Fergus Kerr once remarked that John Milbank's argument in his magisterial Theology and Social Theory could be described as 'simplicity itself' (New Blackfriars 73 (1992)). This will be seen as an extremely odd claim for anyone who's attempted to slog through the 400 plus pages of a book densely packed with references to just about every important and even somewhat marginal figures in the history of Western thought. The general contours of his argument are not, however, difficult to grasp and I offer a brief summary of his thesis below which, if anyone ever comes across it, may be of some use as a very short introduction to John Milbank's theology.
Milbank’s aim in Theology and Social Theory is nothing less than to show how all social theory is in fact ‘heresy’, for it is parasitic upon theology. There is no such thing as an autonomous realm of the secular; as Milbank has it: “once there was no secular”. Milbank decries the “false modesty” of theology which has abandoned its position as the “queen of the sciences” and entered an unholy alliance with social theory. He calls for a complete overturn of this situation: theology must no longer allow itself to be positioned by other discourses.
If secular reason is itself a contingent narrative competing amongst others and not the unfolding of a universal and foundational reason there is no need for theology to prove itself before the tribunal of secular reason. There is no such fundamental account of society and history available and so theology itself must provide its own account. The ‘post-modern condition’ creates the space for Christian theology to reassert itself as a master-discourse. Milbank explains that if Christianity is persuasive then this because of the intrinsic persuasive power of the Christian Logos itself “not the apologetic mediation of a universal human reason.” The virtue of Christianity is that, in contrast to the narratives of modernity and post-modernity, it alone affirms an ontological priority of peace as opposed to an ‘original violence’: “theology, alone remains the discourse of non-mastery”.
Modernity and post-modernity ultimately end up in nihilism. Modernity’s pretensions are exposed as a genealogy of violence by Nietzsche and post-modernity abandons any attempts to ground the human telos in any notion of the good, leaving only an anarchic reality which can only be controlled by subjecting it to the will-to-power. Milbank tells us that the any attempts at a separation of the term ‘good’ from the term ‘God’ invariably lead to the positing of the priority of ‘right’ over the ‘good’ and the abandonment of any objective telos for human beings at all.
I was initially extremely attracted to Milbank's robust assertion of the claims of Christianity as master-discourse and in many ways I still feel he is right about a lot of things. However, it is clear that from a Roman Catholic perspective, Milbank's position cannot be adopted in its totality. He allows no room for any natural law or 'natural' knowledge of God - a position which is simply untenable in Roman Catholic theology. Of course it is tempting to jettison such concepts, especially in today's theological climate, but doing so would go against the grain of the entire Catholic tradition including Vatican I. Milbank (and Pickstock's) attempts to gain Thomas Aquinas for their project are thus rather strange in this context. The fact is Thomas did allow for a 'natural' knowledge of God (i.e. one which has no recourse to revelation) and despite Milbank and Pickstock's tendentious exegesis in Truth in Aquinas, I do not believe it is possible to claim Aquinas for their position.
Denys Turner's book Faith, Reason and the Existence of God is a strong defence of Aquinas' (and Vatican I's) claim that the existence of God can be known through the light of natural reason and he also offers a strong critique of Milbank's claims that Aquinas never meant for his "5 ways" to be taken as demonstrative proofs of God's existence. I hope to write something about this in the future.
19 comments:
A very helpful post. Thank you for your summary of Milbank's position.
Best wishes,
Cynthia
p.s. I've added you to my blogroll.
Hi Cynthia,
Thanks for the comment, feels rather nice with it being the first and all.
And thanks for adding me to your blogroll.
Hopefully the small summary will be useful to some people.
Kind regards,
David
David, thanks for your comment and helpful remarks on Jeff's post over at TLOU.
I noticed the excellent range of topics in your posts and am excited to continue perusing.
btw: any summary of Milbank is extremely helpful. :)
we've added you to our formidable ninja theologian list. Because it's alphabetical, you're above Per Caritatem. Unfortunately, this same feature means we're usually featured at the bottom of Blogrolls.
Cheers!
Dan
Hi Dan,
I only just came across TLOU blog today when searching on technorati for blog posts on von Balthasar. Seems there is a penchant for the nouvelle theologie over there so it's definitely a site I'll be checking up on.
Dear David,
A quick question came to mind regarding Milbank and Pickstock. How are we to understand their strong advocacy for the analogy of being and their stress on the "metaphysics of participation" with their denial of natural theology?
Best wishes,
Cynthia
Hi Cynthia,
I’d have to say it seems somewhat contradictory. Obviously they would abhor the suggestion that they have a sort of ‘Barthian’ objection to natural theology, as this would play too much into the faith/reason dualisms that radical orthodoxy is meant to be putting paid to.
