By ‘Grammatical Thomists,’ Murphy means those Thomists who to some extent have adopted the ‘linguistic turn’ in modern philosophy, primarily through their engagement with Wittgenstein. Thus her primary interlocutors are Thomists such as Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner. What I find especially interesting about this work, is that one of Murphy’s main concerns is to re-present the ‘five ways’ of Thomas Aquinas as full-blooded proofs. Of course, nowadays, arguments for the existence of God are not particularly in vogue, mainly because of theology’s attempts to avoid any suspicion of ‘foundationalism’ and also because (post)modern theology has for the most part, bought into Heidegger’s narrative of Western philosophy as one giant exercise in onto-theology.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
Monday, June 23, 2008
God Is Not A Story - Grammatical Thomists (Part 1)
By ‘Grammatical Thomists,’ Murphy means those Thomists who to some extent have adopted the ‘linguistic turn’ in modern philosophy, primarily through their engagement with Wittgenstein. Thus her primary interlocutors are Thomists such as Herbert McCabe and Denys Turner. What I find especially interesting about this work, is that one of Murphy’s main concerns is to re-present the ‘five ways’ of Thomas Aquinas as full-blooded proofs. Of course, nowadays, arguments for the existence of God are not particularly in vogue, mainly because of theology’s attempts to avoid any suspicion of ‘foundationalism’ and also because (post)modern theology has for the most part, bought into Heidegger’s narrative of Western philosophy as one giant exercise in onto-theology.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
It may appear that her project here shares much in common with that of Denys Turner who in ‘Faith, Reason and the Existence of God’ presents a defence of Vatican I’s promulgation that the existence of God can be known with certainty by the natural power of reason. Murphy shares this belief, but she argues that Turner, by limiting himself to merely arguing for the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, rather than delving into any particular proof whatsoever, is himself guilty of a form of foundationalism. For, as Murphy notes, there is nothing intrinsically ’foundationalist’ about reasoning to God's existence. Rather, foundationalism comes into play when "one reasons upon reason" (33) As she says, not even Descartes though it necessary to first prove the rationality of proving the existence of God before he went on to offer a proof! (87) One recalls here John Paul II’s lamentation in Fides et Ratio that philosophy has been reduced to epistemology - it no longer seeks to know reality but instead limits itself to asking how one can know anything at all.
On this point, I think she is a little unfair on Turner. Yes, it would be preferable to simply get on with the business of proving God's existence, but in a climate which believes this undertaking to be an impossibility, such attempts are not going to be given a hearing in the first place. Turner recognises his goal is limited and may seem 'pedantic' to many, but I think a critique of those Kant-inspired arguments against the possibility of a proof and theological apprehensiveness about 'proofs' in relation to God's existence is a worthy cause in itself.
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
God Is Not A Story
Scottish theologian Francesca Aran Murphy's new book, God is Not a Story continues the revival in interest in the work of Etienne Gilson that her biography of the great Thomist began. Her biography Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson is an excellent introduction to the life and work of the French scholar. In it she details the relationship between Gilson and his contemporaries such as Maritain and the indomitable Garrigou-Lagrange, providing insight into the debates that shaped French Catholic thought in the 20th Century and their philosophical, theological and political ramifications.
Her latest work is a critique of narrative theology. The book reads almost like an amplification of a section of the introduction to ‘Art and Intellect’ where she explains that “For those believers who have made a ghetto peace with nonbelief, revealed faith is without philosophical foundations. They give up the claim that revelation tells them what reality is like and say, ‘This is reality for me, a believer.’”
Murphy wants to get back to reality and in doing so she launches a critique of narrative theology, which she feels merely skims the surface and never really engages with the world of things as they are, favouring a coherence theory of truth and the claim that we all inhabit certain stories. Narrative theology is also characterized by an overemphasis on method in theology - what is deemed important is the ‘language game’ which the theological project represents and not whether reality and scripture correlate. In her book, Murphy focuses her critique on two principle targets: ‘story Barthians’ and ‘grammatical Thomists’. It is her second target that most interests me. I'll hopefully be blogging a bit about this in the coming weeks.
Her latest work is a critique of narrative theology. The book reads almost like an amplification of a section of the introduction to ‘Art and Intellect’ where she explains that “For those believers who have made a ghetto peace with nonbelief, revealed faith is without philosophical foundations. They give up the claim that revelation tells them what reality is like and say, ‘This is reality for me, a believer.’”
Murphy wants to get back to reality and in doing so she launches a critique of narrative theology, which she feels merely skims the surface and never really engages with the world of things as they are, favouring a coherence theory of truth and the claim that we all inhabit certain stories. Narrative theology is also characterized by an overemphasis on method in theology - what is deemed important is the ‘language game’ which the theological project represents and not whether reality and scripture correlate. In her book, Murphy focuses her critique on two principle targets: ‘story Barthians’ and ‘grammatical Thomists’. It is her second target that most interests me. I'll hopefully be blogging a bit about this in the coming weeks.
Friday, June 6, 2008
Say what you will about John Milbank...
...you can't say he's not interesting.
First of all there's this letter in response to this article.
It stirred up some discussion on the theological blog scene.
Personally, I'm of a somewhat 'Red Tory' persuasion myself, in that I'm not in favour of capitalism but I'm 'conservative' on most cultural and social issues. I found it a little odd that some people seemed to take his letter as a sort of lurch to the 'right' as if Milbank hadn't previously espoused views that were 'conservative'. The scare quotes around his use of 'the family' also struck me as rather strange: what exactly do people, including it seems some Christians, have against 'the family'? It is clear that Milbank is no leftist turning 'neo-conservative' as Hitchens did; if he's a Tory, then it's a Tory of the old school like Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and he makes it clear he still retains his (Christian) socialist allegiance.
It's also important to read the letter in the context of the article he's responding to. Thus his reference to "principled elites" is probably a reaction to the article's hysterical aversion to the Church having any influence in society whatsoever (we should all be guided by Science, you see).
Anyway, following on from this, there's a new interview with Milbank in The Other Journal (I was alerted to it on Inhabitatio Dei). The interview tackles the 'new atheism' (Dawkins, Hitchens and their ilk) and touches on other subjects such as sex and politics. He once again references 'Red Toryism' and argues that Christians need to start taking their Christianity into the political realm in a more self-conscious and explicit manner. I found this quote particularly amusing (no doubt it'll serve as further 'proof' that Milbank is a 'fascist' - a ridiculous claim):
We need now to celebrate instead the faithful legacy of peasants, learned, honourable and paternalist aristocrats, Christian warrior kings like Alfred the Great, yeomen farmers and scholars. Péguy is the man for the hour. William Cobbett also. Chesterton and Belloc likewise.
