ the final mediator of grace. For Rahner then, adherents of other religions can be viewed as “anonymous Christians” because they receive grace which ultimately derives from Christ himself even though they remain ignorant of this fact. Rahner is opposed to the approach of “dialectical theology” to the theology of religions which posits a sharp distinction between the revelation of Christianity and the unbelief and humanly constructed character which permeates the other religions. This is so because of his transcendental anthropology wherein all humanity is implicitly seeking God.
One of the major criticisms of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” is that it seems to do away with the salvific efficacy of Christ’s death on the cross. Karl Rahner asks the question of how Jesus Christ can be said to be present in the lives of non-Christians. He affirms that Christ is present in the lives of these individuals through the presence of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is present through the “merits of Christ.” Here Rahner, however, encounters a problem. He does not wish to assert that Christ’s death in anyway ‘changes the mind of God’ – he appears to have a somewhat crude atonement theory in mind wherein the mind of a capricious God is appeased through the sacrifice of his Son. He wants to steer clear of any such notions and also maintain the basic continuity of the revelation of Christ with general, transcendental revelation – it is simply a fuller revelation of what was already implicit – the historical and dramatic aspect of the Christ-event is downplayed. Thus Rahner posits that rather than being an ‘efficient cause’ of God’s grace (i.e. it actually brings it about), the Cross is to be seen as the ‘final’ cause of God’s grace – the sign of his irrevocable and tangible gift of the Spirit for our salvation. It seems clear that Rahner has abandoned the traditional Christian emphasis on the salvific efficacy of the Cross of Christ of which the New Testament is replete. In so doing he also seems to minimise the tragic aspects of life and the brokenness and sinfulness of our human condition. In a sense his theory can appear overly optimistic – he downplays the extent to which human beings reject God’s offer of Himself for a far more optimistic notion that in confronting adherents of other religions one should approach them as if they were already living a life of grace and so are “anonymous Christians”.
This leads on to a second major criticism of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” and that is that it appears to render mission somewhat superfluous. If God’s universal salvific will (and this cannot be denied regardless of what position one takes regarding Rahner) means that humanity is already ‘enveloped’ in grace and on the path to salvation – the necessity of preaching the gospel “to the ends of the earth” appears to lose its urgency. As the then Cardinal Ratizinger points out, all individuals now seem to be able to be saved simply by virtue of fully accepting their humanity and the Christian “plus” is merely that he realises he is grasped by God’s love. This seems apparent in the following passage by Rahner: “anyone who courageously accepts life…has really already accepted God.” The particularity of Christianity, the necessity of the Church, the sacramental system and so forth no longer appear absolutely necessary. The explicit proclamation of having heard Jesus’ call and responded to it are of the essence of Christianity and the formation of disciples and preaching the word is absolutely necessary for this to take place. If others are “anonymous Christians”, however, this urgency is lost, for by becoming Christian, people would merely be moving into the realm of the explicit and visible sign of God’s self-communication. The notion of conversion seems to disappear. Rahner is sensitive to these criticisms and argues that implicit faith is always striving to be made explicit and so all people are still called to become members of the Church. He also adds that Christians have a greater chance of salvation than those who remain outside. Despite these attempted assurances (and Rahner’s basically orthodox intentions cannot be doubted) it is difficult to dismiss the charge that the notion of the “anonymous Christian” does certainly make mission seem far less of an important issue than the major task of the Church which it has long been held to be. Rahner does state, however, that anyone who closed himself off to ‘explicit faith’ could not be justified by implicit faith and so the basic problem may lie to an extent in Rahner’s use of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ which certainly tends towards a misunderstanding of Rahner’s position as making the ‘explicit’ superfluous. Von Balthasar charged Rahner with basically positing an Enlightenment version of religion, a general theory of religion – universally applicable to all men and doing away with particularity.
Or so the story goes. But is it a fair account of Rahner's position? Does his theology ultimately end up with Christians annihilating themselves, as Balthasar has it in his dialogue between the commissar and the Christian (a Rahnerian) in The Moment of Christian Witness? "You've liquidated yourselves and spared us the trouble"...
Another criticism of Rahner has been directed at him from both so-called ‘pluralists’ and ‘exclusivists’. This is that the term “anonymous Christian” is in fact ‘imperialistic’ and an impediment to dialogue. John Hick is one who has thus accused Rahner – stating that if one regards the adherents of non-Christian religions as basically ‘crypto-Christians’ then one is simply imposing a Christian identity on them whether they like it or not. Rahner, however, never meant for the term to be used in the confrontation with other religions, rather it was an intra-Christian term. The force of the argument is somewhat nullified when one considers that Hick basically tells adherents of all religions (including Christianity) that their beliefs and practices are simply expressions of a common religious experience of man and that he knows better than all of them what their fundamental beliefs really are. Rahner is working within a Christian dogmatic framework and any charges of ‘arrogance’ are simply misplaced – they are essentially arguments against the claims of Christianity to be the absolute religion – one can argue against this if one wishes but in doing so one ceases to be a Christian. Similarly Lindbeck argues that any notions of “implicit faith” such as the “anonymous Christian” are a hindrance to dialogue. It is better, says Lindbeck to dispense with any such designations and treat the other religions as they would like to be treated – as distinct readings of being. “The otherness of the other” (Milbank) is thereby respected and an authentic dialogue can commence. There is certainly some force to this argument and it certainly appears more honest than when Hick levels it at Rahner.