The only reason I can think of for their disavowal of natural theology is that they feel it somehow gives way to ‘secularism’, that any concession whatsoever to a universal basis for reasoned argument is to give way to ‘secular reason’. This is presumably why they feel the need to present Aquinas as an Augustinian and to present his ‘five ways’ as mere ‘probabilistic’ arguments rather than demonstrative proofs.
Now, I can’t help but feel that their fears are misplaced. Clearly, if they hold with the Thomist tradition that there is an analogy of being then I don’t think it’s reasonable for them to reject that there can be proper inference from creatures to the Creator. In a sense they don’t reject it, but then they want to argue that the ‘proofs’ only work because the Creator/creature analogy is the presupposition for these proofs. In that manner they ensure that no quarter is given to a ‘purely’ natural theology. But this occurs at the expense of rendering Aquinas an extremely poor logician. Aquinas never did set his arguments apart from the rest of his theology; but he clearly intended them to serve as philosophically independent arguments which yield the conclusion ‘that God exists’.
Thus Denys Turner’s criticisms of Milbank are very telling. Milbank constantly attacks Scotus for his doctrine of the univocity of being (something Scotus advocated because it allowed for true inference between creatures and God and so alone could provide demonstrative proof of God’s existence). That Milbank should insist that Aquinas cannot have meant the proofs as formally valid is ironically because Milbank is more of a Scotist than he would like to think! It’s also because he appears convinced that any endeavour of natural theology is to commit ‘onto-theological’ error.
I would argue that natural theology is a necessary undertaking and that, as Christians, we know it to be a possible one. Thus it is possible to argue to the existence of God without the aid of faith but it is through faith that we know this to be possible. It is a rather impoverished conception of ‘reason’ which would disallow the natural dynamism of the intellect its own proper exercise.
Looking back I realise I probably haven’t answered your question at all! Which is probably because I’m struggling through with the issues myself.
David
Hi David,
Thanks for your response. I am not sure how to make sense of this either, so we’re in the same boat! Interestingly, regarding Thomas and the five ways. In one of my classes at UD (taught by a very traditional Roman Catholic priest who specializes in Thomas and is not a big fan of RO), he also concludes that Thomas was not offering demonstrative proofs with his five ways. The Latin word that Thomas uses, which is often translated (un-helpfully) in English as “demonstrated” is probato, which means “to prove” (more in the realm of dialectic) and in the medieval thought world, this is much weaker than to demonstrate. That Thomas chooses probato is significant, as to demonstrate means to have episteme and very little can be called knowledge/ episteme for the medievals. To demonstrate is to show that something cannot not be otherwise; hence, any contingent fact fails to qualify as episteme because it doesn’t have to be true. According to this priest, the only “purely” philosophical argument for God’s existence given by Thomas comes in the De Ente. Given that this priest is very critical of RO and would be happy to offer arguments against their position, I wonder if RO isn’t on to something with regard to this particular claim?
Best wishes,
Cynthia
Hi again,
I've heard that argument before but then again, referring back to Turner, he remarks that Aquinas offers his "five ways" as argument strategies by which "Deus esse probari potest". He then goes on to say, "I know of no stronger mediaeveal Latin technical term in point of apodeiticity than probari" (On Denying the Right God: Aquinas on Atheism and Idolatry in Modern Theology)
I am, however, taking Turner's word for it as my knowledge of Latin is very limited.
As regards the Priest's argument that the only 'purely philosophical' argument is to be found in De Ente et Essentia , I wonder if he's speaking of the supposed argument from the real distinction between essence and existence to be found in finite beings. That would be interesting as I'm just reading Gilson's 'Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas' at the moment and he revokes his earlier view that this constitutes a proper 'proof' at all.
Kind regards,
David
Dear David,
Thanks for this helpful dialogue.