On a serious note, I would love for someone to present a practical blueprint for how this sort of political vision would work. It's all very well issuing these clarion calls, but what does it actually amount to in the context of British politics? Phillip Blond seems to think David Cameron is perhaps taking some steps towards this, but I don't think it goes anywhere near far enough (and I'm sure he'd agree). So how exactly is Red Toryism or Traditionalist Socialism meant to impact the political scene? And in what sort of changes would it manifest itself? Perhaps Blond's upcoming book on Red Toryism may go some way towards making this clearer.
First of all there's this letter in response to this article.
It stirred up some discussion on the theological blog scene.
Personally, I'm of a somewhat 'Red Tory' persuasion myself, in that I'm not in favour of capitalism but I'm 'conservative' on most cultural and social issues. I found it a little odd that some people seemed to take his letter as a sort of lurch to the 'right' as if Milbank hadn't previously espoused views that were 'conservative'. The scare quotes around his use of 'the family' also struck me as rather strange: what exactly do people, including it seems some Christians, have against 'the family'? It is clear that Milbank is no leftist turning 'neo-conservative' as Hitchens did; if he's a Tory, then it's a Tory of the old school like Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and he makes it clear he still retains his (Christian) socialist allegiance.
It's also important to read the letter in the context of the article he's responding to. Thus his reference to "principled elites" is probably a reaction to the article's hysterical aversion to the Church having any influence in society whatsoever (we should all be guided by Science, you see).
Anyway, following on from this, there's a new interview with Milbank in The Other Journal (I was alerted to it on Inhabitatio Dei). The interview tackles the 'new atheism' (Dawkins, Hitchens and their ilk) and touches on other subjects such as sex and politics. He once again references 'Red Toryism' and argues that Christians need to start taking their Christianity into the political realm in a more self-conscious and explicit manner. I found this quote particularly amusing (no doubt it'll serve as further 'proof' that Milbank is a 'fascist' - a ridiculous claim):
We need now to celebrate instead the faithful legacy of peasants, learned, honourable and paternalist aristocrats, Christian warrior kings like Alfred the Great, yeomen farmers and scholars. Péguy is the man for the hour. William Cobbett also. Chesterton and Belloc likewise.
On a serious note, I would love for someone to present a practical blueprint for how this sort of political vision would work. It's all very well issuing these clarion calls, but what does it actually amount to in the context of British politics? Phillip Blond seems to think David Cameron is perhaps taking some steps towards this, but I don't think it goes anywhere near far enough (and I'm sure he'd agree). So how exactly is Red Toryism or Traditionalist Socialism meant to impact the political scene? And in what sort of changes would it manifest itself? Perhaps Blond's upcoming book on Red Toryism may go some way towards making this clearer.
Tuesday, April 15, 2008
Some thoughts on the Grandeur of Reason conference
The announcement of the Centre for Theology and Philosophy's upcoming conference on the 'Grandeur of Reason' has occasioned a fair amount of debate on some theology blogs.
First of all, the conference itself looks set to be spectacular with a line up of theologians and philosophers including the likes of John Milbank, David B. Hart, Fergus Kerr and Slavoij Zizek. The précis of the conference is said to have been taken from Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg Address wherein he calls for a renewal of the relationship between faith and reason, which avoids the extremes of a fideism wherein God's decrees are completely divorced from humanity's reasoning and a reason which seeks to insulate itself from God altogether.
As a Catholic, I cannot say I share the same concerns that appear to trouble some of the contributors to the debate. The idea that Radical Orthodoxy's position sits too comfortably with that of the current Papacy is not really something that displeases me. The trajectory that RO also seems to be taking towards a more 'universalised' reason (as Jamie Smith contends) is, again, something I would welcome.
It does, however, strike a strange chord in me to hear RO speaking in the sort of way that they do in the conference précis: "From this standpoint we hope to begin thinking through an authentic understanding of tolerance and ecumenism. Our task is thus to establish a path of honest intercultural communication in pursuit of universal truth, guided by the "grandeur" of reason, and unashamedly grounded in the cultural and historical tradition of Christianity."
One of my principle problems with Milbank (and to that extent with various other RO 'adherents') has been the relativistic position he has adopted regarding the claims of reason. Whilst I had no problem with the dismantling of the 'Enlightenment' pretension of a neutral reason operating devoid of all particularities, the notion that the claims of the Christian 'meta-narrative' could only be articulated rhetorically and its truths only adhered to through literary reasons of 'good taste', is simply not compatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. As I argued in my posts on Milbank's essay 'The End of Dialogue', his position does not allow for any real engagement with other traditions.
Of course, Milbank has always insisted that his position is not a fideistic one and indeed he criticises the likes of Barth on that score. The exact envisaging of the relationship between faith and reason has remained somewhat opaque. However, as Smith has noted, the 'later' Milbank is moving towards a position seemingly less extreme than that offered in Theology and Social Theory. I don't think he'd yet embrace the idea of 'natural reason' as Smith suggests or of 'natural law' but his comments on the subject have changed rather dramatically. In an article responding to various readings of TST he rejected Aidan Nicholls' criticisms of his treatment of 'common wisdom', 'natural law' and the like by dismissingly calling them all "yogic delights".
However, Smith sees in Milbank a 'universalizing' tendency which is almost rehabilitating a 'natural theology' tradition in a different guise. He sees this change most markedly in Being Reconciled. (Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, p.165)
I think Smith's qualms about this are a consequence of his Reformed background and the emphasis he wishes to place on the fallen nature of human reason. As D.B. Hart responded to Smith, despite not having placed enough emphasis on a common rationality in The Beauty of the Infinite, his project does not involve the sort of incommensurability thesis that Smith wants to hold on to. Perhaps a similar sort of thing is happening with Milbank who wants to emphasise that the continued giving of grace after the fall in effect 'nullifies' to an extent the idea that reason has fallen to such an extent that it simply cannot function in any 'universal' manner whatsoever. (Introducing, p. 165)
It might not be going too far to say that this conception of universality Milbank seems to be promoting isn't THAT far from the Rahner's anonymous Christianity! So instead of a 'secular reason' acting in a universal fashion because divorced from all religious particularities, there is a universal drive of human reason towards the grace showered upon all. I think this is possible because the differences between de Lubac and Rahner aren't as pronounced as commentators (including Milbank) would have one believe.
