Thursday, August 30, 2007
D.B. Hart on Reason
He responds to three evaluations of his work and it is his response to James K. A. Smith that I was most interested in. He contends that Smith has misread his intentions in The Beauty of the Infinite, and aligned him far too much with ‘Yale School’ tendencies which he had expressed dissatisfaction with but had perhaps not sufficiently distinguished his position from. Thus he flat out asserts that:
In my haste to dismiss the Enlightenment myth of a "pure reason," neutrally available to every reflective mind, undetermined by the particularities of language or culture, I seem not to have made it sufficiently clear that I was by no means calling into question the power of natural reason to discern many truths, to clarify its understanding of those truths, and to inform and receive nourishment from reasoned debate and reflection.
I have to say that this was music to my ears, coming as I do from a Roman Catholic perspective. I fully agree that there is no such thing as a “pure reason” but it seems to me that the rejection of this should not entail a rejection of the possibility of the human mind ‘naturally’ attaining truth. I think it’s all the more important for Catholics to remember that this is not a negotiable aspect of their faith.
Hart continues in the same vein when speaking of God‘s revelation:
He reveals himself in nature, in human reason, in human culture, in human religions: always now through a veil of sin and death, perhaps, but never unavailingly.
Hart, however, does not overstate the role of reason and his view of the analogia entis remains firmly within that established in 1215 by the Fourth Lateran Council wherein it was stated that:
For between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between them.
This was the view followed by Przywara and, following him, Balthasar.
Thus Hart remarks (perhaps rhetorically overstating the case in my view) that:
Still, all that said, I grant that we are talking about a very great difference of degree indeed—as great, perhaps, as the difference between the self-love of the suicide and the self-love of the saint (who loves himself wholly and only in God).
On a separate note, I must say that I was also very pleased when Hart, in the best tradition of 1 Cor 15:14, called himself an “unregenerate primitive” regarding the resurrection, unequivocally asserting that the resurrection only makes sense if it is understood as a literally historical event occurring after the crucifixion. I am of the same opinion and must confess myself completely befuddled as to what some theologians are really saying when it comes to the resurrection (Rahner in The Foundations of Christian Faith springs to mind). I often find myself exasperated at such equivocations and just want them to say outright whether they believe the resurrection really occurred in history.
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Newman on Conscience (3)
This is a serious issue because Newman saw that in his day and age (and the same can be said of ours) there was something else acting under the name of conscience, a “counterfeit” which was really only the claims of a Nietszchean will-to-power, the assertions of self-will. Newman rejects any secular liberal conception of conscience which has no reference to God. Strictly speaking, for Newman, conscience and authority could not really come into collision over matters of belief. So the precedence accorded to conscience does not entail a precedence in the matter of collision contra what modern-day dissenters would assert. Newman’s idea of conscience is not synonymous with so-called ‘liberty of conscience’ which has, as Newman says, “has become a license to take up any or no religion…the right of self-will.” Nevertheless Newman’s work on conscience can be seen to have had an effect on the Church’s teaching. If he really is the ‘father’ of Vatican II, then his influence can be seen in such documents as ‘Dignitatis Humanae’ which asserts the right of freedom to worship according to one’s conscience. Newman’s assertion that conscience is the surest way to knowledge of God’s presence (as opposed to a mere assent to certain doctrinal propositions) would appear to be a more credible articulation of how an individual comes to know God, as opposed to any strictly 'rationalist argumentation that may be employed. Most people simply do not come to believe in God in such a manner. Most people, however, can be said to acknowledge a moral law, and certainly if they do not consider this to be a matter of mere subjective preference then surely they must ask from where this Law is derived. Newman wanted faith to be an affair of the whole person, something that would truly change one’s life. Thus he attempted to link doctrine to the moral sense in order to make it something existentially significant to the individual. This must not be presented as Bremond does, as if Newman advocated bracketing one’s faith before investigating a doctrine to see if it was enriching of the moral life. This would be to abandon the “obedience of faith”. (S.A. Graves) Nevertheless, Newman did feel that conscience gave a sort of affirmation of the truth of doctrine in that it bore real “fruits”.
Friday, August 24, 2007
Newman on Conscience (part 2)
The promulgation of the doctrine of papal infallibility at the First Vatican Council (1870) and William Gladstone’s attack on it in 1874 gave increased impetus to the need to reconcile conscience with authority.
Newman's attempts to allay the sorts of fears which surrounded the promulgation of the doctrine are, I think, important from an ecumenical point of view, in particular as regards the 'High Anglican' tradition which Newman himself came from.
Newman on Conscience (part 1)
I haven't posted anything for a while as I was on holiday. Anyway, here is a post on Newman's attitude towards conscience and its 'freedom'.