Re Gilson—I’m curious as to what Gilson says—in what way does Gilson see Thomas’ argument in De Ente as failing to be a proper proof for God’s existence? I’ve always understood Thomas’ argument in the De Ente as follows (in brief):
Thomas accepts Aristotle’s understanding of matter/form and act/potency for the level of essence, yet he criticizes Aristotle’s because it doesn’t solve the problem of existence. So he takes the best of Aristotle and combines this with the best of with Avicenna (while rejecting Avicenna’s idea that existence is an accident because this would cancel the other accidents). In other words, he takes Avicenna’s idea of accident and transforms it (accident) into the very act by which all essences are the potential. So in every being there is an essence/existence, potency/ act composition, unless there is a being whose essence is its existence. If there is such a being, there can only be one such being because such a being would be absolutely simple and unique. One the one hand, I see the priest’s point, viz., this argument does not seem to rely on special revelation in any way; whereas the Summae are openly theological works with tons of Scripture references, not to mention the interesting statements Thomas gives in the opening section of the ST. E.g., Thomas asserts that human beings are directed to God as an end surpassing reason which he supports with Scripture. I agree with Thomas, but how can he demonstrate this apart from assuming the truth of special revelation? However, even as solid as the argument in De Ente seems to be, it in no way proves the Christian God and of course Thomas would never claim that he could do that. So even if one accepted the De Ente, he/she is no closer to becoming a Christian, which in my opinion can only come about through grace. (I am not suggesting that Thomas would deny this latter statement). I am in many ways sympathetic to Barth’s notion that the theistic “proofs” are really only helpful to the Christian believer (or at least to certain Christian believers who can follow the arguments) and serve a kind of strengthening or clarifying purpose.
Best wishes,
Cynthia
Hi,
Gilson maintains that the argument in De Ente cannot be considered a 'proof' because the existence/essence distinction presupposes the existence of the pure 'act of being' - precisely what the proofs are meant to demonstrate. According to Gilson the real distinction only comes into view once we know that there exists that which is pure act-of-being itself. Thus the proofs from sensible experience are still necessary and only they can be considered proofs as such. He also points to the simple fact that Aquinas didn't include this 'proof' anywhere else when he is explicitly undertaking to prove the existence of God. I'd also like to note that whilst the Summa Theologiae is clearly a theological work which cannot be understood outside its explicitly Christian context, the proofs appear in the Summa Contra Gentiles where the 'apologetic' function they serve is perhaps more apparent.
Milbank actually points to what he thinks is Gilson's argument from the ontological distinction as proof that the argument is circular. Quite how he got this impression when Gilson clearly states that he no longer views it as a proof (and partly for the reason Milbank points out), is a mystery.
You say that the proofs do not prove the existence of the Christian God. I realise this is the problem many (especially coming from a Barthian perspective) have with Aquinas' arguments. However, I think it is of paramount importance not to underestimate the apophatic element in Aquinas' thought.
Firstly, Aquinas would not agree that the God of the proofs is different to the God fully revealed in Jesus Christ. However, what he is not doing, is proving the existence of a sort of generic deity which then has to have all the other, distinctly Christian elements artificially 'tacked on'. Aquinas is clear that we cannot know what God is. What the proofs demonstrate is the existence, not of something but of the act-of-being itself. It is the existence of a mystery that is demonstrated - a mystery which is the only thing that can account for the existence of beings rather than nothing at all. Reason takes us to the limit: to the knowledge that the existence of the finite beings before us is a result of the mystery which infinitely transcends them.
Kind regards,
David
Hi David,
Interesting, I’ll have to read up on Gilson’s claim, as I have not read the specific work of his that you referenced. Regarding the SCG, the same priest (let’s call him henceforth “CP”) mentioned previously argues that in book I, chapter 13, that Thomas is setting forth the arguments of others (philosophers and Catholic doctors—not his own). CP further adds that tradition calls this work, Summa Contra Gentiles, but this is not the title that Thomas gave it. Rather, he called it On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (De Veritate Fidei Catholicae). The common claim is that St. Thomas was to prepare a missionary manual for the missionaries to the Muslims. But the difficulty, says CP, is that there is nothing in the SCG that is directed specifically at Muslims.
Regarding the “five ways”, CP points out that at the end of each, Thomas adds, “This is what all men call God/gives the name of God etc.” The idea then is that Thomas is establishing the use of language—he is trying to say that when we use the word “God,” this is what we mean. In other words, when we talk about God, what we are talking about is the First Mover, the First Efficient Cause, the Necessary Being, the Most Perfect Being, and the Goal of all Things, etc.—so this then gives us the minimal agreement as to what we are talking about.
I agree with you that the apophatic element in Aquinas’ thought (as found e.g., in SCG I.14) should not be neglected and that he claims not to argue for what God is (which is unknowable as his “whatness” is “to be” which is not a some-thing), but I do not see how, e.g., Aquinas’ first way couldn’t be taken by an Aristotelian to argue for Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover (Aquinas seems to specifically attribute this argument to Aristotle in SCG I.13, and Aristotle clearly did not have the true and living God in mind, i.e., the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob)?
Again, thanks for this helpful conversation,
Cynthia
Hi,
As regards the name, I’ve also seen the whole name as: De Veritate Fidei Catholicae contra errores infidelium.
