To conclude this mini-series I offer some thoughts and criticisms on Milbank's approach.
A major criticism of Milbank’s approach in general is that, despite his rhetoric about the possibility of harmonious difference, his assertion of theology (i.e. Christianity) as a master-discourse leaves little room for any other voices to co-exist. Milbank tells us that Christian theology has no need for any “external supplementation” to tell its story, but if this is the case, how can it be anything else than a totalizing discourse which obliterates all other narratives which ultimately have nothing to tell it?
Milbank, of course, firmly resists any notions that to regard Christianity as a master-discourse is to predispose one to act in a violent manner towards others. As we have seen he strongly emphasises the elements in Christianity which are completely opposed to such violence. However, it may well be questioned whether this is very convincing given the Church’s historical record.
His argument that the religions are absolutely incommensurable and that there exists no possibility of dialogue whatsoever can also be questioned. Is it really the case that the religions differ so vastly that no point of contact at all can be established from which some form of dialogue can ensue?
It is further claimed that Milbank’s construal of the other as the object of out-narration is unnecessary and that “the other may teach Christians to know and worship their own Trinitarian God more truthfully and richly.” (Gavin D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity)
A final criticism is that Milbank’s contention that the religions are incommensurable and that no dialogue can take places leads to a form of relativist fideism. Thus it can be seen that the principle objections to Milbank’s challenge are to do with the perceived ‘totalitarian’ character of his thesis which does not allow other narratives, including the religions, to adopt an even remotely positive position as regards the Christian meta-narrative.
Milbank’s challenge to theology of religions is clearly a provocative one. I believe, however, that he is right to assert the priority of mission and the task of conversion over any dialogical attempts to neuter the differences between the religions. In fact, I believe that here Milbank’s rhetoric can at times betray the possibility of conversation which Milbank himself acknowledges.
When Milbank proclaims the end of dialogue it is important that one realises that by this Milbank has in mind primarily the sort of ‘dialogue’ practiced by Pluralists that negates differences deemed to be merely external, in order to reach an underlying Truth shared by all the religions. Since this sort of dialogue is, ironically, profoundly disrespectful of the “otherness of the other” it is to be commended that Milbank denounces it so strongly. Nevertheless, Milbank’s blanket condemnation of ‘dialogue’ does not appear to me to be entirely necessary. Milbank himself states that each of the religions is a reading about Being or “what there is”. This in itself is a sort of ‘commonality’ which can open the way to ‘conversation’ (and Milbank states as much). Furthermore, Milbank does acknowledge the possibility of a joint stand on certain ethical issues (he cites usury) between the religions yet laments that this has not taken place. Milbank’s insistence that Christianity must simply “out-narrate” all other discourses does not mean that there can be nothing positive for the Christian to gain out of an encounter with other religions. In fact, he explicitly claims that in the process of encountering the other with the gospel, the Christian can expect to receive Christ time and again.
This, however, will take place in the context of the Christian’s explicit missionary mandate that must not be downplayed – the other can never simply be the object of dialogue for its own sake, the Christian must remember that the other too is called to enter the Church. It is precisely this sort of thinking that is often criticised by Pluralists, but it is hard to see how the Christian can theoretically adopt any other position without thereby ceasing to be a Christian. From a Christian perspective one also has to be prepared to accept that aspects of other religions may be detrimental to the human good. Thus Milbank’s argument that other religions do not contain the resources within themselves for concrete ethical action need not be all that alarming. If it is believed that Christianity is in fact the true story of God’s condescending love for humanity, and that the Church is the community in which this salvific love is actualised, it need not surprise one that from the perspective of the Church other traditions will be found wanting. As Milbank points out, the Church was firm in its insistence that extra ecclesiam nulla salus. (This need not be construed as meaning that the ultimate eschatological fate of non-Christians is perdition). G.K. Chesterton provides an example of this when he compares Christianity to Buddhism and argues that it is Christianity, not Buddhism, which offers an impetus towards moral action due to the utterly different ontological assumptions which characterise either religion. (G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy)
On the whole then, Milbank's position is a strong one and his critique of pluralist approaches to the theology of religions is to be commended. That said, I would argue that despite there being no 'neutral' vantage-point from which to survey the religions, a Macintyrean approach which fully acknowledges this yet still holds out the possibility of dialectically engaging other religious traditions is one which offers a more fruitful method with which to approach the issue.