One of the major criticisms of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” is that it seems to do away with the salvific efficacy of Christ’s death on the cross. Karl Rahner asks the question of how Jesus Christ can be said to be present in the lives of non-Christians. He affirms that Christ is present in the lives of these individuals through the presence of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is present through the “merits of Christ.” Here Rahner, however, encounters a problem. He does not wish to assert that Christ’s death in anyway ‘changes the mind of God’ – he appears to have a somewhat crude atonement theory in mind wherein the mind of a capricious God is appeased through the sacrifice of his Son. He wants to steer clear of any such notions and also maintain the basic continuity of the revelation of Christ with general, transcendental revelation – it is simply a fuller revelation of what was already implicit – the historical and dramatic aspect of the Christ-event is downplayed. Thus Rahner posits that rather than being an ‘efficient cause’ of God’s grace (i.e. it actually brings it about), the Cross is to be seen as the ‘final’ cause of God’s grace – the sign of his irrevocable and tangible gift of the Spirit for our salvation. It seems clear that Rahner has abandoned the traditional Christian emphasis on the salvific efficacy of the Cross of Christ of which the New Testament is replete. In so doing he also seems to minimise the tragic aspects of life and the brokenness and sinfulness of our human condition. In a sense his theory can appear overly optimistic – he downplays the extent to which human beings reject God’s offer of Himself for a far more optimistic notion that in confronting adherents of other religions one should approach them as if they were already living a life of grace and so are “anonymous Christians”.
This leads on to a second major criticism of Rahner’s “anonymous Christian” and that is that it appears to render mission somewhat superfluous. If God’s universal salvific will (and this cannot be denied regardless of what position one takes regarding Rahner) means that humanity is already ‘enveloped’ in grace and on the path to salvation – the necessity of preaching the gospel “to the ends of the earth” appears to lose its urgency. As the then Cardinal Ratizinger points out, all individuals now seem to be able to be saved simply by virtue of fully accepting their humanity and the Christian “plus” is merely that he realises he is grasped by God’s love. This seems apparent in the following passage by Rahner: “anyone who courageously accepts life…has really already accepted God.” The particularity of Christianity, the necessity of the Church, the sacramental system and so forth no longer appear absolutely necessary. The explicit proclamation of having heard Jesus’ call and responded to it are of the essence of Christianity and the formation of disciples and preaching the word is absolutely necessary for this to take place. If others are “anonymous Christians”, however, this urgency is lost, for by becoming Christian, people would merely be moving into the realm of the explicit and visible sign of God’s self-communication. The notion of conversion seems to disappear. Rahner is sensitive to these criticisms and argues that implicit faith is always striving to be made explicit and so all people are still called to become members of the Church. He also adds that Christians have a greater chance of salvation than those who remain outside. Despite these attempted assurances (and Rahner’s basically orthodox intentions cannot be doubted) it is difficult to dismiss the charge that the notion of the “anonymous Christian” does certainly make mission seem far less of an important issue than the major task of the Church which it has long been held to be. Rahner does state, however, that anyone who closed himself off to ‘explicit faith’ could not be justified by implicit faith and so the basic problem may lie to an extent in Rahner’s use of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ which certainly tends towards a misunderstanding of Rahner’s position as making the ‘explicit’ superfluous. Von Balthasar charged Rahner with basically positing an Enlightenment version of religion, a general theory of religion – universally applicable to all men and doing away with particularity.
Or so the story goes. But is it a fair account of Rahner's position? Does his theology ultimately end up with Christians annihilating themselves, as Balthasar has it in his dialogue between the commissar and the Christian (a Rahnerian) in The Moment of Christian Witness? "You've liquidated yourselves and spared us the trouble"...