The role conscience played in religious life for Newman can hardly be understated. In fact, Henri Bremond goes so far as to say that “for him…the whole religious edifice rests on the conscience.” Newman certainly spoke in very high terms about conscience, calling it “the aboriginal vicar of Christ”. It is an essential constituent of the religious life because it affords the individual an immediate certainty of God’s presence in the world – for Newman, to listen to the voice of conscience is to listen to the Living God Himself.
This ‘immediate presence’ is not to be understood as anything extraordinary or ‘mystical’ in the rigorous sense of the word – it is perfectly ‘ordinary’ and can be experienced by all human beings. It is therefore not surprising that Newman thought that the greatest proof of God’s existence is the ‘moral proof’, that is to say, conscience itself. As he himself states: “[The] Law as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called conscience.” In looking inwardly one finds one’s conscience – a knowledge of good and evil, and this leads to an understanding of sin; which is to disobey this moral law inscribed in our hearts. The Law is known to be an ultimate law and cannot be reduced to a mere socially constructed law. From disobedience of the Law come feelings of guilt and this leads to the question of from whence this Law comes. The feelings of guilt will also necessarily lead to a search for salvation and this prepares the individual for the acceptance of Christianity. One recalls here Kierkegaard’s statement to the effect that the only way to Christianity is through an agonized conscience. Newman would have agreed.He even goes so far as to say that, were it not for conscience, he would be an atheist, a pantheist or a polytheist for he sees no reflection of the Creator in this “busy little world.”
It is interesting to note the contrast between Newman's view and that of contemporary 'Intelligent design' proponents. Newman states flat out that "I believe in design because I believe in God; not in God because I see design". Perhaps all 'ID' theorists should bear in mind that "The Almighty is something infinitely different from a principle, or a centre of action, or a quality, or a generalisation of phenomena".
More to come tomorrow (hopefully). Once again, comments are always welcome.
I've taken lots of the quotes from a useful article in New Blackfriars, vol. 88, 'Newman on the Argument from Design' by Noel Keith Roberts)
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
The Venerable John Henry Cardinal Newman
John Henry Newman has been called the “father of Vatican II”, his work was introduced into
Thursday, August 9, 2007
John Milbank and the Theology of Religions (3)
To conclude this mini-series I offer some thoughts and criticisms on Milbank's approach.
A major criticism of Milbank’s approach in general is that, despite his rhetoric about the possibility of harmonious difference, his assertion of theology (i.e. Christianity) as a master-discourse leaves little room for any other voices to co-exist. Milbank tells us that Christian theology has no need for any “external supplementation” to tell its story, but if this is the case, how can it be anything else than a totalizing discourse which obliterates all other narratives which ultimately have nothing to tell it?
It is further claimed that Milbank’s construal of the other as the object of out-narration is unnecessary and that “the other may teach Christians to know and worship their own Trinitarian God more truthfully and richly.” (Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity)
A final criticism is that Milbank’s contention that the religions are incommensurable and that no dialogue can take places leads to a form of relativist fideism. Thus it can be seen that the principle objections to Milbank’s challenge are to do with the perceived ‘totalitarian’ character of his thesis which does not allow other narratives, including the religions, to adopt an even remotely positive position as regards the Christian meta-narrative.
Milbank’s challenge to theology of religions is clearly a provocative one. I believe, however, that he is right to assert the priority of mission and the task of conversion over any dialogical attempts to neuter the differences between the religions. In fact, I believe that here Milbank’s rhetoric can at times betray the possibility of conversation which Milbank himself acknowledges.
On the whole then, Milbank's position is a strong one and his critique of pluralist approaches to the theology of religions is to be commended. That said, I would argue that despite there being no 'neutral' vantage-point from which to survey the religions, a Macintyrean approach which fully acknowledges this yet still holds out the possibility of dialectically engaging other religious traditions is one which offers a more fruitful method with which to approach the issue.
Wednesday, August 8, 2007
John Milbank and the Theology of Religions (2)
Here is the continuation of the post from yesterday:
Milbank is again demonstrating his conviction that it is Christianity alone which can ultimately serve the cause of justice which pluralism conspicuously fails to do. His view of Christianity as the 'master discourse' is never more apparent. In answer to the criticisms of Western imperialism, Milbank answers that the notions of justice and the Good are themselves inextricably tied up with the West and that the East has no such concept of the Good available to it and so the Eastern religions cannot in fact provide the grounds for concrete ethical action. On the other hand, what Milbank calls the “Platonic-Jewish-Christian mode of social-intellectual imperialism” contains within itself directives to respect the “otherness of the other".
Finally Milbank tackles the theory of Raimundo Panikkar who attempts to posit an identity between the Trinitarian difference and neo-Vedantic difference. Milbank claims that, once again, such a project will only lead to the reinforcement of the ideology of liberal society’s pluralism. Milbank ends his essay with the claim that Christianity must continue the work of conversion and only in this context engage in conversation (not ‘dialogue’) between other religions which each represent readings of the nature of Being itself. This will not attempt to play down differences between religions but will respect the ‘otherness of the Other’ whilst at the same time continuing the work of conversion.