Eric Lee, for example, makes a similar point when he argues that it is the Universality of the Logos that allows for a certain commonality and possibility of genuine debate and engagement (as opposed, perhaps, to simply 'out-narrating' one's opponent). This, however, still leaves the question of to what extent the Logos must be explicitly referred to when talking in the public sphere. Would we constantly need to articulate the entire Christian meta-narrative when proclaiming our views? With this in mind I found a comment made by Milbank especially interesting.
In the book God's Advocates, where he features in one of the interviews, he describes just this dilemma: "let's think of the situation of the Church, especially the Roman Catholic Church today, when it tries to speak in the public realm about moral and political issues. The dilemma is: do you speak on the basis of a natural law that should be available to everybody, whether or not they're recognising God, in which case it's very doubtful whether you're talking about any kind of natural law that the Middle Ages could have recognised; or do you, on the other hand, say that our positions are grounded in our entire Catholic vision, and here the obvious risk is that people will ask why the should listen. But you might also say that that's the only possible alternative course because, in fact, what we say only makes sense in terms of our entire vision."
What he then goes on to say is interesting, not least because it is far removed from what the general perception of Milbank would have you think he'd say. (Again, I think this is partly due to Milbank's own rhetorical ploys). Speaking of the trajectory of de Lubac's theology he goes on to say that "that kind of perspective would say that, speaking in the Christian realm, we should latch onto things that aren't completely unchristian, or that to some extent remain residually Christian. People still talk about forgiveness, reconciliation and mercy, and the idea that each person matters as much as everyone else, in a way that pagans, on a whole, didn't. And therefore we don't need to speak within a completely natural law-based kind of discourse: we can get people to try to see more deeply the implications of what they already think. This includes getting them to recognise that their vision isn't completely cut off from something that in the end resembles a religious vision; but it also doesn't mean that one has to start by overwhelming them with one's entire Christian meta-narrative and ontology." The part in bold is particularly interesting as it is just such a thing many would associate Milbank with advocating!
In this paper, he also calls for a renewed Christian humanism, emphasising that traces of the divine can be found in cultures and religions other than Christianity, and that the doctrine of the incarnation serves as a validation of the "human as such". Thus Milbank seems to be moving away from the incommensurability thesis that seemed more apparent in TST. It is just such a move that I think distresses someone like Smith but in the same way that Hart stated that his theological project wasn't intended to suggest that there was no such thing as a common reason, I think Milbank perhaps also overemphasised this point and is now seeking to redress the balance somewhat.
Rhetorical posturing may have led to many thinking that RO almost advocated not listening to others (the 'twenty-four theses' are a prime example of this'). In practice this isn't really the case though. Take a look at Conor Cunningham's critique of evolution for example, barely any reference to theology at all – so clearly a constant harking back to theological positions is not necessary, and something like Neo-Darwinism can be critiqued on its own terms. With that in mind I wonder whether Milbank would modify his critique of Macintyre in TST? Interestingly, Smith also mentions in a footnote that the Milbank of Being Reconciled is far closer to the Macintyre he criticises in TST. (Introducing, p.181)
It was also especially intriguing to hear that Milbank had allegedly said that the problem with Islam is that it has no conception of the secular! Not sure if this could be verified but if so, then he's probably going a bit too far! That aspect of the conference (i.e. Islam) should also be fascinating although I wish I had more insight into what exactly the RO position regarding Islam (which again seems to be a bone of contention) is. The only clue I have is the articles by Adrian Pabst and Phillip Blond in the International Herald Tribune, but as regards Milbank his sparse comments on Islam have never struck me as overtly negative.
Hopefully, the conference will help elucidate these issues and provide greater insight into Milbank's views on the role of reason. I'm also particularly interested in what D.B. Hart might have to say and whether he'll build upon the reply he made to Smith's assessment of his work.
First of all, the conference itself looks set to be spectacular with a line up of theologians and philosophers including the likes of John Milbank, David B. Hart, Fergus Kerr and Slavoij Zizek. The précis of the conference is said to have been taken from Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg Address wherein he calls for a renewal of the relationship between faith and reason, which avoids the extremes of a fideism wherein God's decrees are completely divorced from humanity's reasoning and a reason which seeks to insulate itself from God altogether.
As a Catholic, I cannot say I share the same concerns that appear to trouble some of the contributors to the debate. The idea that Radical Orthodoxy's position sits too comfortably with that of the current Papacy is not really something that displeases me. The trajectory that RO also seems to be taking towards a more 'universalised' reason (as Jamie Smith contends) is, again, something I would welcome.
It does, however, strike a strange chord in me to hear RO speaking in the sort of way that they do in the conference précis: "From this standpoint we hope to begin thinking through an authentic understanding of tolerance and ecumenism. Our task is thus to establish a path of honest intercultural communication in pursuit of universal truth, guided by the "grandeur" of reason, and unashamedly grounded in the cultural and historical tradition of Christianity."
One of my principle problems with Milbank (and to that extent with various other RO 'adherents') has been the relativistic position he has adopted regarding the claims of reason. Whilst I had no problem with the dismantling of the 'Enlightenment' pretension of a neutral reason operating devoid of all particularities, the notion that the claims of the Christian 'meta-narrative' could only be articulated rhetorically and its truths only adhered to through literary reasons of 'good taste', is simply not compatible with Roman Catholic doctrine. As I argued in my posts on Milbank's essay 'The End of Dialogue', his position does not allow for any real engagement with other traditions.
Of course, Milbank has always insisted that his position is not a fideistic one and indeed he criticises the likes of Barth on that score. The exact envisaging of the relationship between faith and reason has remained somewhat opaque. However, as Smith has noted, the 'later' Milbank is moving towards a position seemingly less extreme than that offered in Theology and Social Theory. I don't think he'd yet embrace the idea of 'natural reason' as Smith suggests or of 'natural law' but his comments on the subject have changed rather dramatically. In an article responding to various readings of TST he rejected Aidan Nicholls' criticisms of his treatment of 'common wisdom', 'natural law' and the like by dismissingly calling them all "yogic delights".