Another criticism of Rahner has been directed at him from both so-called ‘pluralists’ and ‘exclusivists’. This is that the term “anonymous Christian” is in fact ‘imperialistic’ and an impediment to dialogue. John Hick is one who has thus accused Rahner – stating that if one regards the adherents of non-Christian religions as basically ‘crypto-Christians’ then one is simply imposing a Christian identity on them whether they like it or not. Rahner, however, never meant for the term to be used in the confrontation with other religions, rather it was an intra-Christian term. The force of the argument is somewhat nullified when one considers that Hick basically tells adherents of all religions (including Christianity) that their beliefs and practices are simply expressions of a common religious experience of man and that he knows better than all of them what their fundamental beliefs really are. Rahner is working within a Christian dogmatic framework and any charges of ‘arrogance’ are simply misplaced – they are essentially arguments against the claims of Christianity to be the absolute religion – one can argue against this if one wishes but in doing so one ceases to be a Christian. Similarly Lindbeck argues that any notions of “implicit faith” such as the “anonymous Christian” are a hindrance to dialogue. It is better, says Lindbeck to dispense with any such designations and treat the other religions as they would like to be treated – as distinct readings of being. “The otherness of the other” (Milbank) is thereby respected and an authentic dialogue can commence. There is certainly some force to this argument and it certainly appears more honest than when Hick levels it at Rahner.
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Balthasar Blog Conference
I'm not sure if this is the first theology 'blog conference' but it's certainly an interesting idea. It's being hosted at the Fire and the Rose blog.
The topic is “Von Balthasar’s Theological Interpretation of Scripture.” Not something I'm terribly familiar with so it should prove to be enlightening.
A NT scholar whilst I was in University did however, in the course of lamenting the divorce between theology and biblical studies, point to Balthasar as an example of a theologian who proof-texts scripture without due regard to historical criticism and so forth.
Hopefully the conference papers will provide a more nuanced view of von Balthasar's approach to Scripture. Though the issue of Biblical studies' relation to theology is obviously one that needs to be worked out more completely. The same lecturer also complained about Karl Rahner, in an essay in a rare compilation that he owned, telling off Biblical scholars and letting them know that their findings had to conform to the ideas that dogmatic theologians were discussing! I read the essay and found myself agreeing with Rahner for the most part!
The topic is “Von Balthasar’s Theological Interpretation of Scripture.” Not something I'm terribly familiar with so it should prove to be enlightening.
A NT scholar whilst I was in University did however, in the course of lamenting the divorce between theology and biblical studies, point to Balthasar as an example of a theologian who proof-texts scripture without due regard to historical criticism and so forth.
Hopefully the conference papers will provide a more nuanced view of von Balthasar's approach to Scripture. Though the issue of Biblical studies' relation to theology is obviously one that needs to be worked out more completely. The same lecturer also complained about Karl Rahner, in an essay in a rare compilation that he owned, telling off Biblical scholars and letting them know that their findings had to conform to the ideas that dogmatic theologians were discussing! I read the essay and found myself agreeing with Rahner for the most part!
The Charge against Rahner (Part 1)
Rahner has been labelled a 'transcendental thomist'. His failed doctoral thesis on Thomas Aquinas (later published as Spirit in the World) read Thomas through the lens of the German idealist tradition. His account was inspired in part by earlier philosophers such as Maurice Blondel and Joseph Marechal. His basic philosophical presupposition is that all categorical knowledge is possible because of an openness to being itself as the horizon for this knowledge. Being here is taken to be God. For Rahner, humankind is ‘transcendental’ in that it searches for answers to the question of its own finitude – in the long run this answer can only be “the mystery of being” itself. This openness to being is prior to any categorical knowledge (since it is its presupposition). It can be described in a “nutshell” by saying that in recognising his finitude, man has an implicit knowledge of the infinite (God). It is on the basis of his early work in Spririt in the World that Rahner is seen to build the edifice of his theology. Rahner's position is held to be a form of the 'experiential-expressivist' approach to religion which George Lindbeck identifies. Thus he begins with the subject, conceived as existing within a noumenal realm divorced from the phenomenal world and thus ultimately transcending such factors as culture, language, and history (the Kantian inheritance). Indeed, Fergus Kerr, in his Theology after Wittgenstein, points to what he views as the basic Cartesian position that Rahner holds, presenting us with a self which has a "standpoint beyond his immersion in the bodily, the historical and the institutional."
John Milbank is another influential theologian who does not have much time for Rahner, believing that he was not as successful in overcoming the dichotomy between nature and grace that had developed in neo-scholasticism. In Theology and Social Theory, Milbank characterises Rahner's 'solution', in a self-confessed "crude" fashion as "naturalising the supernatural" whereas de Lubac "supernaturalised the natural". The distinction may seem slight to many, but according to Milbank it has disastrous consequences: no less than the relegation of religious faith to a private realm which allows the public and secular realm to continue its reign unabated. In fact it it this factor which undergirds Milbank's critique of Liberation Theology, which he sees as having followed Rahner's line. Rahner's solution to the nature/grace problematic retained the concept of a "pure nature" as a formal distinction in order to guarantee the gratuity of grace. For Milbank this entails an undermining of the rejection of extrinsicism despite Rahner's insistence that in concrete history this "pure nature" is nowhere to be found. The "Supernatural existential" which is a constitutive element in all human beings is already a gift of grace. The desire for the beatific vision is itself already grace, it is not a 'natural' aspect of human beings. But this "remainder concept" ensures the retention of a dual end for mankind, one supernatural, the other natural and the way towards secularisation remains open. Milbank acknowledges his debt to Balthasar's reading of Rahner: once again, it is Rahner's "transcendental" approach which is identified as the cause of the problems. The philosophical presuppositions Rahner is alleged to hold are responsible for the downplaying of the concrete in this theology, for "the encounter with grace is situated at the margins of every individual's knowing" and not in specific texts and images (as for de Lubac and Balthasar).J.B. Metz also shares these reservations about Rahner, arguing that his theology is too individualistic and too privatised to render a truly effective political theology possible.