I think saying something like the God proved by philosophical argument cannot be the same God as that revealed in Scripture is simply completely alien to Aquinas’ thought and plays into the sort of dualism of faith and reason that he so studiously sought to avoid.
I think it’s more a question of the knowledge gained by natural reason being far more limited. As in turn the knowledge of God given in the old covenant is less than that revealed in Jesus Christ.
Limited, but not leading to a ‘different’ god.
Interestingly, Gilson again argues that in the argument from the ‘unmoved mover’ Aquinas does indeed attribute it to Aristotle and gets it from him. Nevertheless, he changes its sense quite radically. Whereas Aristotle was led to a first mover, who ‘moved’ by being a final cause – i.e. was simply the supremely desirable Being. Aquinas proves the existence of a first efficient cause of motion, i.e. the cause of all that exists as such. It is Aquinas’ emphasis on the priority of esse which gives a thoroughly different meaning to the proofs. What Aquinas ultimately demonstrates is the existence of the pure act-of being.
I see why the sort of terminology used seems alien to the Triune God revealed in scripture. But when you think about it, what are they really saying? First mover, efficient cause, necessary being, supreme being, final cause. They really all point to one thing – the supreme act-of-being itself, creator of all that exists, the sum of all perfections, the goal towards which all creation yearns. The God who cannot be known to us in His essence not because He is dark and shadowy but because the excess of light is blinding to our finite reason Put like this, perhaps it does not seem so objectionable.
Thank you too for this discussion, it’s been most helpful.
Kind regards,
David
Hi David,
After further reflection and discussing this with a friend, it is not clear to me how the existence/essence distinction presupposes a being that is pure “act of Being.” As Thomas argues in the De Ente, whatever concept that we may have, whether of a phoenix or a horse, such a concept tells us nothing as to whether the thing actually has esse. Both concepts are intelligible, but only the horse actually exists. Nonetheless, the concept alone doesn’t reveal this to us, it merely gets at the “whatness” of the thing. Here Thomas is able to offer something that transcends Aristotle, who did a great job explaining the “whatness” but failed to account for existence. Given that we can think of a phoenix and clearly understand its “whatness”, yet we know that it doesn’t exist, Thomas reasons that existence and essence must be distinct. Here Thomas follows Avicenna and agrees that existence comes from some other source, though he does not agree with Avicenna’s account of existence as a 10th accident. The essence cannot give itself existence because in order to do so, it would already have to exist, which of course it does not (consider the Phoenix). Thus, existence must come from some other source. One can repeat this same process until we reach some being that does not receive existence from anything. Such a being is the source of esse for all others because it has no existence/essence distinction. This first cannot have any essence that is distinct other wise it would stand in the same position of receiving esse from without and we would have an infinite regress. Given this, how does the esse/essence distinction presuppose a being which is pure act of being or esse? Also, I wonder if Gilson’s work on St. Thomas where you found that claim is an early work, as he does not seem to continue this line of thinking in his later works.
It is true that Aquinas argues for a first efficient cause, something not found in Aristotle, but this is not what Aquinas argues for in the first way—but perhaps you are suggesting that one must combine the ways or take all five ways together. Still, couldn’t a Muslim philosopher use these same arguments to argue for his/her god?
Best,
Cynthia
Hi,
Gilson’s argument is taken from the English translation of the fifth edition of Gilson’s Le Thomisme. As far as I’m aware, Gilson did not change his opinion on this issue.
Gilson believes that the essence/existence distinction cannot be demonstrated or grounded in sense experience. He argues that the De Ente reasoning about the real distinction can be taken in two different ways – it can either refer to the sheer ‘fact’ of existing, or to the Thomistic understanding of esse. So the argument (i.e. I can know what the concept of a phoenix is without knowing whether it exists in reality, therefore existence and essence are distinct) concludes either to the fact of existing being distinct or the act of existing being different. So for Gilson, it doesn’t demonstrate the Thomistic understanding of the distinction it presupposes it. Gilson argues this in The Elements of Christian Philosophy and then goes on to ask from whence the distinction arose. This ties in to his idea of the ‘metaphysics of Exodus’ and his insistence that contra the critics of the day, the notion of a Christian philosophy did make sense; that revelation has furnished philosophy with critical insights which might otherwise have been overlooked.
This is Gilson’s view and I’m not even entirely convinced that the De Ente text is as ‘theologised’ as he supposes. And Gilson himself, in The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, argues that esse is grasped through the natural act of judgement. So in that respect, his position seems a tad contradictory.