However, Smith sees in Milbank a 'universalizing' tendency which is almost rehabilitating a 'natural theology' tradition in a different guise. He sees this change most markedly in Being Reconciled. (Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, p.165)
I think Smith's qualms about this are a consequence of his Reformed background and the emphasis he wishes to place on the fallen nature of human reason. As D.B. Hart responded to Smith, despite not having placed enough emphasis on a common rationality in The Beauty of the Infinite, his project does not involve the sort of incommensurability thesis that Smith wants to hold on to. Perhaps a similar sort of thing is happening with Milbank who wants to emphasise that the continued giving of grace after the fall in effect 'nullifies' to an extent the idea that reason has fallen to such an extent that it simply cannot function in any 'universal' manner whatsoever. (Introducing, p. 165)
It might not be going too far to say that this conception of universality Milbank seems to be promoting isn't THAT far from the Rahner's anonymous Christianity! So instead of a 'secular reason' acting in a universal fashion because divorced from all religious particularities, there is a universal drive of human reason towards the grace showered upon all. I think this is possible because the differences between de Lubac and Rahner aren't as pronounced as commentators (including Milbank) would have one believe.
Eric Lee, for example, makes a similar point when he argues that it is the Universality of the Logos that allows for a certain commonality and possibility of genuine debate and engagement (as opposed, perhaps, to simply 'out-narrating' one's opponent). This, however, still leaves the question of to what extent the Logos must be explicitly referred to when talking in the public sphere. Would we constantly need to articulate the entire Christian meta-narrative when proclaiming our views? With this in mind I found a comment made by Milbank especially interesting.
In the book God's Advocates, where he features in one of the interviews, he describes just this dilemma: "let's think of the situation of the Church, especially the Roman Catholic Church today, when it tries to speak in the public realm about moral and political issues. The dilemma is: do you speak on the basis of a natural law that should be available to everybody, whether or not they're recognising God, in which case it's very doubtful whether you're talking about any kind of natural law that the Middle Ages could have recognised; or do you, on the other hand, say that our positions are grounded in our entire Catholic vision, and here the obvious risk is that people will ask why the should listen. But you might also say that that's the only possible alternative course because, in fact, what we say only makes sense in terms of our entire vision."
What he then goes on to say is interesting, not least because it is far removed from what the general perception of Milbank would have you think he'd say. (Again, I think this is partly due to Milbank's own rhetorical ploys). Speaking of the trajectory of de Lubac's theology he goes on to say that "that kind of perspective would say that, speaking in the Christian realm, we should latch onto things that aren't completely unchristian, or that to some extent remain residually Christian. People still talk about forgiveness, reconciliation and mercy, and the idea that each person matters as much as everyone else, in a way that pagans, on a whole, didn't. And therefore we don't need to speak within a completely natural law-based kind of discourse: we can get people to try to see more deeply the implications of what they already think. This includes getting them to recognise that their vision isn't completely cut off from something that in the end resembles a religious vision; but it also doesn't mean that one has to start by overwhelming them with one's entire Christian meta-narrative and ontology." The part in bold is particularly interesting as it is just such a thing many would associate Milbank with advocating!
In this paper, he also calls for a renewed Christian humanism, emphasising that traces of the divine can be found in cultures and religions other than Christianity, and that the doctrine of the incarnation serves as a validation of the "human as such". Thus Milbank seems to be moving away from the incommensurability thesis that seemed more apparent in TST. It is just such a move that I think distresses someone like Smith but in the same way that Hart stated that his theological project wasn't intended to suggest that there was no such thing as a common reason, I think Milbank perhaps also overemphasised this point and is now seeking to redress the balance somewhat.
Rhetorical posturing may have led to many thinking that RO almost advocated not listening to others (the 'twenty-four theses' are a prime example of this'). In practice this isn't really the case though. Take a look at Conor Cunningham's critique of evolution for example, barely any reference to theology at all – so clearly a constant harking back to theological positions is not necessary, and something like Neo-Darwinism can be critiqued on its own terms. With that in mind I wonder whether Milbank would modify his critique of Macintyre in TST? Interestingly, Smith also mentions in a footnote that the Milbank of Being Reconciled is far closer to the Macintyre he criticises in TST. (Introducing, p.181)
It was also especially intriguing to hear that Milbank had allegedly said that the problem with Islam is that it has no conception of the secular! Not sure if this could be verified but if so, then he's probably going a bit too far! That aspect of the conference (i.e. Islam) should also be fascinating although I wish I had more insight into what exactly the RO position regarding Islam (which again seems to be a bone of contention) is. The only clue I have is the articles by Adrian Pabst and Phillip Blond in the International Herald Tribune, but as regards Milbank his sparse comments on Islam have never struck me as overtly negative.
Hopefully, the conference will help elucidate these issues and provide greater insight into Milbank's views on the role of reason. I'm also particularly interested in what D.B. Hart might have to say and whether he'll build upon the reply he made to Smith's assessment of his work.
Saturday, December 22, 2007
Dickens' "Carol Philosophy"
But I am sure I have always thought of Christmas
time, when it has come round -- apart from the
veneration due to its sacred name and origin, if anything
belonging to it can be apart from that -- as a
good time; a kind, forgiving, charitable, pleasant
time: the only time I know of, in the long calendar
of the year, when men and women seem by one consent
to open their shut-up hearts freely, and to think
of people below them as if they really were
fellow-passengers to the grave, and not another race
of creatures bound on other journeys. And therefore,
uncle, though it has never put a scrap of gold or
silver in my pocket, I believe that it has done me
good, and will do me good; and I say, God bless it!
This is what Dickens referred to as the "Carol Philosophy" and we would do well to adhere to it. Dickens was often written off as overly sentimental and A Christmas Carol may seem to some a perfect example of this. Even many Christians may be inclined to consider the 'Carol Philosophy' an overly 'bourgeois' conception, failing to address the deep horror of sin in the world and thus failing to recognise the immensity of its "sacred origin": a God descending into the midst of the world in order to be crucified for our sins. Perhaps Dickens' optimism clouds this from view, perhaps A Christmas Carol is simply a 'feel-good' story that warms our hearts without us having to stare too deeply into the misery of the world and realise the radical social changes necessary to bring about greater justice.
Yet such thoughts would be, in my view, mistaken. Of course, the vast scale of poverty on earth requires more than just almsgiving and charitable interventions at Christmas time. But if we focus only on grand-scale achievements it is all too easy to neglect the possibilities we have to exercise charity in the here and now, in our very own spheres of life.