The transcendental approach adopted by Rahner, therefore, trades on a Cartesio-Kantian understanding on the self, it fails to locate the site of God's revelation in concrete beings within history and is therefore prone to a relativisation of the specific revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the importance of the Church and so forth. It is also too individualistic, failing to truly ground humanity's inter-subjective nature, in a way that Balthasar's theology of the person does (e.g. his emphasis on the mother's smile as the awakening of the experience of love in the child etc).
As regards the question of other religions; the self is seen to share a common religious experience with the rest of humanity and the religions are seen to be expressions of this prior experience. Although Rahner would never have gone as far as someone such as John Hick in this direction, it may be asked whether Rahner's theory of the "anonymous Christian" does not already tend in that direction. It is the notion of the "anonymous Christian" which drew the most ire from Balthasar. I will explore the problems with the notion of "anonymous Christians" in my next post.
John Milbank is another influential theologian who does not have much time for Rahner, believing that he was not as successful in overcoming the dichotomy between nature and grace that had developed in neo-scholasticism. In Theology and Social Theory, Milbank characterises Rahner's 'solution', in a self-confessed "crude" fashion as "naturalising the supernatural" whereas de Lubac "supernaturalised the natural". The distinction may seem slight to many, but according to Milbank it has disastrous consequences: no less than the relegation of religious faith to a private realm which allows the public and secular realm to continue its reign unabated. In fact it it this factor which undergirds Milbank's critique of Liberation Theology, which he sees as having followed Rahner's line. Rahner's solution to the nature/grace problematic retained the concept of a "pure nature" as a formal distinction in order to guarantee the gratuity of grace. For Milbank this entails an undermining of the rejection of extrinsicism despite Rahner's insistence that in concrete history this "pure nature" is nowhere to be found. The "Supernatural existential" which is a constitutive element in all human beings is already a gift of grace. The desire for the beatific vision is itself already grace, it is not a 'natural' aspect of human beings. But this "remainder concept" ensures the retention of a dual end for mankind, one supernatural, the other natural and the way towards secularisation remains open. Milbank acknowledges his debt to Balthasar's reading of Rahner: once again, it is Rahner's "transcendental" approach which is identified as the cause of the problems. The philosophical presuppositions Rahner is alleged to hold are responsible for the downplaying of the concrete in this theology, for "the encounter with grace is situated at the margins of every individual's knowing" and not in specific texts and images (as for de Lubac and Balthasar).J.B. Metz also shares these reservations about Rahner, arguing that his theology is too individualistic and too privatised to render a truly effective political theology possible.
The transcendental approach adopted by Rahner, therefore, trades on a Cartesio-Kantian understanding on the self, it fails to locate the site of God's revelation in concrete beings within history and is therefore prone to a relativisation of the specific revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the importance of the Church and so forth. It is also too individualistic, failing to truly ground humanity's inter-subjective nature, in a way that Balthasar's theology of the person does (e.g. his emphasis on the mother's smile as the awakening of the experience of love in the child etc).
As regards the question of other religions; the self is seen to share a common religious experience with the rest of humanity and the religions are seen to be expressions of this prior experience. Although Rahner would never have gone as far as someone such as John Hick in this direction, it may be asked whether Rahner's theory of the "anonymous Christian" does not already tend in that direction. It is the notion of the "anonymous Christian" which drew the most ire from Balthasar. I will explore the problems with the notion of "anonymous Christians" in my next post.
Friday, October 5, 2007
The Continuing Relevance of Karl Rahner
It is a common to encounter the opinion that Karl Rahner, once the most influential theologian in the Catholic Church, is now somewhat passé. While Rahner's influence was great during the debates leading up to and after Vatican II, his theology is now often looked upon as overly dependent on his transcendental anthropology. A major reason for this reversal in opinions has been the asendency in influence of Hans urs Von Balthasar. He was one of Rahner's most vocal critics, his objection to Rahner's project being most forcefully expressed in his short book Cordula oder der Ernstfall, translated in english as The Moment of Christian Witness. I am a great fan of Balthasar and feel that he levelled some extremely telling criticisms at Rahner's theology and in so doing all theologies which take as their point of departure 'the turn to the subject' characteristic of modern philosophy. This attitude is clearly expressed in an interview with theologian Werner Loser (which doesn't seem to be available online any longer). In it he states that "One morning while reading one of his books, it suddenly struck me that Rahner's theology was limited by his philosophy." This is a common criticism. In theological discourse Rahner is often presented as a sort of 'Catholic Schleiermacher' (with Balthasar the Catholic Barth).