I am well aware that ‘the argument by efficient cause’ is the second and that the ‘argument from motion’ is the first of the five ways. My point was that Aquinas doesn’t just take Aristotle’s argument without changing it profoundly. Aristotle argues for a First mover which moves in so far as it is the object of desire – the aloof God of Aristotle does not sit well with the Christian notion of God. Aquinas argues for a first efficient cause of motion. Aquinas’ First Mover, does not therefore stand completely separate from the beings it moves, it actively causes their motion.
As for a Muslim being able to prove the existence of God from similar arguments, I would say yes, but I’m not entirely sure where the problem lies in this. Natural reason can only take us a certain distance.
Regards,
David
Hi David,
After further reflection, I think you are right about Gilson's take on what Thomas is doing in the De ente : ). As I understand the Thomistic terrain, Wippel would disagree; however, Gilson, as you point out, claims that Thomas does not in fact offer an argument in the De ente because Thomas assumes God as ipsum esse from the start on the basis of divine revelation. The real distinction is then a logical entailment of understanding God as ipsum esse, but according to Gilson that understanding of God can only be had via divine revelation.
Thanks again for the conversation!
Cynthia
Hi Cynthia,
sorry to take so long to reply - I have been away from my keyboard (thankfully!). It was a great discussion and I was just wondering what Wippel's position was, or where I should look to find it as I'm not really familiar with his work.
Thanks again,
David
And regarding this whole issue there appears to be a very interesting conference coming up:
http://www.dhs.edu/academics/analogiaentis.aspx
(got the link from the Faith and Theology blogspot). Certainly looks like an extremely exciting event and one well worth making the effort to go to (if one is in the United States at least). Great news about Przywara's book being translated too.
David.
DTW,
I respond knowing full well that you may never revisit this post, which means you may not see my comment. Anyway, I again want to commend your desire to engage Milbank, especially this tour de force, Theology and Social Theory.
As a fellow Roman Catholic, I don't necessarily see the same points of contention that you raise. If anything, my greatest criticism against Milbank is really against his whole project, Radical Orthodoxy. How can one promote a kind of theology without an ecclesiology? I think it is possible for him to work this out eventually, but I think that this is his greatest problem at the moment.
As to the points you raise from Theology and Social Theory, I again, and respectfully, contend that you overstate his views of the 'natural'. Take for example the way you frame his rejection of the secular. He does in fact say "once there was no secular, and the secular was not latent, waiting to be released once the pressure from the sacred was deflated..." (or something like that). But this is not an all out rejection of the secular per se. He does acknowldge that the authentic notion of the saeculum was originally conceived as a 'time.'
What Milbank is rejecting is the shift from time to space in which the divine relation to the world is configured. Again, his affinity for De Lubac sheds some light here. Like De Lubac, Milbank does not reject the integrity of 'nature'. What he rejects is the absolutizing of this to the point of radical separation. Even Aquinas does not construct a notion of nature that is separated entirely from the divine grace; instead it was Cajetan that introduced the notion of natura pura into Thomistic discourse. But Thomas himself holds no such doctrine. This is more an Aristotelianizing of Thomas (strange to say, I admit). But it was Gilson who said often: Aristotelian nature is not Thomistic nature. My contention, and what I hope in part to verify in my dissertation, is that because the influence of medieval aesthetics (the anachronism of 'aeshetics' notwithstanding) had been largely displaced as an influence in Aquinas, his metaphysics suffered from begin over-rationalized, and over Aristotelianized.
So, I don't think it is completely accurate to suggest that Milbank rejects the vaibility of the natural law, or of natural knowledge of God. What he rejects are certain univocal configurations of these (Scotist, Ockhamist, Lutheran e.g.).
Best,
Brendan
Hi Brendan,
thanks very much for your clarifying comments. If it is the case that Milbank in fact holds out the possibility of a natural knowledge of God then so much the better. But most of what I've read militates against such a position. I recall a review of TST by Aidan Nicholls where he chided Milbank for rejecting completely eliding the notion of 'nature' in his work - something he admits de Lubac and von Balthasar often seemed to come close to but never quite did. In his response to this criticism Milbank made some rather condescending comment about the futility of any notions of 'common wisdom' and such other "yogic delights" as he put it. His position in Truth in Aquinas also rejects the notion of a natural knowledge of God (as far as I can tell) and his comments about theology completely 'evacuating' mmetaphysics and leaving it nothing to do also tend in that direction.
I would like to be wrong and would welcome a clearer statement by Milbank regarding his position. For example, David Bentley Hart, in the latest issue of New Blackfriars did just that and rejected Jamie Smith's construal of his project as involving a rejection of a shared human rationality.
As regards the issue of ecclesiology, I wholly concur and it is something he needs to address in far more depth.
Regards,
David
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