A Christmas Carol is not a mere 'feel-good' narrative at all. It mirrors the Christian belief that for man to be redeemed, a supernatural intervention is necessary. No less than the visitation of the three spirits could redeem Scrooge. Without the spirits it would be inconceivable that Scrooge should undergo the massive change of heart which occurs at the end of the story. A man like Scrooge, who has cut himself off from fellowship with humankind and hardened his heart against joy needs a tremendous 'jolt'. And this is precisely what Christianity proclaims: metanoia, a complete turning of one's whole being, is possible only through grace.
To close oneself off from the source of all love and joy is to condemn oneself to the hellish misery of those spirits who find themselves condemned to walk abroad in death as they failed to do in life."It is required of every man," the ghost returned, "that the spirit within him should walk abroad among his fellow-men, and travel far and wide; and, if that spirit goes not forth in life, it is condemned to do so after death". The agony they endure as in the afterlife is a direct consequence of their failures to be charitable towards their fellow man in this life: "the misery with them all was, clearly, that they sought to interfere, for good, in human matters, and had lost the power for ever." This is a stark warning for us all not to waste our opportunities in the here and now to truly love our neighbour. This does not mean we need to embark on grandiose plans to 'save the world'. As Dickens puts it through the medium of Jacob Marley: "any Christian spirit working kindly in its little sphere, whatever it may be, will find its mortal life too short for its vast means of usefulness."
So we would all do well to heed the message that A Christmas Carol imparts. And, in whatever sphere of life we find ourselves in, to endeavour to be kind and charitable to our neighbours - our friends, family, workmates, all those we encounter in our daily lives - and know that even should we do this for the rest of our lives, it would still not exhaust our capacity for good. Let us then "honour Christmas in [our] hearts, and try to keep it all the year."
Merry Christmas.
time, when it has come round -- apart from the
veneration due to its sacred name and origin, if anything
belonging to it can be apart from that -- as a
good time; a kind, forgiving, charitable, pleasant
time: the only time I know of, in the long calendar
of the year, when men and women seem by one consent
to open their shut-up hearts freely, and to think
of people below them as if they really were
fellow-passengers to the grave, and not another race
of creatures bound on other journeys. And therefore,
uncle, though it has never put a scrap of gold or
silver in my pocket, I believe that it has done me
good, and will do me good; and I say, God bless it!
This is what Dickens referred to as the "Carol Philosophy" and we would do well to adhere to it. Dickens was often written off as overly sentimental and A Christmas Carol may seem to some a perfect example of this. Even many Christians may be inclined to consider the 'Carol Philosophy' an overly 'bourgeois' conception, failing to address the deep horror of sin in the world and thus failing to recognise the immensity of its "sacred origin": a God descending into the midst of the world in order to be crucified for our sins. Perhaps Dickens' optimism clouds this from view, perhaps A Christmas Carol is simply a 'feel-good' story that warms our hearts without us having to stare too deeply into the misery of the world and realise the radical social changes necessary to bring about greater justice.
Yet such thoughts would be, in my view, mistaken. Of course, the vast scale of poverty on earth requires more than just almsgiving and charitable interventions at Christmas time. But if we focus only on grand-scale achievements it is all too easy to neglect the possibilities we have to exercise charity in the here and now, in our very own spheres of life.
A Christmas Carol is not a mere 'feel-good' narrative at all. It mirrors the Christian belief that for man to be redeemed, a supernatural intervention is necessary. No less than the visitation of the three spirits could redeem Scrooge. Without the spirits it would be inconceivable that Scrooge should undergo the massive change of heart which occurs at the end of the story. A man like Scrooge, who has cut himself off from fellowship with humankind and hardened his heart against joy needs a tremendous 'jolt'. And this is precisely what Christianity proclaims: metanoia, a complete turning of one's whole being, is possible only through grace.
To close oneself off from the source of all love and joy is to condemn oneself to the hellish misery of those spirits who find themselves condemned to walk abroad in death as they failed to do in life."It is required of every man," the ghost returned, "that the spirit within him should walk abroad among his fellow-men, and travel far and wide; and, if that spirit goes not forth in life, it is condemned to do so after death". The agony they endure as in the afterlife is a direct consequence of their failures to be charitable towards their fellow man in this life: "the misery with them all was, clearly, that they sought to interfere, for good, in human matters, and had lost the power for ever." This is a stark warning for us all not to waste our opportunities in the here and now to truly love our neighbour. This does not mean we need to embark on grandiose plans to 'save the world'. As Dickens puts it through the medium of Jacob Marley: "any Christian spirit working kindly in its little sphere, whatever it may be, will find its mortal life too short for its vast means of usefulness."
So we would all do well to heed the message that A Christmas Carol imparts. And, in whatever sphere of life we find ourselves in, to endeavour to be kind and charitable to our neighbours - our friends, family, workmates, all those we encounter in our daily lives - and know that even should we do this for the rest of our lives, it would still not exhaust our capacity for good. Let us then "honour Christmas in [our] hearts, and try to keep it all the year."
Merry Christmas.
Tuesday, December 11, 2007
Aquinas' Mariology (2)
From the earlier post looking at Aquinas’ and the popular view of Mary, significant differences will already have been noticed. Indeed one can sense Aquinas’ impatience with the popular views prevailing during his time in certain of his words. One such example can be found in Aquinas’ discussion of whether Mary was cleansed completely from the ‘inflammation of sin’ (she was not says Aquinas, though its effects were rendered harmless), when he remarks: “We can, then, ascribe to the blessed Virgin perfect virtue and grace’s full intensity without having to claim for her every occasion of perfect virtue.”(S.T. 3a, 27, q.3) Aquinas keeps the scriptural accounts of Mary always in view, and all the grace given to her is always given to her in such a way that its use is always “consonant with her way of life.” (S.T. 3a, 27, q.5) Thus Aquinas is clearly not representative of the popular view which would attribute to Mary every possible “occasion of perfect virtue” such as describing her as full of Biblical knowledge and so forth, in fact regarding this point, Aquinas expressly states that she did not have the use of wisdom as regards teaching for this did not befit her female sex (!). (S.T. 3a, 27, q. 5) Aquinas' 'sexism' (in scare quotes because it's a bit of an anachronism) notwithstanding, the principle feature of his Mariology is that he does not wish to attribute anything to Mary which would not accord with her own admission that she is but a “lowly handmaid” of the Lord.