I do, however, retain a soft spot for Rahner, his 'Foundations of Christian Faith' was the first 'heavy' book of theology I read, and it seems unfair that a theologian of his stature, one whom Balthasar himself acknowledged to surpass him in speculative capacity, should be quite so easily written off. Yet this is unfortunately the sort of view prevalent amongst many orthodox Catholics. Indeed, it was on my first forays into the world of the theology on the internet that I first became aware of the attitudes of many 'conservative' Catholics to Rahner: he is habitually written off as a "modernist" and a "heretic". There still are, however, some excellent expositors of Rahner, who while not trying to pretend that his theology is in some ways problematic, attempt to secure Rahner's legacy by demonstrating his continuing relevance.
Such readings of Rahner by Karen Kilby and Richard Lennan reveal a different Rahner from the 'transcendental' theologian so harshly criticised by Balthasar, one who, it could be argued, is actually non-foundationalist (i.e. he doesn't build him entire system on a questionable transcendental anthropology) and of whom the defining characteristic should rather be said to be his ecclesiological emphasis. His writing on the Church far outweighs any other theological theme. These are important developments for they do not allow an easy dismissal of Rahner on the grounds that his entire theology is built on shaky foundations, that these foundations have been destroyed and thus Rahner's theology too, is merely a matter of historical interest. I will offer a series of posts in the coming weeks examining the critiques of Rahner and arguing that his theology does have a future although many criticisms against him are valid.
I do, however, retain a soft spot for Rahner, his 'Foundations of Christian Faith' was the first 'heavy' book of theology I read, and it seems unfair that a theologian of his stature, one whom Balthasar himself acknowledged to surpass him in speculative capacity, should be quite so easily written off. Yet this is unfortunately the sort of view prevalent amongst many orthodox Catholics. Indeed, it was on my first forays into the world of the theology on the internet that I first became aware of the attitudes of many 'conservative' Catholics to Rahner: he is habitually written off as a "modernist" and a "heretic". There still are, however, some excellent expositors of Rahner, who while not trying to pretend that his theology is in some ways problematic, attempt to secure Rahner's legacy by demonstrating his continuing relevance.
Such readings of Rahner by Karen Kilby and Richard Lennan reveal a different Rahner from the 'transcendental' theologian so harshly criticised by Balthasar, one who, it could be argued, is actually non-foundationalist (i.e. he doesn't build him entire system on a questionable transcendental anthropology) and of whom the defining characteristic should rather be said to be his ecclesiological emphasis. His writing on the Church far outweighs any other theological theme. These are important developments for they do not allow an easy dismissal of Rahner on the grounds that his entire theology is built on shaky foundations, that these foundations have been destroyed and thus Rahner's theology too, is merely a matter of historical interest. I will offer a series of posts in the coming weeks examining the critiques of Rahner and arguing that his theology does have a future although many criticisms against him are valid.
Monday, October 1, 2007
A Nutty Take on La Nouvelle Théologie
This series of articles hosted on a SSPX website (Society of Saint Pius X - 'traditionalist' schismatics) are illuminating in the perspective they offer on 'la nouvelle théologie' of the last century. It's the story of the battles which raged between the proponents of the 'new theology' and the members of the old guard written from the point of view of those who would now be viewed as 'the losers'. Of course, the term 'new theology' was originally one of opprobrium and thus 'réssourcement' is to be preferred. As de Lubac and company argued, the theology was not 'new': it was there in the Fathers and Thomas Aquinas.
For those who know French, the article by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange which originally coined the term 'nouvelle théologie' can be accessed here.
The article by Aidan Nichols on 'Thomism and La Nouvelle Théologie' is a useful historical look at the issues at stake in the debates.
Although it is hysterically negative (and wrong) (the SSPX series. not Aidan Nichols' article!) it is interesting in that it really demonstrates just how radical such theologians as Henri de Lubac and von Balthasar were. The series 'investigates' major theologians and philosophers from Maurice Blondel to Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI and if one is sick of the portrayal of the latter two as unyielding conservatives one is treated here to a diametrically opposed view of them as fiery radicals! In the chapter on Balthasar he is portrayed as having some crazed obsession with ecumenism. Aside from the novelty interest in the articles they do include quite a number of direct quotes from the theologians and passages from correspondence between them which are of interest.
For those who know French, the article by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange which originally coined the term 'nouvelle théologie' can be accessed here.