5 comments:
Hey DJW,
I very much appreciate your wrestling with Milbank, and I think you hit on some very important features of his essay. He's certainly a divisive figure in contemporary theology.
There are areas of his entire corpus where I would be critical of Milbank as well, but overall I have a great deal of affinity for his project. In light of that affinity, and with utmost respect to you and your reading of his essay in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, I have to touch on a few points where I would disagree with your reading.
First, I think that your reading overstates his rhetoric of "the end of dialogue". I think it's important to read his essay within the context of the particular exchange that was taking place at the time. As you probably know from the original work: The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, there was a great deal of rhetoric being thrown around. In think in part, Milbank was implementing tactics in line with all this.
You do allude to this somewhat, but it seems that in the end, this point is cast aside. In other words, the kind of dialogue that Milbank claims is ended is the kind of dialogue promoted by the pluralists: dialogue for dialogue's sake, founded upon an opening to the 'nihil' beyond reason. So when Milbank claims that conversion must be the foundation, he is simply arguing that there must be an 'end' - not as a cessation, but as a goal - to all dialogues. His grammar and rhetoric can be edgy at times, so I admit that it does help if one is more familiar with his larger corpus of work.
Secondly, when Milbank speaks of theology as the only grand narrative, he does not intend 'grandnarrative' as a Kantian a priori category. This reversal would be to buy into the very structure he rejects. As he often says, quite often the mistake of many thinkers is to promote a reversal while leaving the metaphysical structure in place. So Milbank is quite aware of this dilemma. When he claims that theology is the only legitimate 'metanarrative' he is not making a statement of proclamation, but rather a statement of fact: as he contends in his Theology and Social Theory, because they are ultimately founded upon narrative structures, all sciences in the end bear a theological character. Moreover, his affinitiy for the work of William Desmond allows us to characterize his notion of the metanarrative structure of theology as an 'open-whole.' Again, this is a metaphor that serves to resist the notion of the Kantian categorical a priori, which creates the image of a closed structure. The Christian narrative is the only true grandnarrative because it alone can assimilate each and every narrative. It is within this context that we must understand Milbank's controversial claims.
Best,
Brendan
Hi,
I'm aware that the sort of argumentation going on in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness required a robust rebuttal, however, I think that there is more to the issue than a mere 'overstatement' on the part of Milbank. I think Milbank would be the first to argue that rhetoric and reason can't be conveniently cordoned off from each other. He frequently argues against the Enlightenment pretension that it alone represents an 'uninflected' reason and constantly invokes writers such as Hamann and Herder against what he views as the Kantian inheritance.
I think it's safe to say that Milbank's essay in the book is probably not going to be overly conducive to the instigation of a genuine conversation between different religious traditions. Now, is his talk of "out-narration" simply "mere rhetoric"? Or does it represent something far more substantial? Is "out-narration" in fact the only thing left to Christianity?
That said, I'm entirely in agreement with Milbank that the task of conversion ought to take precedence.
And in my defence, it is a common plaint against Milbank that his theological project so positions other narratives such that they all appear as only so many variations on nihilism. It is perhaps not Milbank's intention to do so, but his rhetoric (as I think you yourself acknowledge) tends in that direction.
I also wouldn't wish to be seen as simply criticising Milbank. My posts were a small attempt at understanding Milbank's work and of providing some summaries of his basic positions. Like you, I admire much of what he writes and have been influenced by his positions. Nevertheless, I do feel that his overall theological project doesn't really leave any room for "natural theology" and "natural law" which, although unfashionable in the current climate, are an integral part of the Catholic tradition. I would like nothing else than for Milbank's work to be more fully consonant with this tradition but I just can't see it. And this is something that many Catholic writers criticise in Milbank (i.e. Nicholas Lash, Denys Turner, L.P. Hemming etc)
"The Christian narrative is the only true grandnarrative because it alone can assimilate each and every narrative."
I would agree with that statement as it echoes the Patristic notion of Christianity as the fulfilment of the Logos but does it really apply to Milbank? What assimilation of nihilism can there be to Christianity? What shared basis can different traditions have if there is no 'natural' plain for them to share?
Again, going back to D.B. Hart's recent essay (written in response to some evaluations of his book), he distances himself from J.K.A Smith's reading of his work and claims that he has been read as being too much in line with the 'Yale School' sort of reasoning. Perhaps I'm guilty of just such a misreading as regards Milbank but Hart goes on to defend the notion of a shared human reason and natural knowledge as being essential to avoid such a misreading: would Milbank be prepared to do the same? I'm not so sure.