A reply given to a certain Friar Gerard when asked whether it was true that the Blessed Virgin repeated the words “a sword will pierce my heart” is characteristic of Aquinas’ attitude to what he saw as the excessive Marian devotion of his time: “In my opinion such frivolities ought not to be preached, seeing there are so many subjects for preaching that are absolutely true.” (quoted in H. Graef, 'Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion') Aquinas follows his teacher St. Albert the Great whose Mariology represented the authentic tradition and who maintained the close link between Mariology and Christology: “the cause of her veneration, of her glorification, is not her own person, but Christ.” (quoted in Graef) In this Aquinas differs greatly from the popular view which increasingly developed an emphasis on Mary as an individual with no attention paid to either her union with Christ or with the Church. On the other hand, whilst Aquinas’ Mariology clearly differed significantly from the popular view there are certain points of contact between them. His Mariology may have been far more restrained but he certainly had a strong devotion to her. He had no problem placing her above the angels and would surely have been happy to call her the ‘Queen of Angels’ and ‘Mother of Mercy’. She was ‘in some way’ Mediatrix of all graces and one could profitably pray to her to intercede on one’s behalf.
Having surveyed both Aquinas’ Mariology and the popular view, typical in his time and perhaps paralleling the excesses of Marian devotion that Protestants so fear, it is clear that Aquinas cannot be said to be a representative of the latter. He did not share the popular enthusiasm for the various myths and legends associated with the person of Mary and he was theologically far more reticent about Mary’s role in salvation, always wishing to maintain the union with Christ that gave Mary her significance. The popular view on the other hand concentrated more and more on Mary as an individual in her own right, to the extent that she appeared at times to take on a role of equivalent value to that of Jesus Christ. It might not be going to far to say that had Aquinas’ more sober approach been able to better infiltrate the popular mindset, the Reformers’ backlash against what they saw as the excessive and unbiblical attention given to Mary may not have been so great, and may not have caused them to abandon Mariology altogether as they eventually occurred in the Protestant tradition (Luther at least, had quite a 'high' Mariology). Aquinas’ entire attitude towards Mariology is encapsulated perfectly in his closing sentence from his lecture in Naples: “So therefore is the Virgin blessed, but far more blessed is the fruit of her womb.” (Exposition of the Angelic Salutation)
A reply given to a certain Friar Gerard when asked whether it was true that the Blessed Virgin repeated the words “a sword will pierce my heart” is characteristic of Aquinas’ attitude to what he saw as the excessive Marian devotion of his time: “In my opinion such frivolities ought not to be preached, seeing there are so many subjects for preaching that are absolutely true.” (quoted in H. Graef, 'Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devotion') Aquinas follows his teacher St. Albert the Great whose Mariology represented the authentic tradition and who maintained the close link between Mariology and Christology: “the cause of her veneration, of her glorification, is not her own person, but Christ.” (quoted in Graef) In this Aquinas differs greatly from the popular view which increasingly developed an emphasis on Mary as an individual with no attention paid to either her union with Christ or with the Church. On the other hand, whilst Aquinas’ Mariology clearly differed significantly from the popular view there are certain points of contact between them. His Mariology may have been far more restrained but he certainly had a strong devotion to her. He had no problem placing her above the angels and would surely have been happy to call her the ‘Queen of Angels’ and ‘Mother of Mercy’. She was ‘in some way’ Mediatrix of all graces and one could profitably pray to her to intercede on one’s behalf.
Having surveyed both Aquinas’ Mariology and the popular view, typical in his time and perhaps paralleling the excesses of Marian devotion that Protestants so fear, it is clear that Aquinas cannot be said to be a representative of the latter. He did not share the popular enthusiasm for the various myths and legends associated with the person of Mary and he was theologically far more reticent about Mary’s role in salvation, always wishing to maintain the union with Christ that gave Mary her significance. The popular view on the other hand concentrated more and more on Mary as an individual in her own right, to the extent that she appeared at times to take on a role of equivalent value to that of Jesus Christ. It might not be going to far to say that had Aquinas’ more sober approach been able to better infiltrate the popular mindset, the Reformers’ backlash against what they saw as the excessive and unbiblical attention given to Mary may not have been so great, and may not have caused them to abandon Mariology altogether as they eventually occurred in the Protestant tradition (Luther at least, had quite a 'high' Mariology). Aquinas’ entire attitude towards Mariology is encapsulated perfectly in his closing sentence from his lecture in Naples: “So therefore is the Virgin blessed, but far more blessed is the fruit of her womb.” (Exposition of the Angelic Salutation)
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
A Sober Mariology: Thomas' view of Mary (1)
Medieval man’s attitude towards Mary was one of great devotion, she was seen as the ‘Mother of Mercy’ and mediator between them and Christ. It was felt that they could unreservedly commend themselves to her as their advocate. This view of Mary as the Mother of Mercy arose in part due to the emphasis on Jesus as judge, who was often portrayed as stern and unyielding in regard to sinners. This notion grew to such an extent that Mary was apparently seen as, having power over the bestowal of divine Mercy itself, as is shown in the 13th century Mappa Mundi in Hereford Cathedral. In fact, Mary was held in such high esteem that she was considered second in dignity only to God himself. With the growth of the Marian cult it is not surprising that various myths should have grown up around her. The rather scant account of her one can find in the canonical gospels was supplemented by various other stories which were taken from such works as the Book of James.
One can find far fuller accounts of her life in works such as The Golden Legend by Jacobus de Voragine. These accounts present Mary’s life in such a way as to parallel certain gospel narratives. This can be seen in the account given of Mary’s parents Anne and Joachim. Joachim receives an ‘annunciation’ of his own with an Angel telling him that his wife shall bear a child and that “she will be consecrated to the Lord from infancy and filled with the Holy Spirit from her mother’s womb.” Popular belief in Mary’s Immaculate Conception was unequivocal. Some theologians such as Aquinas rejected it, as had others including St. Anselm and even St. Bernard of Clairvaux who was otherwise renowned for his Marian devotion. Thus a popular legend arose sometime after the death of Bernard of Clairvaux that after his death there appeared upon him a black mark and it was widely believed that he was in Purgatory for having, in this case, spoken ill of the Virgin Mary. There are also tales of Mary’s childhood which of course does not feature at all in the New Testament: at the age of three she was presented at the temple and was able to mount “to the top without help from anyone, as if she were already fully grown up” and thereafter remained at the temple and had daily divine visions and visitations from angels. Mary had every possible perfection attributed her, despite there being no scriptural warrant for the myths that grew around her. During her life too, Mary excelled in every way and was even considered a great teacher of wisdom, proficient in knowledge of the Bible.