The article by Aidan Nichols on 'Thomism and La Nouvelle Théologie' is a useful historical look at the issues at stake in the debates.
Although it is hysterically negative (and wrong) (the SSPX series. not Aidan Nichols' article!) it is interesting in that it really demonstrates just how radical such theologians as Henri de Lubac and von Balthasar were. The series 'investigates' major theologians and philosophers from Maurice Blondel to Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI and if one is sick of the portrayal of the latter two as unyielding conservatives one is treated here to a diametrically opposed view of them as fiery radicals! In the chapter on Balthasar he is portrayed as having some crazed obsession with ecumenism. Aside from the novelty interest in the articles they do include quite a number of direct quotes from the theologians and passages from correspondence between them which are of interest.
Sunday, September 30, 2007
Newman's Ecclesiology
Newman’s ecclesiology encompasses such issues as the role of the laity, the relationship between theologians and the magisterium and the role of authority. Certain dimensions of his ecclesiology drew fire from his critics although the suspicions of his orthodoxy (levelled at him by other Catholics) were unjustified and the Vatican II declaration on the Church vindicates his arguments. Nevertheless certain of his views are somewhat dangerous in that they appear to reflect an overly positive view at times such as, for example, the notion that the laity ought to be consulted on matters of faith - quite what this entails is of supreme importance.
The concept of the threefold office of the Church comprises Newman’s ecclesiological views. He articulates this view in his 1877 preface to ‘Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church’, written when he was atill an Anglican. This threefold office corresponds to the threefold ministry of Christ, whose body the Church is. The three offices – prophetic, priestly and kingly – correspond to three offices in the Church, respectively: theology (prophetic), the worshipping community (priestly) and governance – the provenance of the Pope and the hierarchy (kingly). Even during his period as an Anglican Newman had developed an ecclesiology which, although conceived of as a ‘Via Media’ between Protestantism and the Roman Catholic Church, was heavily indebted to the Church Fathers. He wanted to return to the Catholicism of the Church. Newman was utterly opposed to the protestant notion of ‘private judgement’ wherein each individual judged revelation of his accord. The simple historical fact that so many diverse opinions resulted through this emphasis on ‘sola scriptura’ was enough to show forth the need for the authority of the Church which correctly interprets scripture (does not ‘invent’ it, although development of doctrine may occur, i.e. a making explicit of what was already implicit in revelation). This notion of development can be seen as the result of Newman’s division of tradition into ‘Episcopal’ (derived from the apostles) and ‘Prophetical’ (derived from the interpretation of revelation. In this preface Newman also sought to explore the relation between the formal teaching of the Church and its popular manifestation. Thus Newman was able to both acknowledge that there was corruption in the Church as well as assert that this cannot be attributed to the official teaching of the Church. The role of the theologian is to attempt to regulate the teaching of the Church, although he was also sensitive to popular devotion and felt theology needed to let this seep through so that it may not become cold and rigid. Newman even went so far as to express his doubts that, were any nation to completely do away with superstition, faith could still be said to exist there.
This brings us to the issue of the role of the Laity – something that brought about suspicions of his orthodoxy. Newman’s experiences as Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland (1851-1858) made him aware of the little regard with which the hierarchy regarded the laity. Newman wrote an article in the liberal Catholic publication ‘The Rambler’ (of which he had been made editor – a ‘compromise’ choice, it was hoped he would reign in the more radical aspects of the paper whilst still contributing to the task of creating an educated laity) entitled “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine”. In this work he argued that the Church ‘consults’ the laity (in the sense of inquiring into a matter of fact, not of asking its opinion) before defining a doctrine. The ‘consensus fidelium’ was an indicator of the faith of the Church. Newman had first explored this idea in his work ‘The Arians of the Fourth Century’ in which he argued that it had been the laity, not the Bishops, who had upheld orthodoxy. Newman argued that the Church had to take into account the faithful and that this was necessary for its well-being. This did not go down well with members of the Roman curia nor with Catholics closer to home such as Cardinal Manning. It was considered that Newman was endangering the notion of authority and his statement that "there was a temporary suspense of the functions of the Ecclesia docens" in the fourth century appeared to many that Newman was calling into question the infallibility of the Church’s magisterium by claiming that it had failed over the Arian controversy. Monsignor Talbot in Rome interpreted Newman’s invocation of the “consensus fidelium” as meaning a consensus of the faithful in opposition to the clergy. As Ian Ker points out, Newman’s terminology – his use of the word consult – was certainly the cause of much confusion. These arguments, however, do not stand up when one considers Newman’s respect for authority (more will be said on this in due course). What they reflected was an inflated view of the hierarchy which was seen as the ‘real’ Church whilst the laity were simply ‘passengers’. Vatican II’s decree on the dogmatic constitution of the Church, ‘Lumen Gentium’, vindicates Newman’s approach by seeing the Church as ‘The People of God’, that is both clergy and laity whose role was given much greater emphasis than in the past. On this, as with many things, Newman can be seen to have been ahead of his time.