Once again, thanks for your comments, and if you could point me in the direction of something by Milbank that would allay my concerns I would be grateful. I'm not familiar with William Desmond's work unfortunately. Is he Catholic? and were would you locate him on the theological/philosophical spectrum? (I think he's done some work on Hegel but presumably he's not a fully-fledged Hegelian!)
Thanks,
David
David,
I appreciate very much that you took the time to respond to my thoughts, and with such erudition and clarity.
It could be that I give Milbank a too generous reading. I do think that he offers much to the contemporary Catholic, especially for the way he critiques liberalism in both forms (conservative and liberal) - two ideologies that continue to distort the beauty of the Catholic faith. I apologize if i gave the wrong impression of how you view Milbank; the scholarly reading you gave Milbank was enough to indicate to me that your take on him is probably just as well balanced. So my critical points were, I suppose, more out of defense for one who, as you point out, is getting criticized by many (though I wouldn't put Hemming in the same class as Lash, Turner and Hankey).
Anyway, I think the question regarding Christianity's assimilation of nihilism is the crucial point. And again, it could be that my reading of Milbank is too generous, but I would say that his whole project - and regardless of the amount of criticism, it is certainly a project that has won many devotees - is an attempt to demonstrate how Christianity can assimilate nihilism (cf. Hemming's essay in "Radical Orthodoxy", despite the fact that he has broken ranks so to speak).
Of course, all this assumes that there is something called 'nihilism' in a representable form. I think the fact of the matter is that 'nihilism' has become a scapegoat under which certain philosophical positions are attacked (and as you mention, this is certainly problematic). Depending on the particular voice, the RO approach to nihilism may come across as mere apologetics, but I think Milbank's affinity for aesthetics and his interest in theological beauty leave room for us to see a mode of redemption beyond apologetics in his project. Beauty seems to open people in a way unforeseen.
Moreover, Graham Ward's presentation at the recent AAR struck me as much more redemptive of the 'nihilism' involved in the particular panel discussion than being a defensive posture against it (that was Conor Cunningham's job apparently).
Anyway, I would add to this that it is precisely the central task of theology, especially Catholic theology in our day and age to become the agent of assimilation - but to be clear, the word 'assimilation' may not be the best word (and it may be the use of this word that is the issue). By assimilation, I have in mind a mode of redemption over against apologetics; assimilation (not accomodation) involves redirecting the principle desire of the thought in question.
I question the viability of apologetics in an age like ours where so many have erected defensive walls. It seems to me that more defense does little to break these down. Defensive dialectics, rational apologetics, seems rather to push people further and further behind their walls. So rhetoric and persuasion certain has its place.
Now, I would not go as far as DBHart does by proclaiming a 'rhetoric without reserve', where the sole task of theology is to persuade; as you mention, there is always reason - or dialectics - involved in all rhetoric, just as there is rhetoric involved in all dialectics (a point DBH certainly drums home well enough). But I would take a more middle position between dialectics and rhetorics where beauty serves as the mode of discourse, dialectics and rhetoric, generating a new kind of apologetics (hence, my affinity for theological aesthetics).
I suppose I see Milbank's project going in this direction. A few of his other works I would recommend are his essay in Between System and Poetics (which is a group of peer essays dedicated to the metaxological metaphysics of William Desmond, so you get two aspect of our exchange in one); he also has a small essay in Theology, God and Beauty (if I'm not mistaken about the title). Graham Ward has an essay in this one too. And there's his Ontology and Pardon, which I think highlights some of these issues.
I do share your desire to reinvigorate the natural law tradition, though I think that it must happen with a degree of novelty (and, surprise!, I think beauty holds the key here too). Your question as to what is shared if not a natural basis is a good one, opening to many directions - too many to consider here. But it may interest you to know that Desmond is a philosopher who has renewed a sense of natural law. As Desmond sees it, we can concede a shared human reason and 'natural knowledge' as you put it, without declaring these to be closed entities that would render its 'others' unnecessary to its very constitution. But really, is not a 'shared human reason and natural knowlede' declared in every act of discourse, even if such a declaration is not conceded at the level of willful cognition?