As well as the various stories about her life, there were also myriad stories about miracles that had been worked by the Blessed Virgin which fit in with the popular view of her as the ultimate intercessor. One such tale is that of a thief who had a deep devotion to the Blessed Mary and was miraculously kept from execution by the Virgin, after having being caught red-handed. Upon being released he is said to have entered a monastery and lived out his life in service to her. It is not surprising that such a tale would evoke a great sense of trust in Mary as Intercessor, seeing as she goes to the aid even of criminals who show devotion to her. In these folktales and miracle stories, however, it can be seen that Mary “undeniably usurps the unique privileges of Christ.” (Maria Warner, Alone of All Her Sex). These tales about Mary infiltrated the popular imagination, in particular through the medium of art, the visual image being readily accessible to all people regardless of education. The Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, Italy features various frescos by Giotto which detail the story of Mary and her infancy as elaborated in The Golden Legend.
This sort of hyper-mariology is of course one which many protestants tend to attribute to Catholics. Of course, nowadays, Marian devotion has decreased a great deal, but it isn't difficult to find protestant polemics which focus on such excesses and it must be said that it is probable that some Catholics do in fact tend towards superstition when it comes to Mary.
In this sense then, it is fruitful to look at Thomas' Mariology as a paradigm for Catholic views on the Mother of God: one which is always christocentric.
Aquinas’ Mariology is planted firmly within the context of his Christology - there is no separate section devoted exclusively to Mary – and is to be found in the Tertia Pars of the Summa. This in itself is a significant factor which points the way to an understanding of his entire Mariological outlook. Aquinas’ treatment of the theological importance of Mary cannot be divorced from his Christology – Mary is never spoken of other than in terms of what relation such and such a doctrine about her has to Christ. His Mariology is also based firmly on the accounts of Mary given by the Evangelists, and the opinion of Church Fathers, he does not look to apocryphal accounts of Mary in order to supplement his work.
Perhaps the best known aspect of Aquinas’ Mariology is his rejection of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. It was a much debated issue during the thirteenth century as it was not yet a dogmatically defined article of faith for Catholic believers. It was of course dogmatically defined in 1854 by Pope Pius IX. Aquinas rejects the doctrine that Mary was sanctified from the very moment of her conception and was instead sanctified whilst still in the womb (S.T. 3a, 27, 1) Now, at first sight it may seem that it matters little whether she was sanctified from the moment of conception or whether this took place a short time after, and indeed the controversy of the time was sometimes characterised as a 'controversy about a few moments' (Karl Rahner). The issue at stake, however, was indeed one of importance. Aquinas’ difficulty lay in his inability to see how if Mary was indeed sanctified from the moment of conception, she could still be said to have been redeemed by Christ. If she had never been subject to original sin, she could not be said to have been liberated from it. This, Aquinas felt, would “derogate from the dignity of Christ” who is the universal Saviour. (S.T. 3a, 27, 3) Likewise in his discussion over whether Mary was completely cleansed from the ‘inflammation of sin’ he objects on the grounds that whilst this assertion may seem to be part of the dignity of Mary it is somewhat demeaning to Christ, for only he can be declared to be completely free from sin. (He does state, however, that whilst it was not wholly removed, it was rendered harmless.)(S.T. 3a, 27, 3)
Whilst Aquinas was unable to see how Mary, despite being immaculately conceived, could still be said to have been redeemed (It was the Franciscan John Duns Scotus who championed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, arguing that the Blessed Virgin Mary was indeed redeemed by Christ and in fact could be said to have been the person most radically redeemed of all for to prevent someone from falling is better than to pick them up once they have fallen), he nevertheless asserted without hesitation that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin whether mortal or venial. Aquinas also states that she received a greater fullness of grace than all others and also argues that Mary was Mediatrix of all graces insofar as “by giving birth to him she brought, in a certain way, grace to all.” (S.T. 3a, 27, 5) In this minimal sense, I don't think many could have serious problems with the notion of Mary as mediatrix of grace.
Aquinas’ Exposition of the Angelic Salutation (Ave Maria), a Lenten Sermon probably dating from 1273, also helps illuminate our understanding of his Mariology. Aquinas states that the Angel’s salutation reveals her to exceed even the angels in fullness of grace, purity and familiarity with God. Mary is also said to be above all other saints for “she performed the works of all virtues whereas the saints exhibit particular ones.” Aquinas’ discussion of Mary’s virginity also reflects his Christological concerns and one of his principle arguments for Mary’s virginity is that it is fitting that Christ should be born of a virgin. He holds that Mary was a virgin when she conceived Christ and also in partu (during the actual birth of Christ) and this is because it was appropriate that it should be so when one considers whose birth is in question, and because to lose her virginity would lessen the honour due to the Mother of God. Mary is also held to have remained a virgin throughout the rest of her life.
The whole discussion concerning Mary’s virginity shows clearly Aquinas’ concern to place Mary within a Christological context, that she was a virgin throughout her life has more to do with her being the Mother of God than with any considerations about her own person and any ‘honour’ due to her, although this too is taken into account. Aquinas states that it was fitting that Mary should have been espoused and that she truly was married against those who would claim otherwise. His final section on Mariology concerns the Annunciation to the Blessed Virgin, wherein he tells us that the Annunciation was made to inform Mary so that her free consent “which was petitioned during the course of the announcement” should stand “for the consent of all men.” (S.T, 3a, 30, 1) Mary is seen here as acting on behalf of the whole of mankind, not acting in her own right, so to speak. Aquinas can be seen to hold a ‘high’ view of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but it remains strictly within Biblical bounds and he makes sure always to subject her to Christ, who is the Universal Redeemer.