Nevertheless, it must be said that on this issue one can see why many would have had qualms. For example, today many Catholics (mistakenly) appeal to this notion in defense of their dissenting views against the magisterium. If the Church were to consult the faithful on matters of doctrine today, she may be given a rather odd, if not downright heretical, view. This, of course, is to look on one aspect of Newman’s ecclesiology to the neglect of others such as the authority of the Church. As already noted, Newman felt all needed to co-exist in a creative tension for the Church to function correctly. Also Newman’s conception of the ‘faithful’ was one which tried to reflect the earlier Church’s conception – that of all faithful, baptized Christians – before a stark division had been made between clergy and laity.
It is said to reflect that these suspicions on his orthodoxy had such an effect that Newman ceased to publish until spurred into action by Charles Kingsley’s attack on him which gave rise to Newman’s classic ‘Apologia pro vita sua’. With this work Newman endeared himself once again to English Catholics. When one considers Newman’s views on authority, however, it is difficult to understand how one could have doubted his orthodoxy. He was, to be sure, no ‘ultramontane’ such as Cardinal Manning, yet neither could he be seen as a liberal Catholic who despised tradition. This can be seen in his rejection of the principle of private judgment and his emphasis on the need for an authoritative protection of the “deposit of faith”. Thus he was a defender of infallibility and was particularly pleased with the decree when it eventually came out for it was fairly restrained. He championed the rights of conscience but this had a role in the practical sphere in which infallible judgements could not be pronounced. Conscience could not simply go against authority without due consideration and the need for an informed conscience.
As against theologians who would make martyrs of their being silenced (a la Hans Kung), he asserted that even when in a particular case the hierarchical Church may be wrong there is a need for the theologian to abide by the decision out of the “obedience of faith” even though he may hope that in time his opinion may be vindicated: one can see this sort of attitude in such theologians as Yves Congar and Henri de Lubac - their insights ultimately being taken up into the purview of the Church. That said, he did desire greater discussion amongst theologians that an opinion may either be vindicated or eventually condemned and looked to the Middle Ages as an ideal when the Church ‘let things go’ for a period of time until it finally made a decision. But submission to authority was not something which Newman wished to downplay, even when it may be unjust, for challenging it only does greater damage to the Church as a whole.
Newman’s ecclesiological views did not warrant the suspicions with which certain members of the Church looked upon them. He was ahead of his time and his influence can be seen in Vatican II documents. His being chosen as a Cardinal is also a vindication of his orthodoxy even in his own time.
The concept of the threefold office of the Church comprises Newman’s ecclesiological views. He articulates this view in his 1877 preface to ‘Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church’, written when he was atill an Anglican. This threefold office corresponds to the threefold ministry of Christ, whose body the Church is. The three offices – prophetic, priestly and kingly – correspond to three offices in the Church, respectively: theology (prophetic), the worshipping community (priestly) and governance – the provenance of the Pope and the hierarchy (kingly). Even during his period as an Anglican Newman had developed an ecclesiology which, although conceived of as a ‘Via Media’ between Protestantism and the Roman Catholic Church, was heavily indebted to the Church Fathers. He wanted to return to the Catholicism of the Church. Newman was utterly opposed to the protestant notion of ‘private judgement’ wherein each individual judged revelation of his accord. The simple historical fact that so many diverse opinions resulted through this emphasis on ‘sola scriptura’ was enough to show forth the need for the authority of the Church which correctly interprets scripture (does not ‘invent’ it, although development of doctrine may occur, i.e. a making explicit of what was already implicit in revelation). This notion of development can be seen as the result of Newman’s division of tradition into ‘Episcopal’ (derived from the apostles) and ‘Prophetical’ (derived from the interpretation of revelation. In this preface Newman also sought to explore the relation between the formal teaching of the Church and its popular manifestation. Thus Newman was able to both acknowledge that there was corruption in the Church as well as assert that this cannot be attributed to the official teaching of the Church. The role of the theologian is to attempt to regulate the teaching of the Church, although he was also sensitive to popular devotion and felt theology needed to let this seep through so that it may not become cold and rigid. Newman even went so far as to express his doubts that, were any nation to completely do away with superstition, faith could still be said to exist there.