Desmond is indeed a Catholic - a traditional Irish Catholic. His philosophy is the newest mode of metaphysical dialectic, which goes beyond the kind of self-determination one finds in Hegel's. I would characterize Desmond's metaphysics as what analogical metaphysics, such as one finds in Aquinas, would look like in a post-Cartesian, Post-Kantian age. I would suggest:
Philosophy and Its Others;
Being and the Between;
Desire, Dialectic and Otherness;
Art and the Absolute;
Is There A Sabbath for Thought?;
Art, Origins, and Otherness;
In a way, I was somewhat disheartened when Milbank and Pickstock jumped on the (very small) Desmond bandwaggon, simply because I know that many will hold Desmond "guilty" by association. He is not one of the 'radical orthodox' crew, though I think they see something congenial in his work. But don't let that dissuade you, if such would be the case. He is well worth the effort.
Best regards,
Brendan
Hi David,
Thank you for this very well-written series of posts and blog! It is refreshing to see such eloquence and smart writing.
I have been reading Milbank for a couple of years now and am almost as interested in the 'Milbank' phenomenon (how he gets critiqued, usually) as what he is actually writing about. Aside from his prose, which I can get used to, the main critique I have heard resounding around the blog world is that 'Radical Orthodoxy' as espoused especially by Milbank, is "inherently violent" because it makes claims against other narratives as nihilistic.
Thus, above, you wrote:
Thus it can be seen that the principle objections to Milbank’s challenge are to do with the perceived ‘totalitarian’ character of his thesis which does not allow other narratives, including the religions, to adopt an even remotely positive position as regards the Christian meta-narrative.
And then quoting Brendan above, you also replied:
"The Christian narrative is the only true grandnarrative because it alone can assimilate each and every narrative."
I would agree with that statement as it echoes the Patristic notion of Christianity as the fulfilment of the Logos but does it really apply to Milbank? What assimilation of nihilism can there be to Christianity? What shared basis can different traditions have if there is no 'natural' plain for them to share?
I think what is shared in the 'natural' is not so much just a set of agreements, but the more de Lubacian/Thomistic point that the natural is never pure as such but is always supernaturally given as a gift with a supernatural end. Thus, I would offer the words of Joel Garver as another way to begin thinking about Milbank's (and to a lesser extent some of the others in RO) treatment of other's viewpoints whether it be 'religious dialogue/conversation' or just conversation with other narratives:
Even Milbank himself can prove to be both "for and against" Hegel and Marx (in Theology and Social Theory), can see the Enlightenment as in many respects a positive outgrowth of the gospel (in "The Gospel of Affinity"), and can say positive things about Luther (in "The Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann and Jacobi") and Calvin (in "Alternative Protestantism: Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition").
So, the question for me is whether RO's "violence" towards certain positions and figures is inherent to RO as a system of theological thought, or whether it says more about the personality and temperament of a curmudgeonly guy like Milbank. [source]
See, what I think is what really going on is somewhat left 'unsaid' by Milbank himself, and that is that Milbank's own "out-narration" is not just coming up with a better story to squash all other stories, but it necessarily involves conversation with them to find out just what is in them that could very well be somewhat congruent with Christianity. This takes various forms: as mentioned above by Garver, Milbank's "for and against Marx"; Milbank's ad hoc appropriation of postmodern logic here and there while ultimately taking a harsh stand on the fact that the entire modern/post-modern entireprise is itself, when taken in full, ultimately nihilistic; then there are the countless times that Milbank and Pickstock say something like this: "Such and such a thing in Christianity was anticipated by Plato in the [insert dialogue here]."; and there are surely many more examples.
I think where the disconnect comes is that Milbank's own rhetoric and what he's actually doing are often perceived as incongruent. For instance, Milbank will talk about out-narrating, and often be polemical with naming his papers "Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics" and the like.
We see in Conor Cunningham's Genealogy of Nihilism (in the RO book series) ending with a section on the "difference of theology." The main point of this is that difference is actually allowed in Christian theology because of Trinitarian love, and makes the concluding points that 1.) nihilistic logic is not too far away from creation ex nihilo, perhaps close enough that creation out of nothing as a part of proper theology also makes way for 2.) his concluding call to find the form in the chaos and love in the hatred.