One can find far fuller accounts of her life in works such as The Golden Legend by Jacobus de Voragine. These accounts present Mary’s life in such a way as to parallel certain gospel narratives. This can be seen in the account given of Mary’s parents Anne and Joachim. Joachim receives an ‘annunciation’ of his own with an Angel telling him that his wife shall bear a child and that “she will be consecrated to the Lord from infancy and filled with the Holy Spirit from her mother’s womb.” Popular belief in Mary’s Immaculate Conception was unequivocal. Some theologians such as Aquinas rejected it, as had others including St. Anselm and even St. Bernard of Clairvaux who was otherwise renowned for his Marian devotion. Thus a popular legend arose sometime after the death of Bernard of Clairvaux that after his death there appeared upon him a black mark and it was widely believed that he was in Purgatory for having, in this case, spoken ill of the Virgin Mary. There are also tales of Mary’s childhood which of course does not feature at all in the New Testament: at the age of three she was presented at the temple and was able to mount “to the top without help from anyone, as if she were already fully grown up” and thereafter remained at the temple and had daily divine visions and visitations from angels. Mary had every possible perfection attributed her, despite there being no scriptural warrant for the myths that grew around her. During her life too, Mary excelled in every way and was even considered a great teacher of wisdom, proficient in knowledge of the Bible.
As well as the various stories about her life, there were also myriad stories about miracles that had been worked by the Blessed Virgin which fit in with the popular view of her as the ultimate intercessor. One such tale is that of a thief who had a deep devotion to the Blessed Mary and was miraculously kept from execution by the Virgin, after having being caught red-handed. Upon being released he is said to have entered a monastery and lived out his life in service to her. It is not surprising that such a tale would evoke a great sense of trust in Mary as Intercessor, seeing as she goes to the aid even of criminals who show devotion to her. In these folktales and miracle stories, however, it can be seen that Mary “undeniably usurps the unique privileges of Christ.” (Maria Warner, Alone of All Her Sex). These tales about Mary infiltrated the popular imagination, in particular through the medium of art, the visual image being readily accessible to all people regardless of education. The Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, Italy features various frescos by Giotto which detail the story of Mary and her infancy as elaborated in The Golden Legend.
This sort of hyper-mariology is of course one which many protestants tend to attribute to Catholics. Of course, nowadays, Marian devotion has decreased a great deal, but it isn't difficult to find protestant polemics which focus on such excesses and it must be said that it is probable that some Catholics do in fact tend towards superstition when it comes to Mary.
In this sense then, it is fruitful to look at Thomas' Mariology as a paradigm for Catholic views on the Mother of God: one which is always christocentric.
Aquinas’ Mariology is planted firmly within the context of his Christology - there is no separate section devoted exclusively to Mary – and is to be found in the Tertia Pars of the Summa. This in itself is a significant factor which points the way to an understanding of his entire Mariological outlook. Aquinas’ treatment of the theological importance of Mary cannot be divorced from his Christology – Mary is never spoken of other than in terms of what relation such and such a doctrine about her has to Christ. His Mariology is also based firmly on the accounts of Mary given by the Evangelists, and the opinion of Church Fathers, he does not look to apocryphal accounts of Mary in order to supplement his work.
Perhaps the best known aspect of Aquinas’ Mariology is his rejection of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. It was a much debated issue during the thirteenth century as it was not yet a dogmatically defined article of faith for Catholic believers. It was of course dogmatically defined in 1854 by Pope Pius IX. Aquinas rejects the doctrine that Mary was sanctified from the very moment of her conception and was instead sanctified whilst still in the womb (S.T. 3a, 27, 1) Now, at first sight it may seem that it matters little whether she was sanctified from the moment of conception or whether this took place a short time after, and indeed the controversy of the time was sometimes characterised as a 'controversy about a few moments' (Karl Rahner). The issue at stake, however, was indeed one of importance. Aquinas’ difficulty lay in his inability to see how if Mary was indeed sanctified from the moment of conception, she could still be said to have been redeemed by Christ. If she had never been subject to original sin, she could not be said to have been liberated from it. This, Aquinas felt, would “derogate from the dignity of Christ” who is the universal Saviour. (S.T. 3a, 27, 3) Likewise in his discussion over whether Mary was completely cleansed from the ‘inflammation of sin’ he objects on the grounds that whilst this assertion may seem to be part of the dignity of Mary it is somewhat demeaning to Christ, for only he can be declared to be completely free from sin. (He does state, however, that whilst it was not wholly removed, it was rendered harmless.)(S.T. 3a, 27, 3)
Whilst Aquinas was unable to see how Mary, despite being immaculately conceived, could still be said to have been redeemed (It was the Franciscan John Duns Scotus who championed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, arguing that the Blessed Virgin Mary was indeed redeemed by Christ and in fact could be said to have been the person most radically redeemed of all for to prevent someone from falling is better than to pick them up once they have fallen), he nevertheless asserted without hesitation that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin whether mortal or venial. Aquinas also states that she received a greater fullness of grace than all others and also argues that Mary was Mediatrix of all graces insofar as “by giving birth to him she brought, in a certain way, grace to all.” (S.T. 3a, 27, 5) In this minimal sense, I don't think many could have serious problems with the notion of Mary as mediatrix of grace.
Aquinas’ Exposition of the Angelic Salutation (Ave Maria), a Lenten Sermon probably dating from 1273, also helps illuminate our understanding of his Mariology. Aquinas states that the Angel’s salutation reveals her to exceed even the angels in fullness of grace, purity and familiarity with God. Mary is also said to be above all other saints for “she performed the works of all virtues whereas the saints exhibit particular ones.” Aquinas’ discussion of Mary’s virginity also reflects his Christological concerns and one of his principle arguments for Mary’s virginity is that it is fitting that Christ should be born of a virgin. He holds that Mary was a virgin when she conceived Christ and also in partu (during the actual birth of Christ) and this is because it was appropriate that it should be so when one considers whose birth is in question, and because to lose her virginity would lessen the honour due to the Mother of God. Mary is also held to have remained a virgin throughout the rest of her life.
The whole discussion concerning Mary’s virginity shows clearly Aquinas’ concern to place Mary within a Christological context, that she was a virgin throughout her life has more to do with her being the Mother of God than with any considerations about her own person and any ‘honour’ due to her, although this too is taken into account. Aquinas states that it was fitting that Mary should have been espoused and that she truly was married against those who would claim otherwise. His final section on Mariology concerns the Annunciation to the Blessed Virgin, wherein he tells us that the Annunciation was made to inform Mary so that her free consent “which was petitioned during the course of the announcement” should stand “for the consent of all men.” (S.T, 3a, 30, 1) Mary is seen here as acting on behalf of the whole of mankind, not acting in her own right, so to speak. Aquinas can be seen to hold a ‘high’ view of the Blessed Virgin Mary, but it remains strictly within Biblical bounds and he makes sure always to subject her to Christ, who is the Universal Redeemer.
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