This brings us to the issue of the role of the Laity – something that brought about suspicions of his orthodoxy. Newman’s experiences as Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland (1851-1858) made him aware of the little regard with which the hierarchy regarded the laity. Newman wrote an article in the liberal Catholic publication ‘The Rambler’ (of which he had been made editor – a ‘compromise’ choice, it was hoped he would reign in the more radical aspects of the paper whilst still contributing to the task of creating an educated laity) entitled “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine”. In this work he argued that the Church ‘consults’ the laity (in the sense of inquiring into a matter of fact, not of asking its opinion) before defining a doctrine. The ‘consensus fidelium’ was an indicator of the faith of the Church. Newman had first explored this idea in his work ‘The Arians of the Fourth Century’ in which he argued that it had been the laity, not the Bishops, who had upheld orthodoxy. Newman argued that the Church had to take into account the faithful and that this was necessary for its well-being. This did not go down well with members of the Roman curia nor with Catholics closer to home such as Cardinal Manning. It was considered that Newman was endangering the notion of authority and his statement that "there was a temporary suspense of the functions of the Ecclesia docens" in the fourth century appeared to many that Newman was calling into question the infallibility of the Church’s magisterium by claiming that it had failed over the Arian controversy. Monsignor Talbot in Rome interpreted Newman’s invocation of the “consensus fidelium” as meaning a consensus of the faithful in opposition to the clergy. As Ian Ker points out, Newman’s terminology – his use of the word consult – was certainly the cause of much confusion. These arguments, however, do not stand up when one considers Newman’s respect for authority (more will be said on this in due course). What they reflected was an inflated view of the hierarchy which was seen as the ‘real’ Church whilst the laity were simply ‘passengers’. Vatican II’s decree on the dogmatic constitution of the Church, ‘Lumen Gentium’, vindicates Newman’s approach by seeing the Church as ‘The People of God’, that is both clergy and laity whose role was given much greater emphasis than in the past. On this, as with many things, Newman can be seen to have been ahead of his time.
Nevertheless, it must be said that on this issue one can see why many would have had qualms. For example, today many Catholics (mistakenly) appeal to this notion in defense of their dissenting views against the magisterium. If the Church were to consult the faithful on matters of doctrine today, she may be given a rather odd, if not downright heretical, view. This, of course, is to look on one aspect of Newman’s ecclesiology to the neglect of others such as the authority of the Church. As already noted, Newman felt all needed to co-exist in a creative tension for the Church to function correctly. Also Newman’s conception of the ‘faithful’ was one which tried to reflect the earlier Church’s conception – that of all faithful, baptized Christians – before a stark division had been made between clergy and laity.
It is said to reflect that these suspicions on his orthodoxy had such an effect that Newman ceased to publish until spurred into action by Charles Kingsley’s attack on him which gave rise to Newman’s classic ‘Apologia pro vita sua’. With this work Newman endeared himself once again to English Catholics. When one considers Newman’s views on authority, however, it is difficult to understand how one could have doubted his orthodoxy. He was, to be sure, no ‘ultramontane’ such as Cardinal Manning, yet neither could he be seen as a liberal Catholic who despised tradition. This can be seen in his rejection of the principle of private judgment and his emphasis on the need for an authoritative protection of the “deposit of faith”. Thus he was a defender of infallibility and was particularly pleased with the decree when it eventually came out for it was fairly restrained. He championed the rights of conscience but this had a role in the practical sphere in which infallible judgements could not be pronounced. Conscience could not simply go against authority without due consideration and the need for an informed conscience.
As against theologians who would make martyrs of their being silenced (a la Hans Kung), he asserted that even when in a particular case the hierarchical Church may be wrong there is a need for the theologian to abide by the decision out of the “obedience of faith” even though he may hope that in time his opinion may be vindicated: one can see this sort of attitude in such theologians as Yves Congar and Henri de Lubac - their insights ultimately being taken up into the purview of the Church. That said, he did desire greater discussion amongst theologians that an opinion may either be vindicated or eventually condemned and looked to the Middle Ages as an ideal when the Church ‘let things go’ for a period of time until it finally made a decision. But submission to authority was not something which Newman wished to downplay, even when it may be unjust, for challenging it only does greater damage to the Church as a whole.
Newman’s ecclesiological views did not warrant the suspicions with which certain members of the Church looked upon them. He was ahead of his time and his influence can be seen in Vatican II documents. His being chosen as a Cardinal is also a vindication of his orthodoxy even in his own time.
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
New Wintersleep album
My first non-theology related post (although is there any aspect of existence in which theology has no role to play?). Anyway, one of my favourite bands Wintersleep have a new album due on the 2nd October.
Checking out the lyrics, the song "Dead Letter & The Infinite Yes" contains a line which would have made a great name for a theology blog..."Whispers of an Infinite Yes".
If anyone chances upon this post I would definitely recommend checking them out, especially if you're an afficionado of alternative rock (though I wouldn't like to pidgeon-hole them like that, they display other influences such as folk as well).
Checking out the lyrics, the song "Dead Letter & The Infinite Yes" contains a line which would have made a great name for a theology blog..."Whispers of an Infinite Yes".
If anyone chances upon this post I would definitely recommend checking them out, especially if you're an afficionado of alternative rock (though I wouldn't like to pidgeon-hole them like that, they display other influences such as folk as well).
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