The point I want to make with all the above is that for any call to find the form in the chaos and the love in the hatred, there must be actual interaction and conversation that is already presupposed. Milbank's rhetoric might sound like the refusal to "dialogue" just means that he doesn't want to talk to anybody or listen to what they have to say, but again, their pathological name dropping and referencing of figures shows that they interact with an enormous amount of disciplines and their narratives, whether self-avowedly 'religious' or not.
To clarify, David, I don't think that you're arguing that Milbank is just holding his hands over his ears because he does not want to 'dialogue'; I am just trying to hopefully dispel something I hear far too often at conferences and in blog land.
Now, what all the above says about the 'natural' -- I am not really sure. I am not Roman Catholic, but am very appreciative of the tradition and inspired by so many theologians and philosophers within it. I am actually stoked about the analogia entis (yes, that sounds really weird, I'm sure-- I'm from San Diego so I'll have to be forgiven for my slang!) and am very thankful for DB Hart's work on it in his Beauty of the Infinite and his use of analogy in general; on the flip-side, inspired by Stanley Hauerwas' thesis in his With the Grain of the Universe, I have heavy reservations with some natural theology that finds itself detached from any doctrine of God and thus makes crazy violent claims about all sorts of things.
My guess is that what my thoughts above say about the 'natural' is a bit disconnected from Milbank's words and what he actually does. I am very poorly read in any directly Thomistic work (save de Lubac's The Mystery of the Supernatural), so I have not read Milbank & Pickstock's Truth in Aquinas and do not really remember places where he/they argue against reasoning from the natural, so I will have to take your word on that for now. I do know that, at the very least, Milbank argues that the natural is supernaturally and teleologically gifted, and so this becomes the impetus for how he goes about interacting and drawing from everything under the sun, like Plato and Marx.
Thanks again for these interactions! I'm definitely adding you to my blogroll.
Peace,
Eric
Brendan and Eric,
Thanks for the comments and the helpful engagement.
Although I've been a little critical of Milbank in those posts, as I stated in some of my comments, I have a deep appreciation for his work and feel he's done theology a great service by giving it a 'kick up the backside', so to speak. Whether you love him or hate him, he can't be ignored and he's certainly forced people to articulate their positions far more carefully.
I find the accusations of 'violence' constantly bandied about whenever someone argues that somebody else is wrong as simply a concession to 'liberal' values which are intoxicated with notions of the celebration of difference and where an anaemic obsession with 'tolerance' has assumed exaggerated proportions.
As regards the notion of 'nature' - there is no doubt that Thomas never conceived of such a thing as 'pure nature', and all natural striving will ultimately open up to the supernatural - but this is not to say that no such thing as the natural exists. I realise Milbank probably isn't saying this but he tends in that direction and his overblown rhetoric doesn't help matters. Though, as you point out, his constant engagement with other figures belies this reading.
My main concern is basically the issue of whether or not the existence of God can be naturally known through the light of reason. And my concern has manifestly to do with 'apologetics'.
Now, as Brendan pointed out, perhaps an aesthetic approach is better suited to the task in this day and age. But again, I suppose that this presupposes a universal notion of 'beauty' accessible to all without the explicit aid of revelation. And even the more traditional proofs for God's existence can be cast in a new light, such as, for example, emphasising the aspects of awe and wonder at the sheer fact that anything exists at all (Thomas' third way). And I do feel there's an argument to be had with atheists and that, by and large, theologians have forsaken that task.
In this I've been influenced by Denys Turner (and behind him one can see the infuence of people like Herbert McCabe) and his conviction that to prove God exists is to drive reason to the end of its tether, where it begins to lose its grasp on the concept of 'exists' and proves the existence of an unknowable mystery. There is no 'onto-theological' grasping at God here. Reason is open to the sacramental shape of creation as he puts it and through its own resources ultimately opens up into the absolute mystery that is God (here I think Thomas and Blondel coincide).
In a way I don't really understand Milbank's reluctance to allow for this possibility and, as Turner argues, he oddly holds a Scotist position when it comes to the issue of valid inference between analogically related premises and the conclusion! Milbank rejects the possibility (as did Scotus) only Scotus went on to predicate terms univocally of God and creatures in order to prove the existence of God whereas Milbank simply rejects the possibility. Given Milbank's espousal of the analogia entis I can't help but feel he's missed something here.
And thanks Brendan, for the suggested reading on Desmond, I think I'll try and get a copy of 'Is there a Sabbath for thought?' for starters.
Regards,
David
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